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1Whenever a debtor files bankruptcy on a date other than the first or last day of the 
tax year, the debtor will potentially owe some taxes on income earned before bankruptcy 
and some taxes on income earned after bankruptcy.  For example, suppose that a debtor 
files a bankruptcy petition on November 1, 2005, and owes $12,000 in taxes for the entire 
2005 calendar year.  Suppose also that the income upon which the taxes were imposed 
was earned evenly during the year.  Eleven months of the tax liability was incurred on 
prepetition income, and one month of the tax liability was incurred on post-petition 
income.  How will the government’s claims for the unpaid tax liability be treated in 
bankruptcy?   
The answer to this question was surprisingly complex and confusing prior to the 
new Bankruptcy Abuse, Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 20052 (the “2005 
Act”),3 with courts reaching different results depending on whether the debtor was an 
individual or a corporation, and whether the debtor filed for a liquidation under Chapter 7 
of the Bankruptcy Code, or sought to reorganize under Chapters 11-13 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.   
The 2005 Act made what appeared to be a minor change in the language of 
section 507(a)(8)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code - the words “for a taxable year ending on or 
before the date of the filing of the petition” were moved from subsection 507(a)(8)(A)(i) 
to the flush language in subsection 507(a)(8)(A).  The Senate Committee Report makes 
no mention of the reason for moving the language.4 Indeed, the change appears to have 
gone un-noticed by bankruptcy law experts discussing the new statute.5 Yet, the change 
will impact virtually every debtor who files a bankruptcy petition, and may dramatically 
impair the government’s ability to collect the taxes on prepetition income earned in the 
year of bankruptcy.  In the example stated above, a strong argument can be made that the 
change in the statute should allow a debtor to convert what would have been an $11,000 
claim that would be entitled to priority over most other general unsecured claims and 
would be excepted from discharge, into an $11,000 general unsecured claim that could be 
discharged without full payment.6
This article looks at the treatment of the government’s claims for taxes incurred in 
the year of bankruptcy by analyzing the complex state of the law before the change made 
by the 2005 Act, and then considering how those rulings may impact the law after the 
2005 Act goes into effect for cases filed on or after October 17, 2005.7
2 S. 256, PUB. L. NO. 109-8, 199 Stat. 23 (2005). 
3 See discussion infra beginning at page 19. 
4 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 Report by Committee on the 
Judiciary S. 256, H.R. 109-31 pt. 1 (April 8, 2005), reprinted on Lexis at 2005 Committee Reports, April 8, 
2005. 
5 See, e.g. Alan N. Resnick and Henry J. Sommer, The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005:  A Section-by-Section Analysis, Collier Portable Pamphlet, 2005 Supplement, p. 
lviii to lxiii (Lexis 2005) (discussing bankruptcy tax provisions without mentioning import of statutory 
change). 
6 See discussion infra starting at note 277. 
7 See 2005 Act, § 1501 (although some provisions of the 2005 Act go into effect immediately, most of the 
Act is effective 180 days after enactment.  The law was enacted on April 20, 2005, and thus goes into effect 
on October 17, 2005.) 
2I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIORITY AND DISCHARGEABILITY.
One of the fundamental purposes of bankruptcy is to provide an individual debtor 
with a fresh start.  Bankruptcy provides a “fresh start” by creating a clear separation 
between the debtor’s prepetition assets and liabilities and the debtor’s post-petition assets 
and liabilities.  Upon filing bankruptcy, a new entity known as the bankruptcy estate is 
created.8 The bankruptcy estate becomes the owner of most of the debtor’s assets as of 
the date of bankruptcy,9 and in turn the bankruptcy estate becomes liable for the debtor’s 
debts existing as of the date of bankruptcy.10 In a Chapter 7 case, this new bankruptcy 
estate is administered by an independent trustee,11 whose job it is to sell off the debtor’s 
assets and to distribute the proceeds to creditors in accordance with the rules of priority.12 
In the usual Chapter 7 case, an individual debtor’s personal liability for most13 prepetition 
claims is discharged.14 The debtor thus receives a “fresh start” by being allowed to earn 
money after the filing of the bankruptcy petition without subjecting those earnings to the 
claims of most prepetition creditors.   
Certain claims against the bankruptcy estate are entitled to “priority”15 under the 
Bankruptcy Code.  Priority claims must be paid in full from the proceeds generated from 
the sale of the bankruptcy estate’s property before lower priority and non-priority claims 
receive any distribution.16 Priority only directly impacts the rights of creditors vis à vis 
each other to receive distributions from the bankruptcy estate. 
The Bankruptcy Code contains two separate priority provisions for income tax 
claims.  First, the bankruptcy estate’s post-petition income tax liabilities are entitled to a 
first priority (or, under the 2005 Act, a second priority17) as administrative expenses.18 
As a general matter, administrative expense priority is given to creditors who render 
value to the estate after the bankruptcy petition is filed.19 However, the Bankruptcy Code 
 
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 541. 
9 Id. 
10 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5) (definition of “claim”), 502(b) (allowance of claims against the estate). 
11 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-704. 
12 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(1) (“trustee shall . . . collect and reduce to money the property of the estate”), 726 
(distribution of property of the estate to pay claims). 
13 Some prepetition claims are not discharged.  See discussion infra beginning at note 40. 
14 11 U.S.C. §§ 727 (general rule for court to grant discharge), 524(a)(2) (discharge operates as an 
injunction against any act to collect a discharged debt). 
15 See 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
16 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (“property of the estate shall be distributed – (1) first, in payment of claims of the 
kind specified in, and in the order specified in, section 507 of this title.”) 
17 Prior to the 2005 Act, administrative claims were entitled to a first priority.  See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) 
(repealed 2005).  However, the 2005 Act moved administrative clams to second priority behind spousal and 
child support obligations.  See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1), (a)(2) (2005).   
18 11 U.S.C. §§ 503 (defining “administrative claims), 5077(a)(1) (repealed 2005) (administrative claims 
subject to first priority), 507(a)(2) (2005) (administrative claims subject to second priority).   
19 Under the original Bankruptcy Code, a creditor received an administrative claim for rendering value to 
the estate.  See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) (repealed 2005); Charles Jordan Tabb, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY, §
7.9, p. 504 (Foundation Press, 1997) (“Administrative expenses should be allowed to the extent that they 
will benefit the general creditors and the estate. . . .  The fundamental prerequisites for most administrative 
expenses therefore are (1) that the claim be incurred post-petition in a transaction with the estate, and (2) 
that the claim benefit the estate”). 
3grants administrative expense priority to any tax claim incurred by the estate,20 regardless 
of whether the estate received a benefit,21 as long as the claim is not subject to eighth 
priority.22 
Second, under very complex rules that incorporate applicable non-bankruptcy law 
and other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, certain prepetition claims for income taxes 
are entitled to an eighth priority.23 Tax claims entitled to eighth priority are excluded 
from being treated as first priority administrative expenses.24 It is therefore necessary to 
first determine whether the tax claims in issue are entitled to eighth priority, and if not to 
then to determine whether the tax claims are entitled to first priority.   
The priority rules are complicated by the cleavage between an individual debtor 
and the bankruptcy estate.  When an individual debtor files under Chapter 7,25 two 
separate taxpayers are created – the post-petition debtor and the bankruptcy estate.26 
Because of the fresh start, the post-petition debtor’s earnings are freed from the claims of 
most prepetition creditors by the discharge.27 The debtor, not the estate, is solely 
responsible for taxes on the debtor’s post-petition earnings.28 Similarly, the estate may 
have post-petition earnings on the property of the estate, and those taxes are borne solely 
by the estate.29 The individual debtor is not personally liable for taxes on the estate’s 
earnings.30 
20 The statute says that post-petition taxes entitled to eighth priority under section 507(a)(8) are not entitled 
to first priority as administrative expenses.  11 U.S.C. § 503(b).  As is discussed below, a superficial 
reading of section 507(a)(8) would appear to cover all post-petition taxes.  See discussion infra beginning at 
at note 135.  However, the courts have correctly held that section 507(a)(8) only applies to prepetition tax 
claims and not to post-petition tax claims.  See infra at note 136.  So why the reference to section 507(a)(8) 
in section 503(b)?  How could a prepetition tax claim constitute an obligation of the estate, when the estate 
did not even exist prepetition to incur the tax debts?  The answer to the riddle is that the government’s 
claim for the prepetition portion of taxes in the year of bankruptcy technically arises at the end of the tax 
year.  See discussion infra at notes 155 and 210.  Prior to the 2005 Act, section 502(i) of the Bankruptcy 
Code was intended to treat the prepetition portion of taxes for the year of bankruptcy as if it were a 
prepetition claim even if it were deemed to arise post-petition.  See discussion infra at note 232.   The claim 
would be entitled to eighth priority under section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code, and would not 
be treated as a first priority administrative expenses.  11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B). 
However, under the change made by the 2005 Act, the prepetition taxes incurred in the year of 
bankruptcy will no longer be entitled to eighth priority (except where an individual debtor makes a split-
year election, or possibly files on the last day of the tax year).  See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (flush language) 
(2005).  Section 502(i) will no longer apply to these taxes, because they no longer fall under section 
507(a)(8).  How these prepetition taxes will be treated under the 2005 Act is unclear.  See discussion infra 
beginning at page 41..   
21 11 U.S.C. § 503(b).  In addition, fines, penalties and reductions in credit relating to administrative taxes 
are also entitled to administrative priority.  11 U.S.C. § 503(c). 
22 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B). 
23 See discussion infra beginning at note 54. 
24 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B). 
25 For simplicity, I have assumed that the debtor is voluntarily filing a bankruptcy case.  The same rules 
apply in an involuntary case if the bankruptcy court grants relief under Chapter 7.  See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h). 
26 See 11 U.S.C. § 541.   
27 11 U.S.C. § 727(b). 
28 26 U.S.C. § 1398(e)(2).  All references hereafter to 26 U.S.C. shall be to the “Internal Revenue Code” or 
“I.R.C.” 
29 See I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1). 
30 I.R.C. § 1398(e)(2). 
4To constitute an administrative expense subject to first priority, the tax liability 
must be “incurred by the estate.”31 Tax liabilities of the debtor that were not “incurred by 
the estate”32 are not entitled to priority as administrative expenses,33 and may not be 
claims against the estate at all.34 This cleavage between the post-petition debtor and the 
post-petition estate does not apply to entity taxpayers because they do not have a separate 
existence from the estate.35 
The proper analysis of year-of-bankruptcy claims depends on whether the taxes 
on prepetition income are treated as prepetition taxes,36 or whether the taxes on 
prepetition income are treated as post-petition taxes that are deemed to arise at the end of 
the year.37 The courts have taken inconsistent positions on this fundamental question 
depending on whether the taxpayer is an individual or a corporation.38 These inconsistent 
positions are about to be magnified by a change in the 2005 Act, which eliminates the 
possibility of relying on the eighth priority rules to avoid treating the taxes on prepetition 
income either as first priority administrative expenses or as general unsecured claims.39 
A separate question from priority is whether the government’s claims are 
excepted from discharge.40 Claims excepted from discharge remain collectible from the 
debtor’s post-bankruptcy earnings.  There are several different ways in which tax claims 
may be excepted from discharge.  First, all tax claims entitled to eighth priority are 
excepted from discharge.41 Second, if the debtor committed certain types of wrongful 
conduct, the tax claims arising therefrom are excepted from discharge even though they 
may not be entitled to priority.42 Finally, claims that did not exist prepetition are not 
 
31 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B). 
32 The Internal Revenue Code provides that the bankruptcy estate and not the debtor is to be liable for taxes 
on income “received or accrued” post-petition to which the estate is entitled.  I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1).  
Therefore, the allocation issue should properly focus on whether the income upon which the taxes are 
imposed belongs to the estate (in which case the government has a claim against the estate and not the 
debtor) or to the debtor individually (in which case the government’s sole claim is against the debtor). 
33 Id. 
34 See discussion infra beginning at note 192. 
35 See I.R.C. § 1399. 
36 This is what the courts have done with corporate taxes, relying on section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) to treat the 
pre-petition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes as eighth priority taxes, which are excepted from discharge 
under 523(a)(1)(A).  See discussion infra beginning at note 151.  The Internal Revenue Service has 
consistently disputed this treatment, seeking to obtain first priority administrative expense treatment for 
taxes on prepetition income.  See infra at note 178. 
37 This is what the courts have done with individual taxpayers who do not make the split-year election.  See 
discussion infra beginning at note 192. 
38 Supra notes 36 and 37. 
39 See discussion infra beginning at page 41. 
40 See 11 U.S.C. § 523. 
41 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1). 
42 The debtor does not receive a discharge if the debtor failed to file a required tax return, filed a required 
tax return late and within two years of bankruptcy, filed a fraudulent return, or willfully attempted to evade 
or defeat the tax in any manner.  11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1)(B) - (C).  Claims for taxes that are excepted from 
discharge on one of these grounds are not entitled to eighth priority, apparently even if there is an 
independent basis for eighth priority.  See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).  With respect to year-of-
bankruptcy taxes, only the tax fraud provisions could apply because the return would not be due at the time 
of bankruptcy, and it would be unusual for tax fraud to occur before the return is due.  Therefore, these 
specific exceptions to discharge would only rarely be relevant to year-of-bankruptcy taxes. 
5covered by the discharge, as the discharge only applies to prepetition claims.43 The 
discharge therefore does not apply to most administrative expenses, because the expenses 
were incurred post-petition.  However, unlike most administrative expenses, tax claims 
“incurred by the estate” and not entitled to eighth priority are treated as administrative 
expenses44 irrespective of when the claims were incurred or accrued.   
Unlike eighth priority claims which are always excepted from discharge,45 tax 
claims that are entitled to first priority as administrative expenses may be dischargeable, 
as there is no blanket discharge exception from discharge for first priority administrative 
expenses.46 If there are insufficient assets in the estate to pay first priority administrative 
expenses, and the discharge covered the administrative expenses, the government would 
not be able to collect the unpaid balance if the post-petition obligation is subject to 
discharge.  However, the Chapter 7 discharge only applies to prepetition claims,47 so 
post-petition administrative expenses would generally not be discharged in a Chapter 7 
case.  However, prepetition administrative expenses – if there is such a thing48 – would 
be subject to discharge in Chapter 7.  Moreover, the Chapter 11 discharge applies to pre-
confirmation obligations, and thus covers post-petition pre-confirmation administrative 
expenses which are not paid as part under the plan of reorganization.49 
Prepetition non-priority tax claims incurred in the year of bankruptcy would 
generally be dischargeable.50 General unsecured creditors are thus at significant risk of 
receiving less than full payment in bankruptcy cases. 
The proper characterization of the claim is therefore essential to determine how 
the claim will be treated in the distribution of the bankruptcy estate, and whether the 
claim will be collectible from the debtor’s post-petition assets and earnings.  The 
complex interplay between the priority and dischargeability rules creates many confusing 
and complex issues that are considered below.   
 
II. PRIORITY FOR INCOME TAX CLAIMS IN THE YEAR OF BANKRUPTCY.
There are two basic ways in which income tax claims may be entitled to priority 
under the Bankruptcy Code:  (1) as first priority administrative expenses,51 and (2) as 
 
43 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (“a discharge . . . discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of 
the order for relief”). 
44 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B). 
45 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A). 
46 See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (note the absence of provision excepting administrative priority claims from 
discharge). 
47 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (discharge of claims “that arose before the date of the order for relief.”) 
48 See discussion infra beginning at note 268 as to whether the government’s claim for the prepetition 
portion of taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy under the 2005 Act will be entitled to first priority as an 
administrative expense.  The issue is whether the taxes on prepetition income are “incurred by the estate” 
within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i). 
49 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b)(1)(A).  However, confirmation of the plan requires first priority administrative 
expenses to be paid in cash in full on the effective date.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A).  Therefore only 
administrative expenses which are not properly claimed as part of the plan would be subject to discharge. 
50 The claim would be excepted from discharge only if the debtor made a “willful attempt to evade or 
defeat taxes” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C). 
51 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(1)(B); 507(a)(1). 
6eighth priority claims.52 Because income taxes entitled to eighth priority are not entitled 
to first priority as administrative expenses,53 one must first determine whether the 
government’s claim for taxes is entitled to eighth priority before analyzing whether the 
government’s claim is entitled to treatment as a first priority administrative expense. 
The Bankruptcy Code grants an eighth priority under section 507(a)(8) to the 
government’s income tax claims if they fall within any one54 of the following three rules:  
(1) the lookback rule,55 (2) the 240 day assessment rule,56 and (3) the post-petition 
assessability rule.57 Each of these three rules is highly complex, and each is considered 
in order. 
 
1. The Lookback Rule. 
 
The lookback rule gives a priority to taxes for which a return was last due within 
the three year period before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.58 The due date of the 
return, not the date that the taxes were incurred or the year for which the taxes were due, 
is the key date for determining whether the taxes are non-dischargeable under the 
lookback rule.59 
While the lookback rule is written mechanically, the Supreme Court recently held 
that the three year lookback period is, in essence, a statute of limitations, albeit one that 
involves priority rather than enforceability of a claim, and can thus be equitably tolled 
when the government is prevented from assessing taxes as a result of an earlier 
bankruptcy case.60 
The 2005 Act codifies and expands the Supreme Court’s determination that the 
lookback period is tolled during a prior bankruptcy case.  All of the statutory periods 
during which a priority is granted for governmental claims, including the lookback 
period, are suspended during the stay in a prior case plus 90 days.61 In addition, the 
periods are suspended for any period, plus 90 days, during which the government is 
prohibited from collecting the tax as a result of a debtor’s request for hearing or appeal.62 
Even before the 2005 Act, the lookback rule contained language making it clear 
that the rule applied only to tax years “ending on or before” the petition date.63 On its 
 
52 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8). 
53 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B) (granting priority to a tax incurred by the estate “except a tax of a kind 
specified in section 507(a)(8)”).   
54 The three provisions are written in the alternative (see the use of “or” in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii)). 
See also In re Vitaliano, 178 B.R. 205, 208 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); In re Etheridge, 91 B.R. 842,845  
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that priority is to be granted if the taxes fall within any one of the three 
rules);  In re Easton, 59 B.R. 714, 716-17 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986); In re Coleman American Moving 
Services, Inc., 20 B.R. 267, 269 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). 
55 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i). 
56 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii). 
57 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii). 
58 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A. 
59 Id. 
60 In re Young, 535 U.S. 43, 47 (2002). 
61 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (flush language) (2005). 
62 Id. 
63Prior to the 2005 Act, the lookback rule granted priority  for income taxes “for a taxable year ending on or 
before the date of the filing of the petition for which a return, if required, is last due, including extensions, 
after three years before the date of the filing of the petition.”  11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i). 
7face, the lookback rule appeared not to apply to year-of-bankruptcy taxes incurred by 
calendar year taxpayers who filed bankruptcy on any date other than December 31, 
because the taxpayer’s calendar tax year would not have ended “on or before” the petition 
date.  Similarly, for fiscal year taxpayers, the lookback rule appeared not to apply to 
petitions filed on any date other than the last day of the taxpayer’s fiscal year.  However, 
this appearance is false, because of the split-year election.   
The Internal Revenue Code allows an individual debtor in a Chapter 7 or Chapter 
11 case64 to elect to split the tax year in which a bankruptcy petition is filed into two 
separate tax years – the first one ending on the date that the bankruptcy petition was 
filed.65 If the debtor makes the split-year election, the taxes owing for the pre-petition 
partial year of bankruptcy would fall under the language of the lookback rule, because the 
partial tax year would have ended “on or before” the petition date.   
Because only individuals in cases under Chapters 7 or 11 may make the split-year 
election,66 and because it is optional,67 taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy by entity 
taxpayers, such as corporations, by individuals in Chapter 12 and 13 cases, and by 
individuals who do not make the split-year election68 will not be entitled to priority under 
the lookback rule, unless the debtor happens to file bankruptcy on the last day of the 
debtor’s tax year. 
 
2. The 240 Day Rule. 
 
All taxes which are “assessed” within 240 days prior to bankruptcy are entitled to 
priority.69 Taxes assessed more than 240 days before bankruptcy may also be entitled to 
 
64 Debtors in Chapter 12 and 13 cases are not eligible to make the split-year election.  This is because there 
is no cleavage between the debtor’s and the estate’s post-petition income in Chapter 12 and 13 cases, 
because the debtor is required to use its “projected disposable income” for three or five years to fund the 
plan.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1), 1325(b)(1)(B).  Therefore, individuals in Chapter 12 and 13 cases are 
treated much like corporations – unable to make a split-year election.   
Under the 2005 Act, individual Chapter 11 debtors are also treated much like Chapter 12 and 13 
debtors, in that they are required to use their projected disposable post-petition income for five years to 
fund the plan.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15). Congress did not consider the effect of the 2005 Act changes 
on the right to make a split-year election.  It would appear under the existing statute that this post-petition 
income which the debtor is required to use to fund the plan would be taxable to the estate and not to the 
debtor, since the income is subject to use by the estate.  See I.R.C. §§ 1398(e)(1), (e)(2).  
65 I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(A)(i). 
66 I.R.C. § 1398(a) (section applies “to any case . . . in which the debtor is an individual.”) 
67See I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(A) (“the debtor . . . may elect”); see also In re Prativadi, 281 B.R. 816, 819 
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Haedo, 211 B.R. 149, 152 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Johnson, 190 B.R. 
724, 726-27 (Bankr. Mass. 1995); In re Mirman, 98 B.R. 742, 744-745 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989); In re 
Turboff, 93 B.R. 523, 525 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988).  The election must be made prior to the due date for the 
return, and the election once made is irrevocable.  I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(D).  For individuals, the due date for 
the return is “the 15th day of the fourth month following the close of the fiscal year.”  I.R.C. § 6072(a).  For 
corporations, the return is due on “the 15th day of the third month” following the petition date.  I.R.C. § 
6072(b). 
68 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i). 
69 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii).  A longer period of time applies if the taxpayer made an offer in 
compromise within 240 days after an assessment is made.  The statute extends the 240 day period by 30 
days plus the time that the offer in compromise was pending, presumably because the Secretary would not 
attempt to collect the tax while the offer was pending.  See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii). 
8priority if there was an offer in compromise in effect after assessment,70 if collection 
during the 240 day period was stayed by a prior bankruptcy case,71 or possibly if the 
government was prohibited from collecting the tax by applicable non-bankruptcy law 
because of a request for hearing or appeal filed by the debtor.72 
Taxes may only be assessed either when a tax return is filed showing an amount 
due,73 or after a return is due if the government follows the procedures for making a so-
called deficiency assessment.74 
Since a taxpayer cannot file a return until after the end of the tax year,75 and since 
a return is not due until after the end of the taxable year,76 an assessment cannot be made 
 
70 The statutory language  in effect prior to the 2005 Act was confusing, but the courts interpreted the 
language to allow a lengthy extension of the 240 day period if the offer in compromise was entered into 
within 240 days after assessment.  See, e.g. In re  Romagnolo, 269 B.R. 63, 66 (“Accordingly, when an 
offer in compromise is submitted within 240 days of assessment, the 240 day period is extended 30 days 
plus any time during which the offer-in-compromise was pending.”) ; Accord  In re Mulcahy, 260 B.R. 
612, 617 (Bankr. Mass. 2001) (taxes assessed 317 days before bankruptcy entitled to priority because offer 
in compromise pending for 210 days and  any assessment within 480 days of bankruptcy (240+210+30) 
would have been entitled to priority); In re Chelena, No. 96-66521, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1720, *2-3; 80 
A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 7562  (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997) (adding 1,049 days to the statutory 240 day period 
because of a longstanding offer in compromise).  Under the 2005 Act, the 240 day period is extended by 
the number of days during the 240 day period that an offer in compromise was pending or in effect, plus 30 
days.  11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii)(I) (2005).  The changes made by the 2005 Act set the maximum period 
at 510 days if the offer in compromise was in effect during the entire 240 day period preceding bankruptcy.    
71 The Supreme Court held, in dicta, that the 240 day period would be tolled during the period in a prior 
bankruptcy case that the government was stayed from collecting the taxes.  In re Young, 535 U.S. at 44.  
The 2005 Act codifies and extends the holding in Young. Under the 2005 Act, the 240 day period is 
extended for 90 days plus the period during which the government was prevented by law from collecting 
the taxes, if the prohibition occurred in the debtor’s prior bankruptcy case.  11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (flush 
language) (2005). 
72 The 2005 Act provides that all tax priority periods are extended during the period that the government is 
prohibited by applicable non-bankruptcy law from pursuing collection because the debtor is requesting a 
hearing or filing an appeal.  This language was likely drafted to protect the government from losing priority 
status when taxpayers file appeals or court challenges in connection with collection due process cases 
brought under I.R.C. sections 6320 and 6330. 
73 I.R.C. § 6201(a)(1) (“The Secretary shall assess all taxes determined by the taxpayer or by the Secretary 
as to which returns or lists are made under this title.”).  This is known as a “self assessment” because the 
taxpayer has permitted an assessment by admitting on the return the taxpayer’s obligation to pay the taxes 
shown.  In addition, the government may assess taxes even though not shown on a return as owing where 
the taxpayer has made a simple computational error.  See I.R.C. § 6213(b) (Secretary may assess taxes 
arising out of mathematical or clerical errors without notice of deficiency, but taxpayer has right to request 
prompt abatement).   
74 See I.R.C. §§ 6213(a) (“[N]o assessment of a deficiency . . .and no levy or proceeding in court for its 
collection shall be made . . . until the expiration of such 90 day period . . . nor, if a petition has been filed 
with the Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax Court has become final”), 6211(a) (“[T]he term 
‘deficiency’ means the amount by which the tax imposed . . . exceeds the excess of – (1) the sum of (A) the 
amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return, if a return was made by the taxpayer and an 
amount was shown as the tax by the taxpayer thereon, plus (B) the amounts previously assessed (or 
collected without assessment) as a deficiency, over (2) the amount of rebates, as defined in subsection 
(b)(2), made.”) 
75 The Tax Code does not actually say this – it merely says when is the last day for filing a return.  See 
I.R.C. § 6072(a).  However, a taxpayer could not compute the amount of tax due until the end of the tax 
year, and therefore could not file a return before the end of the year.  See I.R.C. § 6012(a) (returns must be 
filed by “individuals having for the taxable year income”). 
76 I.R.C. § 6072(a) (Calendar year returns due April 15 of following year). 
9until after the end of the taxpayer’s calendar or fiscal year.  Therefore, the 240 day rule 
cannot apply to taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy, because the taxes could not have 
been assessed prior to the petition date since the tax year had not ended before the 
petition date.77 
3. The Post-Petition Assessability Rule before the 2005 Act.  
 
For cases filed prior to the effective date of the 2005 Act,78 the post-petition 
assessability rule granted a priority to taxes that were not assessed before, but were 
assessable under applicable non-bankruptcy law after, the date that the bankruptcy 
petition was filed, unless the taxes were “of a kind specified in section 523(a)(1)(B) or 
523(a)(1)(C).”79 Taxes incurred for the year of bankruptcy could not be assessed pre-
petition,80 and were always assessable post-petition.81 Thus, all taxes in the year that 
bankruptcy was filed (and indeed all taxes arising for future post-bankruptcy years) 
would appear to fit within the technical language of the post-petition assessability rule, 
unless the taxes were “of a kind” specified in the referenced provisions of section 523. 
 
A. Taxes “of a kind specified in section 523(a)1)(B) and (C).” 
 
The first interpretative problem with the statute is determining what taxes are excluded 
from eighth priority because they are “of a kind” specified in section 523(a)(1)(B) or (C).  
Section 523 contains a list of claims excepted from an individual debtor’s discharge.82 A
debtor remains personally liable to pay claims excepted from discharge even though the 
debtor receives a general discharge under the Bankruptcy Code.83 The referenced 
subsections in Bankruptcy Code section 523 cover taxes excepted from discharge 
because the debtor (1) failed to file a required tax return, (2) filed a required tax return 
late and within two years of bankruptcy, (3) filed a false return, or (4) willfully attempted 
to evade or defeat taxes.84 Thus, taxes excepted from discharge for one of these reasons 
are not entitled to eighth priority under section 507(a)(8), even though the taxes are 
assessable post-petition.  Presumably, Congress did not want a taxpayer to get the benefit 
of having the non-dischargeable claim reduced by priority distributions from the 
 
77 Even if the split-year election is made, the partial tax year will not have ended before bankruptcy, and 
there will be no way for the government to make an assessment prepetition. 
78 Most provisions of the 2005 Act are effective on October 17, 2005.  See supra note 7. 
79 Id. 
80 See supra notes 75 - 76. 
81 The government has at least three years after the date the return for the taxes is due to assess taxes.  See 
I.R.C. § 6501(a).  Note that if a return is filed before the due date, it is treated as filed on the due date for 
purposes of determining the limitations period.  I.R.C. § 6501(b)(1).   
82 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (“[a] discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt”). 
83 According to section 523(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, certain of the debts excepted from discharge are 
automatically excepted from discharge, while others are excepted from discharge only if the creditor timely 
obtains an order from the court determining that the debts are excepted.  The tax debts listed in section 
523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code are automatically excepted from discharge. 
84 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) (assessable post-petition other than 523(a)(1)(B), 523(a)(1)(C)), 
523(a)(1)(B) (non-filed or late filed returns), 523(a)(1)(C) (willful attempt to evade or defeat taxes). 
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bankruptcy estate where the taxes are assessable post-petition solely because of the 
debtor’s misconduct.85 
i. Late Returns Filed More than Two but Fewer than 
Three Years Before Bankruptcy. 
 
The reference to taxes “of a kind” specified in the referenced subsections of 
section 523 causes a number of interpretative problems.  First, Congress made an error in 
the drafting of the late-filed return language of section 523(a)(1)(A), which potentially 
causes taxes which Congress intended to be dischargeable to be both entitled to priority 
and excepted from discharge.  Congress provided that taxes covered by a late return filed 
more than two years before bankruptcy would not be excepted from discharge (i.e. would 
be dischargeable).86 Congress likely did not want to punish taxpayers for filing late 
returns – by making the tax claim non-dischargeable – if the government had at least two 
full years before bankruptcy to collect the taxes.87 
The law works as intended with respect to taxes covered by late returns filed 
fewer than two years before bankruptcy – the taxes would be excepted from discharge.88 
85 The statutory cross-reference to section 523(a)(1)(B) and (C) is much broader than it should be.  For 
example, if there is an independent basis for allowing taxes to be assessed post-petition (other than the fact 
that the debtor failed to file a return, for example), why should the fact that the debtor failed to file a return 
preclude priority?  Congress likely meant that tax claims are not to be given priority solely because they are 
assessable post-petition due to the fact that the debtor failed to file a return, filed a false return, etc.  If there 
is an independent basis upon which the taxes can be assessed post-petition, the government should not lose 
priority because one of the grounds in section 523(a)(1)(B) or (C) provides an alternative basis for making 
the assessment post-petition.  This could be relevant to year-of-bankruptcy taxes if the prepetition portion 
of the taxes were entitled to eighth priority.  For example, the courts have held that the prepetition portion 
of a corporation’s year of bankruptcy taxes is entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) – at least 
before the 2005 Act.  See discussion infra beginning at note 152.  Under the statute, however, the 
government would lose priority if the debtor happened to willfully attempt to evade or defeat taxes.  See 11 
U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) (reference to “other than a tax of a kind specified in . . . 523(a)(1)(C)”).  Surely, 
this result was not intended.   
86 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) (general discharge does not discharge individual debtor from a tax for which 
a return “was filed after the date on which such return was last due under applicable law or under any 
extension, and after two years before the date of the filing of the petition.”) (repealed 2005).  Minor 
changes were made in the 2005 Act to cover situations in which a taxpayer is required to file or give a 
report or a notice rather than a tax return.  See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2005). 
87 The report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, upon which the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978 was based, originally provided that taxes covered by a late return filed within three 
years of bankruptcy would be non-dischargeable.  Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of 
the United States, § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii), H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in App. B-
(c) Collier on Bankruptcy - 15th Edition Revised, App. Pt. 4 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.  The three 
year period proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission would have matched the federal statute of limitations 
period.  However, the House version, H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), changed the period from 
three years to one year.  Id. The Senate version, S.2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., as reported by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and the Senate Finance Committee (1978), adopted the three year period 
recommended by the Commission.  The conference committee (apparently in a compromise) changed the 
period to two years.  Id. 
88Since the return was filed late and after two years before the date of the filing of the petition, the taxes 
would be excepted from discharge.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A)(i).    In addition, because the taxes are 
excepted from discharge under section 523(a), the taxes would not be entitled to priority under the post-
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Similarly, the law generally89 works as intended with respect to most taxes covered by a 
late return filed more than three years before bankruptcy – the taxes would not be 
excepted from discharge because of the late filing of the return (and, unless another 
independent exception to discharge applied, would be dischargeable).90 
The problem arises with respect to taxes covered by a late return that is filed 
more than two but fewer than three years before bankruptcy, because of the interplay 
between the two-year rule in Section 523(a)(1)(B) and the post-petition assessability rule 
coupled with the normal three-year period of limitations for assessment of a deficiency 
contained in the Internal Revenue Code.91 Taxes covered by a late return filed more than 
two but fewer than three years before bankruptcy would not be excepted from discharge 
under section 523(a)(1)(B), because Congress intended to allow discharge when the 
government had a full two years before bankruptcy to attempt to collect the taxes.  
However, the taxes would still be assessable post-petition under the three year statute of 
limitations contained in the Internal Revenue Code, which begins to run only when the 
tax return is filed.92 The taxes would thus be entitled to priority under a conventional 
reading of section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) – because the taxes would be assessable post-petition 
under applicable non-bankruptcy law, and would not be excepted from discharge under 
sections 523(a)(1)(B) or (C).  The Catch-22 is that all eighth priority taxes are non-
 
petition assessability rule.  11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).  However, the taxes may be entitled to priority 
under the lookback rule or the 240 day rule.  See discussion supra beginning at note 58. 
89 There are a number of situations in which taxes can be assessed under applicable non-bankruptcy law 
more than three years after a return is filed.  First, there is no statute of limitations on assessment if the 
taxpayer files a fraudulent return, or willfully attempts to defeat or evade taxes.  I.R.C. §§ 6501(c)(1), 
6501(c)(2)).  In such cases, the taxes would be excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C) 
anyway.  Second, there is a six year statute of limitations if a return contains a “substantial omission of 
income.”  I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A).  A substantial omission is an amount exceeding 25% of the gross income 
reported.  Id. Third, the assessment limitations period is tolled for the period plus 60 days during which the 
Secretary is prohibited from making an assessment after the Secretary mails to the taxpayer the required 
statutory notice of deficiency which is a prerequisite to assessment.  I.R.C. § 6503(a).  The Secretary is 
prohibited from making an assessment for the 90 day period following the mailing of the notice.  I.R.C. § 
6213(a).  In addition, if the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court to re-determine the proposed 
deficiency during the 90 day period following the mailing of the statutory notice of deficiency, then the 
Secretary is stayed from assessing a deficiency until a Tax Court’s re-determination becomes final.  Id. 
Thus, the three year period can be greatly extended by a taxpayer challenging a proposed assessment in the 
Tax Court.  Finally, the limitations period can be extended by agreement.  I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4).  In any of 
these situations, the taxes are assessable post-petition under applicable non-bankruptcy law for a reason 
other than the late filing of the return.  Because the taxes are assessable post-petition for a reason other than 
the late-filing of the return, Congress may well have intended such taxes to be given priority and to be 
excepted from discharge even though the late return was filed more than two years before bankruptcy. 
90 As a general matter, if the late-filed return is filed more than three years before bankruptcy, the 
government would be barred from making an assessment on or after the petition date by the applicable 
three-year statute of limitations contained in the Tax Code, which begins to run upon the filing of the 
return.  See I.R.C. § 6501(a).  If the statute of limitations on collection expires before the bankruptcy 
petition is filed, the claim in bankruptcy would be disallowed in its entirety and would not be entitled to 
priority in bankruptcy.   See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(8)(A) (only “allowed unsecured claims of governmental 
units” are given priority)  (emphasis added); 502(a)(1) (claims that are unenforceable under applicable non-
bankruptcy law are not “allowed.”). 
91The 3 year statute of limitations on assessment contained in the Internal Revenue Code begins to run only 
when a return is filed.  See I.R.C. § 6501(a). 
92 I.R.C. § 6501(a) (government has at least three years from the time a return is filed to assess a 
deficiency). 
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dischargeable under section 523(a)(1)(A). Thus, although Congress provided that taxes 
covered by a late return filed more than two years before bankruptcy would be 
dischargeable under section 523(a)(1)(B)(ii), the boomerang effect of not being excepted 
from discharge under section 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) is that the taxes are eligible for eighth 
priority treatment under the post-petition assessability rule of section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii), 
and in turn are excepted from discharge under 523(a)(1)(A).  Congress surely did not 
intend by shortening the nondischargeability period for late-filed returns to two years to 
grant a priority and make nondischargeable taxes subject to late returns filed more than 
two but fewer than three years before bankruptcy.93 It appears that Congress simply 
made an error by shortening the period in section 523(a)(1)(B) without addressing the 
boomerang effect of section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) and section 523(a)(1)(A).   
The confusion created by Congress’ snafu did not go unnoticed by litigants and 
the courts.  In In re Doss,94 the debtors sought a determination that taxes owing on late 
returns filed more than two but fewer than three years before bankruptcy were excepted 
from discharge and not entitled to priority.95 The government argued that because the 
taxes were more than two years old (and thus not covered by section 523(a)(1)(B)), they 
were entitled to priority (and, because they were entitled to priority, the taxes were not 
dischargeable under section 523(a)(1)(A)).96 
To carry out the intent of Congress, the Doss court held that the taxes were not 
entitled to priority and were dischargeable.  However, the court’s explanation of its 
decision only added to the confusion:  “the clauses following the first comma [in 
507(a)(8)(A)(iii)] modify and relate to the first clause.”97 This explanation is plainly 
wrong – it is clearly the phrase before the comma that limits the language after the 
comma.  More importantly, the implications of the court’s ruling were ambiguous.  
Indeed, some debtors argued on the basis of Doss that the post-petition assessability rule 
in section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) only applied to late-filed returns.98 
Using language almost as confusing as the Doss opinion itself, some courts 
sought to distinguish Doss by suggesting that the Doss court had merely ruled that the 
taxes were dischargeable, not that they were non-priority.99 In fact, however, the Doss 
93 Indeed, the legislative history suggests that Congress intended not to grant a priority to taxes due solely 
to the debtor’s conduct in filing a return late, not filing a return at all, or committing tax fraud.  According 
to the Senate Report:  “The bankruptcy policy for this treatment is that it is not fair to penalize private 
creditors of the debtor by paying out of the "pot" of assets in the estate tax liabilities arising from the 
debtor's deliberate misconduct. On the other hand, the debtor should not be able to use bankruptcy to 
escape these kinds of taxes. Therefore, these taxes have no priority in payment from the estate but would 
survive as continuing debts of the case. (Not giving priority to a debt means that the creditor can still 
collect part or all of the debt from the estate, but the creditor must do so as general creditor, sharing pro rata 
with other general creditors).”  S. REP. NO. 95-1106 at 22 (1978). 
94 In re Doss, 42 B.R. 749, 750 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1984). 
95 Id. at 750. 
96 Id. at 751-52. 
97 Id. at 754. 
98 See In re Wines, No. 91-0433, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5574, *11, *23-24; Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶74,674 
(S.D. Fla. 1992). 
99In re Longley, 66 B.R. 237, 241 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (“[t]he Doss court held that Section 
507(a)(6)(A) contained its own exclusions; namely, taxes of a kind specified in Section 523(a)(1)(B), and 
that merely because a tax was still “assessable” as of the date of the filing of the Title 11 petition did not 
mean that a tax excluded from the nondischargeability provision of Section 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) was, 
nonetheless, nondischargeable under Section 507(a)(6)(A)(iii).”).   
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opinion clearly stated that the taxes were not entitled to priority.100 Other courts have 
rejected the Doss court’s analysis outright rather than trying to distinguish it.101 For 
example, the court in In re Torrente, rejected both the analysis and holding of Doss,
ruling that the taxes covered by a late filed return, which was filed more than two but 
fewer than three years before bankruptcy, were entitled to priority under section 
507(a)(8)(A)(iii), and were also nondischargeable under section 523(a)(1)(A).102 At least 
one commentator has likewise misunderstood the issue.103 The problem identified in Doss 
creates a significant conundrum.   
Fortunately, there is an interpretative solution to the conundrum that carries out 
Congress’ intent to make dischargeable taxes covered by late returns filed more than two 
years before bankruptcy.  The post-petition assessability rule says that taxes which are 
assessable post-petition because they are “of a kind specified in sections 523(a)(1)(B) 
and 523(a)(1)(C)” are not to be given priority, even though assessable post-petition under 
applicable non-bankruptcy law.104 The courts (other than Doss) have been interpreting 
the quoted phrase to mean taxes that are made non-dischargeable by the two referenced 
subsections of section 523.  Instead, they should look to the factual situations addressed 
in the specified subsections of section 523.  Taxes “of a kind specified” in Section 
523(a)(1)(B) should be interpreted to mean taxes (1) for which a return was not filed, or 
(2) for which a return was filed late, regardless of how late.  The courts have erred by 
ignoring the “of a kind” language and excluding from priority only tax claims that are 
excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(1)(B).   
Several appellate courts have considered the interpretation of similar “of a kind” 
language contained in section 523(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, with mixed results.  
Section 523(a)(1)(A) provides that taxes “of a kind” specified in section 507(a)(8) are 
excepted from discharge, whether or not a proof of claim is filed or allowed.  The Court 
 
See also In re Treister, 52 B.R. 735, 739 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1985) (“The [Doss] court held that simply 
because a tax was a priority tax under section 507 because still assessable did not mean that the tax was 
automatically nondischargeable.”). 
100 In re Doss, 42 B.R. at 753 (“The court thus concludes that the unassessed taxes for 1976, 1977 and 1978 
are not entitled to priority status and shall be considered general unsecured claims.”). 
101See, e.g. In re Crawford, 144 B.R. 346, 347 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992) (“It is difficult to read Doss and 
understand the interpretation of the relevant Code section”); In re Vitaliano, 178 B.R. at 208  (“[Doss]
involves a very dubious reading of the Bankruptcy Code. Although Doss has been widely cited by debtors 
seeking discharge of tax debts, every court which has considered it has either distinguished it or criticized 
it.”). 
102 75 B.R. 193, 195 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987). 
103 See Darrell Dunham & Alex Shimkus, Tax Claims in Bankruptcy, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 343, 355 (1993) 
(“[the Doss court]  reasoned that, if the IRS's argument were accepted, then all tax returns filed within three 
years of the commencement of the case would be within the scope of § 507(a)(7)(A)(iii). This, of course, 
would render nugatory § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii)'s two-year provision.”)  This is not a correct statement.   Section 
523(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code would not be rendered nugatory because it applies to make 
nondischargeable (and 507(a)(7)(A)(iii) makes non-priority)  taxes covered by late-filed returns which were 
filed within two years of bankruptcy.  Confusion only exists for taxes filed more than two and fewer than 
three years before bankruptcy, because section 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) does not make these taxes non-
dischargeable and they are thus eligible for priority treatment under the post-petition assessability rule in 
section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii). 
104 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). 
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of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in In re Victor was first to consider this language105. In 
Victor, two sets of debtors confirmed Chapter 11 reorganization plans in which the 
government held secured tax liens.106 The issue in Victor was whether the government’s 
claim for post-petition pre-confirmation interest, known as “gap” period interest, on its 
secured tax claims survived the confirmation of the plans, which did not provide for the 
payment of gap period interest.107 The Victor panel first held that the government’s 
claims for gap period interest were not entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8), 
because only allowed unsecured claims are given priority under that provision, and the 
government’s claim for gap period interest was neither allowed nor unsecured.108 The 
Victor panel relied on an earlier bankruptcy court decision, In re Sproul,109 for the 
proposition that only claims allowable under section 502 would be excepted from 
discharge under section 523(a)(1).110 
105 121 F.3d 1383 (10th Cir. 1997). 
106 Id. at 1384. 
107 Id. at 1383. 
108 The court stated that the claim for post-petition interest was not allowed because the government had not 
filed a proof of claim for, and had not objected to confirmation of the plan of reorganization which did not 
provide for payment of, post-petition interest.  See In re Victor, 121 F.3d at 1386.  The government argued 
that it could not have filed a claim for post-petition interest, because section 502(b)(2) disallows claims for 
un-matured interest.  The Victor panel reasoned that this disallowance would not apply to a secured claim 
for post-petition interest, which is allowed under section 506(b).  However, the Court suggested that the 
government was required to file a claim for, and seek allowance of its claim for, gap period interest, and to 
object confirmation of any plan that did not provide for payment of gap period interest if it wished to 
pursue such a claim.  Id. at 1387. 
109 83 B.R. 359 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1988).  The debtors in Sproul owned farmland subject to a mortgage held 
by the South Atlantic Production Credit Association ("PCA").  The PCA ultimately got relief from the 
automatic stay and foreclosed on the property.  After foreclosing, the PCA paid the accrued property taxes 
which had become a priority lien against the property.  The PCA then asserted an unsecured claim against 
the debtors for the unpaid property taxes, arguing that it was a subrogee of the taxing authority.   Section 
502(b)(3) disallows property tax claims which exceed the value of the estate’s interest in the property.  
Since the value of the debtor’s interest in the property was zero, section 502(b)(3) would disallow any 
claim against the estate on account of the property taxes.  Id. at 361.  The PCA argued, however, that the 
claim survived as a non-dischargeable personal liability of the debtor under section 523(a)(1), because the 
claim was of the kind entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8)(B) (which grants a priority to “allowed 
unsecured claims of governmental units” for property taxes incurred within one year before bankruptcy).  
Id. The debtor argued that the property tax claims were not “allowed unsecured claims” because of the 
section 502(b)(3) disallowance.  Id. The PCA argued that section 523(a)(1)(A) excepts the claims from 
discharge “whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or allowed,” and therefore its claim should be 
excepted from discharge.  Id. The Sproul court properly held that the language in 523(a)(1)(A) applies only 
to claims that are allowable, whether or not actually filed or allowed.  Id. at 361 (“This legislative history 
suggests that the language of the final version of § 523(a)(1)(A) relied on by PCA was intended to prevent 
the discharge of tax claims which were never filed or filed late but which would otherwise have been 
allowable, not tax claims which would have been disallowed even if they had been timely filed.”).   
110 The Victor panel failed to consider whether the gap period interest was made “allowable” by section 
502(i), which provides that tax claims arising after the commencement of the case which are entitled to 
priority under 507(a)(8), are treated as if they arose before the commencement of the case.  If section 502(i) 
requires the post-petition interest to be treated as if it had arisen prepetition, then it would not constitute un-
matured interest as of the petition date and would not be disallowed by section 502(b)(1).  The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Miller v. United States, 363 F.3d 999, 1009 (9th Cir. 2004), pointed out that the 
Victor panel’s interpretation would render section 502(i) non-sensical, because section 502(i) references 
claims entitled to priority under 507(a)(8), and 507(a)(2) references claims allowed under 502(a), creating a 
chicken and egg cycle that could not be broken.  Sproul could have been distinguished from the facts in 
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The Victor  panel then reasoned that since the interest claim was not entitled to 
priority, it was also not excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(1)(A).  Like the 
courts considering the relationship between sections 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) and 523(a)(1)(B) 
and (C), the Victor panel ignored the “of a kind” language in section 523(a)(1)(A), 
discharging the government’s claim because the government failed to file and seek 
allowance for the claim, notwithstanding the specific language in section 523(a)(1)(A) 
excepting claims for discharge even if they are not filed or allowed.  In its conclusion, the 
Victor panel suggested that interest on secured tax claims would always be dischargeable, 
a bizarre result that would treat under-secured tax claimants worse than unsecured tax 
claimants.111 
The two circuit courts to consider the issue after Victor have rejected its analysis 
by focusing on the important “of a kind” language in section 523(a)(1)(A).  In In re Gust,
the Court of Appeals adopted the opinion of the District Court awarding gap period 
interest on a secured tax claim.112 The government in Gust held prepetition tax liens 
against the debtor’s property to secure trust fund penalties owing for unpaid employment 
taxes.  The debtor filed a “no asset” Chapter 7 case, in which creditors were not required 
to file proofs of claim,113 and the debtor thereafter obtained a general discharge.  Two 
years later, the debtor filed a Chapter 13 case and sought a determination that the 
government’s tax liens did not attach to the debtor’s personal property (some of his 
personal property, apparently, had been exempted in the original Chapter 7 case, and 
some had been acquired later).114 The debtor cited Victor for the proposition that the 
government’s secured tax claims were discharged in his prior Chapter 7 case because 
only unsecured claims were entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8).115 The Gust 
courts rejected the analysis in Victor, claiming that the Victor panel erred by focusing on 
the type of “claim” rather than focusing on the type of “tax” at issue.116 This was a rather 
confusing way of saying that when section 523(a)(1) refers to “tax of the kind and for the 
periods specified in section . . . 507(a)(8),” it does not mean a tax claim entitled to 
priority under section 507(a)(8).  Rather, the statute means to refer to taxes of the general 
 
Victor because 502(i) would not have saved the taxes disallowed under section 502(b)(3), because the 
disallowance was based on value not timing. 
111 Victor, 121 F.3d at 1390 (“We conclude §§ 523(a)(1)(A) and 507(a)(7) clearly authorize the exception 
of tax debts and interest from dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2) only when the governmental 
entity holds an unsecured claim to that debt.”) . 
It is important to note that the Victor panel did not discuss whether the government’s lien against 
the property for the gap period interest survived.  The government retained its lien under the plan, so the 
lien would survive the Chapter 11 discharge.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (property free and clear after 
confirmation, except as otherwise provided in the plan).  The government’s tax lien would cover accruing 
post-petition interest under applicable non-bankruptcy law.  Section 506(b) would allow the government’s 
claim for post-petition interest against the property if the value of the property exceeded the claim (which 
the court said it did).  The discharge of the debtor’s personal liability under section 1141(d) would not 
impair the government’s claim against the property.  See Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1886); 
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1992).  One wonders whether the government failed to argue an 
important theory supporting its right to recovery. 
112In re Gust, 239 B.R. 630 (S.D. Ga. 1999), aff’d 197 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1999). 
113 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 2002(e), 3002(c)(5). 
114 Gust, 239 B.R. at 631. 
115 Id. at 632-33. 
116 Id. at 633 (“Instead of focusing on the type of ‘tax’, the Victor court focused on the type of ‘claim.’ This 
focus was in error.”). 
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type discussed in section 507(a)(8).   By so interpreting the inartful statutory language, 
the Gust courts sought to avoid the absurd result of causing otherwise nondischargeable 
taxes to be discharged simply because the government held security for its claim.117 Like 
the panel in Victor, the courts in Gust did not discuss the effect of the personal discharge 
on an existing secured claim.118 
In Miller v. United States,119 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in an 
opinion written by a former Tax Court Judge Cynthia Holcomb Hall,120 followed the Gust 
court’s logic in holding that gap period interest on a secured tax claim is excepted from 
discharge under section 523(a)(1)(A), even though the tax claim would not be entitled to 
priority under section 507(a)(8).  The panel in Miller rejected the Victor court’s analysis 
because it “would render superfluous the plain language of § 523(a)(1), which preserves 
debts for particular types of taxes ‘whether or not a claim was filed or allowed.’”121 The 
panel in Miller also pointed out that the “unsecured” language in section 507(a)(8) is not 
rendered superfluous, because only unsecured claims would receive priority in 
distribution from the estate.122 Secured claims would not be entitled to priority,123 but 
 
117 See id. at 634 (“Gust's position contravenes this policy [of preventing the discharge of tax claims] and 
would result in illogical outcomes. Under the Gust court’s reasoning, the tax debt would be non-
dischargeable only if the IRS had done nothing to secure the tax debt because it would be ‘unsecured’ 
under § 507(a)(8). Here, the Bankruptcy Court was correct in concluding that ‘Section 523(a)(1)(A) 
addresses 'debt' arising from 'a tax', 'of the kind' specified in § 507(a)(8), not debt evidenced by a claim 
described in § 507(a)(8).’"). 
118 The District Court in Gust cited In re Frengel, 115 B.R. 569, 571 (N.D. Ohio 1989), for the proposition 
that tax claims are not rendered dischargeable by being secured.  Gust, 239 B.R. at 633.  Frengel, however, 
dealt with whether a tax lien was discharged where the tax liability was clearly dischargeable (presumably, 
outside of the priority period in section 507(a)(8)).  The Bankruptcy Court in Frengel, citing to Long v. 
Bullard and its progeny, discussed supra at note 111, held that tax liens are not discharged by a general 
bankruptcy discharge – even where the debtor’s personal liability for the underlying claim is discharged.  
Frengel, 115 B.R. at 570-71.  Frengel did not involve a tax “of a kind” excepted from discharge under 
section 507(a)(8).  While Frengel would support the non-dischargeability of the government’s tax lien on 
the property held by the debtor in Gust on the date of discharge, it does not support the holding in Gust that 
taxes not given priority under section 507(a)(8) may nevertheless be taxes “of a type” covered by section 
507(a)(8).  The Gust courts failed to address the separate issue concerning the validity of the government’s 
lien on the debtor’s property at the time the discharge was granted.  This omission is curious in light of the 
Court citation to Frengel.
The district court in Gust also cited In re Latulippe, 13 B.R. 526 (Bankr. D.V. 1981), which 
considered whether a secured tax claim could be enforced against property exempted by the debtor in 
bankruptcy.  The Latulippe court rejected out of hand as illogical (and contrary to the legislative history of 
the statute) the debtor’s suggestion that the tax claim was not excepted from discharge under 523(a)(1) 
because it was secured.  See Latulippe, 13 B.R. at 527  (“[I]t seems illogical that it was the intent of 
Congress to make unsecured claims for taxes non-dischargeable while at the same time rendering a claim 
for taxes dischargeable if the governmental unit has taken steps to enforce payment of an un-dischargeable 
tax claim by imposing a lien on the taxpayer's property.”).  After holding that the tax claim was excepted 
from discharge, the Latulippe court held that the property remained subject to the government’s tax lien.   
119 363 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2004). 
120According to her biography, Judge Hall served on the Tax Court from 1972-1981.  See 
http://www.appellate-counsellor.com/profiles/hall.htm. 
121 Miller, 363 F.3d at 1007. 
122 Id. at 1008-09. 
123 Although not discussed in the opinion, secured claims would, of course, be entitled to priority in 
distribution from the collateral.  According to the theory advanced by the Miller panel, under-secured 
claims would not be entitled to priority in distribution from the estate under section 507(a)(8).   
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would nevertheless be excepted from discharge because they are claims “of the kind” 
covered by the priority statute. 
One problem with the opinions in Victor, Gust and Miller is that they all ignore 
the Bankruptcy Code’s distinctive treatment of secured and unsecured claims.  There is 
no such thing as an under-secured claim under the Bankruptcy Code.  Section 506(a) 
bifurcates a single under-secured claim into two separate claims:  a secured claim to the 
extent of the value of the collateral, and an unsecured claim for the deficiency.124 In most 
cases, a secured claimant will not need priority in distribution vis à vis unsecured 
creditors because the secured claim is fully covered by, and will be paid in full either 
from the sale of collateral or, with interest, under the plan of reorganization.125 Indeed, a 
secured creditor is entitled to a special super-priority if the court erroneously over-values 
the collateral in finding the secured creditor to be adequately protected.126 It is only with 
respect to gap period interest – the interest which would accrue between the time of the 
filing of the petition and the date of confirmation – that the under-secured creditor bears a 
potential risk loss on its secured claim.127 There should have been no issue if the taxing 
authority in Victor, Gust, and Miller had been over-secured – section 506(b) would have 
allowed gap period interest, and the estate would have had to pay the entire claim either 
from the sale of the collateral, or pursuant to the terms of a plan of reorganization.128 On 
the other hand, if the taxing authority had been under-secured, the unsecured portion of 
the claim should have been entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8), and would have 
been non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(1).  The three courts erred by failing to 
address the fact that an under-secured creditor has a plain vanilla unsecured claim in 
bankruptcy for the portion of the claim that is not covered by the value of the collateral.  
They also erred by failing to address that the secured portion of the claim would have to 
be paid either from the sale of the collateral or under a plan.  The issue in Victor, Gust,
and Miller should have concerned only the narrow question of the taxing authority’s 
entitlement to gap period interest on the secured portion of the claim. In any case, the 
Gust and Miller courts correctly focused on the “of the kind” language in section 
523(a)(1) to hold that gap period interest on a secured claim would be excepted from 
discharge under the “of a kind” language, even though the claim would not itself be 
entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8).129 
124 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (“An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property . . . is a secured claim 
to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property . . . and is an 
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest . . . is less than the amount of such 
allowed claim.”).   
125 Under the reorganization chapters, the secured claim must be paid in full with interest from the effective 
date of the plan.  See §§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (payments must total, and where the claim is fully secured 
must have a “value as of the effective date of the plan” equal to, the allowed amount of secured claim); 
1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) (same); 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (same).  The Supreme Court in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 
U.S. 465,467 (2004), interpreted “value as of the effective date of the plan” to require the payment of 
interest at the prime rate plus a premium for the additional risk that a loan to the debtor carries over the risk 
of a loan to a prime-rate-qualified borrower. 
126 11 U.S.C. § 507(b). 
127 If the creditor is over-secured, the creditor is entitled to recover post-petition gap period interest.  11 
U.S.C. § 506(b). 
128 See note 125. 
129 As a general matter, it would appear that both an under-secured creditor and an unsecured creditor 
would be treated the same – both would not be denied the right to recover gap period interest as a claim 
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The same theory that allowed the Gust and Miller panels to find that gap period 
interest, which was not entitled to priority under section 507(a), could still be “of the 
kind” entitled to priority under 507(a)(8), should be used in interpreting the “of a kind” 
language in section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).  That is, even though a claim for taxes covered by a 
late return filed more than two but fewer than three years before bankruptcy would not be 
excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(1)(B), the taxes could still be “of a kind” 
specified in section 523(a)(1)(B).  Using a proper interpretation of the statutory language, 
taxes covered by a late return filed more than two years but fewer than three years before 
bankruptcy would be dischargeable.  The taxes would not be excepted from discharge by 
section 523(a)(1)(B), because the late return was filed more than two years before 
bankruptcy.  The taxes would also not be entitled to priority under section 
507(a)(8)(A)(iii), because the only reason the taxes are assessable post-petition is because 
a return was filed late – hence the kind of taxes addressed in section 523(a)(1)(B).  Had 
the return been filed timely, assessment would have been barred under applicable non-
bankruptcy law by the three year limitations period.  Since the sole reason the taxes are 
assessable post-petition is because the return was filed late, the taxes would not be 
entitled to priority under the post-petition assessability rule of section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).130 
In turn, if the taxes are not entitled to priority, they would not be excepted from discharge 
 
against the estate.  This is because section 502(b)(2) generally disallows claims for un-matured interest, and 
the section 506(b) exception applies only to over-secured creditors.   
However, it could be argued that section 502(i) allows an unsecured tax claimant holding a 
priority claim under section 507(a)(8) to recover gap period interest.  Section 502(i) says that a claim that 
does not arise until after the case (here, the claim for post-petition interest) will be treated under section 502 
as if it had arisen before the commencement of the case.  11 U.S.C. § 502(i).  Does this mean that gap 
period interest will be treated as having arising prepetition, in which case it would not constitute 
“unmatured” interest?  If so, then unsecured tax creditors holding priority claims would be entitled to gap 
period interest, while under-secured tax creditors would only be entitled to gap period interest on the 
unsecured portion of their claims (the secured portion of their claims would not be entitled to priority under 
507, and therefore would not qualify for prepetition treatment under section 502(i).  I could find no cases 
directly addressing this issue.  The bankruptcy court in In re Patch Press, Inc., 71 B.R. 345 (Bankr. W.D. 
Wis. 1987), suggested in dicta (it was considering whether interest was recoverable on a post-petition tax 
claim) that “[s]ince tax claims can accrue post-petition, see 11 U.S.C. § 502(i), it is not unreasonable that 
interest should also accrue post-petition as part of the claim.”  Id. at 350.  If this is a correct interpretation 
of section 502(i), then an unsecured claim that is entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8) would also be 
entitled to accrue gap period interest, while the secured portion of an under-secured creditor’s claim would 
not.   
However, several courts have held that section 502(i) was intended to cover only taxes relating to 
prepetition activities for which the liability is deemed under applicable non-bankruptcy law to arise post-
petition.  These courts rejected the argument that section 502(i) applies to treat post-petition taxes as if they 
arose prepetition (even though post-petition taxes fit within the literal language of section 502(i)).    See, 
e.g. In re St. Louis Freight Lines, Inc., 45 B.R. 546, 549 (Bankr. E.D. Mi. 1984) (following Collier on 
Bankruptcy’s suggestion that section 502(i) was intended to cover only prepetition taxes that are assessed 
post-petition); In re Razorback Ready-Mix Concrete Co., 45 B.R. 917, 925 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1984).  
Similarly, if section 502(i) was not intended to cover gap period interest (the liability for which, like post-
petition taxes, does not come into existence until post-petition), then the treatment of the secured portion of 
an under-secured tax lien would be treated the same as any unsecured tax claim – gap period interest would 
not be recoverable.  This is the preferable result to accord similarly situated creditors with equal treatment 
in distribution. 
130 See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (three year rule).  If a longer period of limitations applies for a reason other than 
the late-filing of the return, then there is an independent basis for priority and non-dischargeability.  See 
discussion, supra, at note 90. 
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under section 523(a)(1)(A).  The result intended by Congress – that taxes covered by late 
returns filed more than two years before bankruptcy would be dischargeable – is 
achieved.  The court in Doss thus got the rule right – the taxes should be dischargeable 
and not subject to priority.  Unfortunately, the Doss court did a poor job of developing a 
proper rationale for its holding.   
Congress’ use of vague cross-references in section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) (and in 
section 523(a)(1)(A)) has created unnecessary confusion about whether claims arising 
from late-filed returns are entitled to priority.  Under a correct interpretation of the “of a 
kind” language, a claim for taxes which is assessable post-petition solely because the 
debtor failed to file a return, or filed a late return, should not be entitled to priority under 
section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii), regardless of when the late return was filed.  In order to make 
sense of the statute, the “of a kind” language should be interpreted as a reference to the 
general category of taxes discussed in the referenced statute, rather than to whether the 
taxes in fact meet the specific test in the referenced statute.131 
B. Pre-petition Taxes in the Year of Bankruptcy. 
 
On its face, all taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy – both prepetition and 
post-petition – appear to be covered by the post-petition assessability rule of section 
 
131 A second oddity caused by the vague reference in section 507(a)(8)(A)(ii) to taxes “of a kind specified” 
in section 523(a)(1)(C) concerns taxes for which the debtor substantially understated income.   If the debtor 
intentionally understated income, the government’s claim would likely be excepted from discharge under 
section 523(a)(1)(C), which excepts from discharge tax claims with respect to which the debtor filed a 
fraudulent return or willfully attempted to evade or defeat the taxes.  Since the claim is excepted from 
discharge under section 523(a)(1)(C), it would likewise not be entitled to priority under the post-petition 
assessability rule. But if the debtor unintentionally understated its income – no “fraud” or a “willful attempt 
to evade or defeat” the taxes – then the taxes would not be excepted from discharge under section 
523(a)(1)(C).  Since not excepted from discharge, the taxes would be entitled to priority under the post-
petition assessabilty rule of section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) if assessable post-petition.  The Tax Code provides for 
a longer six year period of limitations on assessments when the debtor makes a “substantial 
understatement” of income, even though the debtor lacked any wrongful intent in making the 
understatement. See I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A).  A “substantial understatement” occurs if the understatement 
exceeds 25 percent of the income reported. I.R.C. § 6662(e)(1)(A). Thus, the statute would treat tax claims 
arising from the debtor’s innocent error better vis à vis other creditors than tax claims arising from the 
debtor’s intentional fraud.  Worse, even though the unintentional understatement is not excepted from 
discharge under 523(a)(1)(C), the claim would still be excepted from discharge through the back door of 
section 523(a)(1)(A) (which excepts from discharge all claims entitled to priority).  The Court in In re Zeig, 
206 B.R. 974, 977 (Neb. 1997), allowed a debtor who had embezzled money to discharge the tax claim 
under a Chapter 13 plan without providing for any payments on the claim.  The government argued that the 
result was perverse because the debtor would have had to pay the claim in full if the debtor’s “substantial 
understatement” had been  unintentional – the debtor would have been required to provide for full payment 
of a priority claim in a Chapter 13 plan.  11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2).  The Court nevertheless held for the 
debtor.  Zeig, 206 B.R. at 977   (“[T]he government argues that the bankruptcy court's decision produces a 
perverse result in that debtors can benefit from their fraud and avoid paying their income tax debt. While 
this may be the effect of the bankruptcy court's ruling . . . the bankruptcy code has produced similar 
seemingly inequitable results. . . .  [I]n those instances, Congress corrected the inequity. . . .  [I]f the law 
needs to be changed, Congress must change the law. That is not the job of the courts.”).  There is, of 
course, no good reason for giving the government a priority claim over other creditors if the debtor 
commits an unintentional understatement within seven years of bankruptcy, but not to give priority if the 
understatement was intentional.  This is yet another example of the problems caused when Congress 
references another body of law without understanding the implications of its reference. 
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507(a)(8)(A)(iii).  Taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy could not have been 
assessed132 before the bankruptcy petition was filed, since the amount is only 
determinable at the end of the tax year, and the taxes would be assessable under 
applicable nonbankruptcy law after bankruptcy, since the three-year statute of limitations 
on assessment does not even begin to run until, at the earliest, the due date of the return 
for the taxes.133 Under this literal reading of the statute, post-petition taxes would never 
be entitled to first priority as administrative expenses, because such taxes would always 
 
132 A different issue was presented by the use of the term “assessed” with respect to property taxes.  Under 
some state laws, a property tax assessment is made before the taxes become a lien against the property and 
the owner becomes liable for payment.  Prior to the 2005 Act, property taxes “assessed” prepetition (and 
not more than one year before bankruptcy) were entitled to eighth priority (11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(B), and 
were thus not entitled to priority as administrative expenses.  11 U.S.C. § 503 (b)(1)(B)(i).  The debtor 
argued in  In re Federated Department Stores, Inc., 270 F.3d 994 (6th Cir. 2001), that property taxes 
incurred by the estate for a post-petition were not entitled to be treated as administrative expenses because 
the taxes had been assessed under New York law prepetition.  The panel struggled with the statutory 
language and the obvious intent that the post-petition taxes be administrative expenses, ultimately adopting 
a federal definition of “assessed” that focuses on the debtor’s liability for the taxes.  Most other courts 
considering the property tax issue adopted similar reasoning.  See In re King, 961 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 
1992) (tax is not "assessed" until fixed and final); In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 124 B.R. 488, 494 (Bankr. 
W.D. Tex. 1991) ("assessed" refers to the date taxpayer's liability is determined, not prior date fixing value 
of property); In re Kamstra, 51 B.R. 826, 833 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1985) (same); In re Stroud, 37 B.R. 735, 
741-42 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) (assessed when taxed due, not when lien arises); In re Scrap Disposal, Inc., 
24 B.R. 178, 180 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) aff'd, 38 B.R. 765 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984) ("assessment" occurs 
when liability arises); In re Davis, 11 B.R. 621, 622-23 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) ("assessment" requires the 
fixing of a tax liability, not merely valuing property).  Earlier, several courts had focused on the date the 
lien attaches.  See In re Prairie Mining, Inc., 194 B.R. 248, 257 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995); In re Grivas, 123 
B.R. 876, 881 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1991); In re Point Rest. & Oyster Bar, 86 B.R. 252, 254 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 
1988).  See also In re Members Warehouse, Inc., 991 F.2d 116, 118-19 (4th Cir. 1993) (adopting state law 
definition of “incurred.”).  While the courts differed on when precisely property taxes are “assessed” for 
purposes of section 507(a)(8)(B), the court in In re Solomon Financial. Services., No. 91-4-3084, 1996 
Bankr. LEXIS 1915 *9 (Bankr. Md. 1996), who of course followed the majority view, could find only one 
published decision in which a court had found taxes to have been "assessed" on the date that the value of 
the property was fixed – In re T & T Roofing and Sheet Metal, Inc., 156 B.R. 780 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993). 
In the 2005 Act, Congress ended the debate by amending section 507(a)(8)(B).  Instead of using 
the word “assessed,” Congress substituted the word “incurred,” thus properly focusing on the period to 
which the taxes related.  The property tax imbroglio may have been foremost on Congress’s mind when 
moved up from section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) language granting priority only to taxes for years ending 
prepetition.  See discussion infra after note 265.   
The proper definition of the word “assessed” is when the tax liability is reflected in the taxpayer’s 
records as owing and becomes due and payable.   I.R.C. §§ 6201, 6203 (recording in records).    See Bull v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935); see also I.R.C. § 6331(a).   
The problem of interpreting a poorly written statute to carry out the logical intent of Congress was 
recently discussed by Judge Posner in In re Handy Andy Home Improvement Centers., Inc., 144 F.3d 1125, 
1127 (7th Cir. 1998).  The issue in Handy Andy was whether a landlord would be entitled to an 
administrative claim for prepetition property taxes reimbursable under the lease by the tenant.  Posner held 
that the statutes must be viewed in context rather than in a hyper-technical way.  See also Heathcon 
Holdings, LLC v. Dunn Indus., LLC, 320 B.R. 86, 93 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005) (following Handy Andy in 
requiring allocation of amounts accruing both prepetition and post-petition); but see In re Montgomery 
Ward Holding Corp., 268 F.3d 205, 211 (3rd Cir. 2001) (applying what the court called a “bright line 
test”). 
133 See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (general rule that government has three years from the time a return is filed to 
assess a deficiency).  But returns filed before the due date for the return do not start the limitations period 
running.  See I.R.C. § 6501(b)(1) (return filed before due date is treated as filed on due date). 
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be entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8), and would thus be specifically excepted 
from the definition of an administrative expense.134 
This literal interpretation of the statute is inconsistent with the legislative 
history,135 and has been repeatedly rejected by the courts.136 Those courts who offered 
any reasoning at all to support their holding that Congress intended only prepetition taxes 
to be covered by the post-petition assessability rule simply found that any other result 
would be “absurd.”137 
There is a way to reach the conclusion that taxes on post-petition income are not 
entitled to priority under the post-petition assessability rule, without resorting to name-
calling.  Eighth priority is given only to “allowed unsecured clams.”138 This is a 
reference to the claim allowance provision in section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code – 
which provides for the allowance of claims that are in existence as of the petition date.139 
As a general matter, claims that first arise for bankruptcy purposes after the petition date 
are not “allowed claims” under section 502,140 and are thus not entitled to priority under 
section 507(a)(8).  Unlike section 502, which provides for “allowed claims,” post-petition 
claims under section 503(a) and (b) are referred to as “administrative expenses.”  The 
 
134 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B) (taxes incurred by the estate are administrative expenses “except a tax of a 
kind specified in section 507(a)(8) of this title.”).   
135 United States v. Redmond, 36 B.R. 932, 934 (D. Kan. 1984) (“’The actual, necessary costs and expenses 
of preserving the estate, including wages . . . rendered after the commencement of the case, and any taxes 
on, measured by or withheld from such wages . . . are allowable as administrative expenses.’  S.Rep. No. 
95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5852; H.R.Rep. No. 
95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 355, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5963, 6311. The Senate 
Report, supra, further states that ‘[i]n general, administrative expenses include taxes which the trustee 
incurs in administering the debtor's estate.’”). 
136 See, e.g. In re Westholt Mfg., Inc., 20 B.R. 368, 371 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (“a tax given priority status 
under section 507(a)(6) and predicated on pre-petition liability incurred by the debtor before the filing of 
the petition should not be promoted to a first priority administrative expense merely because it is assessed 
after the petition is filed. On the other hand, actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the 
estate . . . should not be denied administrative status merely because in character the claims resemble 
claims for taxes described in section 507(a)(6)”), aff’d United States v. Redmond, 36 B.R. 932, 934 (Bankr. 
D. Kan.  1984) (stating that taxes are “incurred” when they accrue); In re L.J. O'Neill Shoe Co., 64 F.3d 
1146, 1151 (8th Cir. 1995) (“We believe that subsection (iii) can be read, like the other subsections of 
507(a)(7)(A), to address only prepetition taxable activity or events”); In re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co., 64 
F.3d 1292, 1303 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting government’s argument that the panel’s interpretation of 
507(a)(8)(A)(iii) would apply to all post-petition taxes:  “[W]e will not presume Congress intended an 
absurd result. . . .   Taxes for periods which occur entirely post-petition are afforded an administrative 
expense priority under § 503(b)(1)(B). Congress certainly did not intend for taxes earned entirely post-
petition to be ‘relegated’ to seventh level priority”) (citations omitted); In re EMC Indus., Inc., 27 B.R. 696 
(Bankr. D. S.C. 1983). 
137See, e.g. Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co., 64 F.3d at 1303, quoted supra at note 136; see also In re O.P.M. 
Leasing Servs., Inc., 68 B.R. 979, 983-84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
138 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8). 
139 Section 502(b) provides that, after the filing of an objection, the court will allow claims after 
determining “the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the date of the filing of 
the petition.”  11 U.S.C. § 502(b).  Claims that did not exist as of the date of the filing of the petition would 
not be allowed in any amount, because nothing was owing as of the petition date.  This is to be 
distinguished, of course, from claims which exist prepetition, but are not ripe for payment or enforcement 
(such as contingent claims, unliquidated claims and unmatured claims).  See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (definition 
of claim). 
140 Id. 
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priority granted by the post-petition assessability rule in section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) only 
applies to “allowed claims” not to “allowed administrative expenses.”   
This analysis begs the question about whether the taxes incurred in the year of 
bankruptcy constitute prepetition tax claims or post-petition tax claims.  The division is 
easy if an individual debtor in a Chapter 7 or 11 case elects to make the split-year 
election.  When the election is made, the debtor’s tax year for the year of bankruptcy is 
split into two tax years, consisting respectively of a prepetition “year” and a post petition 
“year.”141 If the election is made, the taxes owed for the pre-petition partial “year” are 
treated as Section 507(a)(8) pre-petition priority taxes,142 and taxes owed for the post-
petition partial “year” are treated as 507(a)(1) administrative expenses if the benefit of 
the income redounded to the estate, or as personal obligations of the debtor if the benefit 
redounded to the debtor as part of the debtor’s “fresh start.”143 
The complexity arises if the split year election is not (or, in the case of corporate 
entities144 or individual debtors in Chapter 12 or 13 cases,145 cannot be) made.  In cases 
where the election is not or cannot be made, it is necessary to determine whether the 
taxes for the year of bankruptcy are first priority administrative expenses, eighth priority 
unsecured claims, somehow divisible between the two, or non-priority general unsecured 
claims. 
Income taxes that are entitled to eighth priority are automatically excluded from 
being treated as first priority administrative expenses.146 Income taxes incurred in the 
year of bankruptcy can only be entitled to eighth priority if the post-petition assessability 
rule applies, because the other two priority-granting rules cannot apply to year-of-
bankruptcy taxes when the split year election is not made.  The lookback rule147 could 
never apply to income taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy, absent a split year 
election or a petition filed on the last day of the tax year, because, by its terms, the rule 
only applies to taxes “for a taxable year ending on or before the filing of the petition.”148 
Unless the debtor files on the last day of the tax year, the year in which the petition is 
filed will not have ended on or before the petition date.  Similarly, income taxes incurred 
in the year of bankruptcy could not have been assessed before bankruptcy under the 240-
 
141 I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2). 
142 The taxes for the prepetition “year” of filing would be entitled to priority under both the lookback rule 
(11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i)) and the post-petition assessability rule (11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii)).  The 
lookback rule would apply because the prepetition year terminated “on” the petition date, and the return for 
the year would be due after the 3 year lookback period (indeed, the return would be due after the petition 
was filed).  The post-petition assessability rule would apply because the period of assessment would not 
even begin to run until the return for the tax year is due.  See supra note 133. 
143 By definition, the taxes owing for the post-petition tax year were not incurred prepetition.  To be 
administrative expenses, the taxes must have been “incurred by the estate.”   If the estate is “entitled to the 
income” then the estate is taxed on the income (I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1)) and the debtor is not taxed on the 
income (I.R.C. § 1398(e)(2)).  If the estate did not get the income, then nothing in the Bankruptcy Code 
would allow the government to have a claim against the estate for repayment. 
144 Only individuals are eligible to make a split-year election.  I.R.C. § 1398(a). 
145 The election can only be made by debtors in Chapter 7 or 11 cases.  Id. 
146 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i). 
147 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i). 
148 Prior to the 2005 Act, this language was in the lookback rule itself. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a)(8)(A)(i) 
(repealed 2005).  After the 2005 Act, this language was moved to 11 U.S.C. § 502(a)(8)(A), and applies to 
the lookback rule, the 240 day rule, and the post-petition assessability rule.  As is discussed below, the 
change only has an impact on the post-petition assessability rule. 
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day rule of section 507(a)(8)(A)(ii).149 Therefore, the post-petition assessability rule of 
section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) is the only provision in section 507(a)(8) that could apply to 
income taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy (unless the debtor makes a split-year 
election or files bankruptcy on the last day of the tax year).   
Does the post-petition assessability rule of section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) apply to make 
priority all or part of the taxes owing for the year of bankruptcy?  First, as discussed 
above, taxes on post-petition income should not be covered by the post-petition 
assessability rule, because the taxes do not constitute “allowed unsecured claims.”150 So 
the real question is whether taxes on income earned prepetition in the year of bankruptcy 
will be covered by the post-petition assessability rule of section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii). 
Prior to the 2005 Act, courts applied different rules for corporations and for 
individuals who did not make the split year election in deciding whether taxes on income 
earned prepetition in the year of bankruptcy were covered by section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).   
 
i. Corporate Taxpayers. 
 
The courts have consistently held that the obligation of corporate taxpayers151 to 
pay taxes on income earned prepetition is covered by the post-petition assessability 
rule,152 and is therefore not entitled to priority as an administrative expense.153 The issue 
was considered at length by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in In re Pacific-
Atlantic Trading Co. (“PATCO”).154 The PATCO panel considered whether corporate 
income taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy would be treated as first priority 
expenses of administration or as eighth priority claims under the post-petition 
assessability rule.  The debtor in PATCO did not operate post-petition, and therefore it 
appeared that all income taxes owing for the year of bankruptcy were attributable to pre-
petition earnings.  After carefully reviewing the legislative history, the PATCO panel first 
determined that Congress intended all taxes for the year of bankruptcy be treated as 
“incurred” on the last day of the taxable year.155 The Ninth Circuit panel’s focus on the 
 
149 An assessment cannot be made until after the tax return for the year is due.  See I.R.C. §§ 6201(a), 
6213(a). 
150 See supra beginning at note 132. 
151 Note that, unlike an individual taxpayer, a corporate taxpayer does not receive a discharge under 
Chapter 7.  11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1).  This is because corporate taxpayers, unlike individual taxpayers, cease 
to exist following liquidation in Chapter 7.  The corporate taxpayer’s assets are sold, creditors are paid from 
the proceeds, and only an inactive corporate shell remains.  Individual debtors, on the other hand, continue 
to live their lives and need the fresh start provided by the discharge.   
In a Chapter 11 case, a corporate debtor may continue to operate after confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization, and therefore needs the fresh start that a discharge provides.  The Chapter 11 discharge for 
corporations is broader than the Chapter 11 discharge for individuals.  Corporations are able to discharge 
obligations that would not be dischargeable to an individual.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1141(d)(1), 1141(d)(2) 
(excepting from an individual debtor’s Chapter 11 discharge debts not dischargeable under section 523).  
However, under the 2005 Act, the Chapter 11 discharge will not discharge corporate debtors from tax debts 
arising out of fraudulent returns or willful attempts to evade or defeat taxes.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(6)(B) 
(2005).   
152 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii). 
153 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i). 
154 64 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1995). 
155 Id. at 1301 (“The pertinent legislative history clearly demonstrates that the drafters of § 503(b)(1)(B)(i) 
intended that a tax on income should be treated as "incurred" on the last day of the taxable period.”).  The 
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legislative history is curious,156 as nothing in the statute suggests that taxes accruing 
prepetition in the year of bankruptcy should be treated as “incurred” at the end of the tax 
year.157 The panel then held that although the taxes were deemed to have been “incurred” 
by the estate post-petition, the taxes also fell within the literal wording of the post-
petition assessability rule,158 and would therefore be an eighth priority claim and not 
entitled to first priority as an administrative expense.  
The government objected that the panel’s reading of the post-petition assessability 
rule would treat all taxes incurred by the estate post-petition as eighth rather than first 
priority – including taxes for years beginning after the petition date.  Although the 
government’s argument was logical, the PATCO panel called the argument “absurd.”159 
The panel stated that it was following two other bankruptcy court opinions160 in holding 
 
panel recognized that a New York bankruptcy court in In re O.P.M. Leasing Services., Inc., 68 B.R. 979, 
983-84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987), had previously concluded that taxes in the year of bankruptcy are incurred 
as they accrue.  The Panel rejected the O.P.M. Court’s interpretation because it had not considered 
legislative history which, the panel believed, indicated an intent to adopt a definition of “incurred” 
contained in the version of the Bankruptcy Code adopted by the Senate Finance Committee.  The definition 
proposed by the Senate Finance Committee was not included in the final version of bill which became law.  
Nevertheless, the House and Senate managers discussing the final bill stated an intent to adopt the deleted 
portion of the Senate Finance Committee’s version.  As stated by the PATCO court:  “final statements of 
both House and Senate sponsors, Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini, reflect that Congress 
intended that the compromise bill adopt the substance of the Senate Finance Committee's definition of 
‘incurred.’”  PATCO, 64 F.3d at 1300.  Of course, it would be just as easy to conclude (regardless of what 
the House and Senate managers intended), that by omitting the language from the bill, Congress intended 
the accrual result determined by the bankruptcy court in O.P.M..  After all, if they intended to follow the 
Senate Finance Committee’s definition, why was the language omitted?  Both sides are attempting to 
determine the meaning of Congress’ omission, which is a fruitless task.  The legislative history is 
ambiguous. 
156See discussion infra beginning at note 237 regarding the propriety of using legislative history to create an 
ambiguity in the statute. 
157See In re Garfinckels, Inc., 203 B.R. 814, 820 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1996) (“Setting aside this court's concerns 
about the dubious nature of [the PATCO panel] relying on unenacted proposed legislation.”);   cf. United 
States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (courts should look beyond the text of a statute 
only in "rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds 
with the intentions of its drafters") (citations omitted). 
158 PATCO, 64 F.3d at 1302 (“The tax at issue, however, fits on its face within the narrow parameters set by 
§ 507(a)(7)(A)(iii). Since § 507(a)(7)(A)(iii) is satisfied, PATCO's liability for the 1988 taxes is excepted 
from § 503 and given seventh priority.”) 
159 Like the taxes in the year of bankruptcy, taxes for an entirely post-petition year were not assessed before 
and are assessable after the petition date.  The PATCO panel rejected the government’s argument that, 
under the panel’s theory, taxes for an entirely post-petition year would also fit within the post-petition 
assessability rule:  “We will not presume Congress intended an absurd result. . . .  Taxes for periods which 
occur entirely post-petition are afforded an administrative expense priority under § 503(b)(1)(B).  Congress 
certainly did not intend for taxes earned entirely post-petition to be "relegated" to seventh level priority 
status.  PATCO, 64 F.3d at 1303.     
160Id. at 1303-04 citing In re Interco,  Inc., 143 B.R. 707 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992), aff’d sub nom.   In re L.J. 
O’Neill Shoe Co., 64 F.3d 1146 (8th Cir. 1995), discussed supra note 159, and In re O.P.M. Leasing 
Services., Inc., 68 B.R. 979 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).   In Interco, the court issued two orders regarding 
priority claims.  One order set a bar date for creditors holding priority claims other than administrative 
claims to file proofs of claim with the court.  The other order stated that administrative claimants were not 
required to file claims by the priority claim bar date.  The Missouri Department of Revenue did not file a 
proof of claim for the year of bankruptcy, claiming that all of the taxes for the year of bankruptcy were 
entitled to administrative priority.  The Interco court ultimately split the baby, holding “that the taxes 
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that income taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy would be treated as eighth priority 
under the post-petition assessability rule.161 After determining that the post-petition 
assessability rule applied to taxes for a prepetition period that are deemed to have been 
incurred post-petition, it was a straightforward matter of statutory interpretation to hold 
that the taxes were not entitled to administrative priority.162 The PATCO panel did not 
adequately reconcile its ruling that the tax claim accrued post-petition (at the end of the 
year) with its ruling that the taxes would be treated as a pre-petition eighth priority 
claim.163 
A few days after PATCO was filed, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
filed an opinion in In re L.J. O'Neill Shoe Company.164 Unlike the panel in PATCO, the 
O’Neill Shoe panel did not address whether taxes on prepetition income would be 
deemed to have been incurred post-petition.165 Like PATCO, however, the court held that 
 
attributable to income earned prepetition receive the seventh level priority status described in Section 
507(a)(7), and the taxes attributable to income earned after the petition date receive first priority 
administrative expense status under Section 503(b)(1)(B).”  Interco, 143 B.R. at 714.  The court did not 
indicate how the prepetition and post-petition tax liability (which, after all, is based on the application of 
marginal rates) should be computed.  The bankruptcy court’s decision in Interco was affirmed by the Court 
of Appeals for the 8th Circuit in In re L.J.  O’Neill Shoe, 64 F.3d 1146 (8th Cir. 1995), discussed supra 
note 159. 
The O.P.M. court reached a similar allocation result by focusing on when the activity giving rise 
to the tax liability occurred.  If the activity occurred prepetition, then the taxes would be covered by 
507(a)(8)(A)(iii) and would not be entitled to administrative priority.  If the activity giving rise to the taxes 
occurred after the petition date, then the taxes would be “incurred” by the estate and would be subject to 
administrative priority.  The only authority cited by the court for focusing on the activity giving rise to the 
tax liability are cases involving tax years entirely prepetition or entirely post-petition.  See O.P.M., 68 B.R. 
at 983-84.   
161 Id. at 1304 (“In conclusion, we hold that PATCO's 1988 income tax liability for income earned prior to 
the granting of the order for relief and the appointment of the Trustee on October 31, 1988 does not qualify 
as an administrative expense. Even though the taxes were "incurred by the estate" on December 31, 1988, 
the plain meaning of the phrase "not assessed before, but assessable, under applicable law or by agreement, 
after, the commencement of the case," persuades us that the 1988 tax claim fits squarely within the 
definition of § 507(a)(7)(A)(iii) and is therefore not an allowable administrative expense.”) 
162 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i). 
163 An additional issue in PATCO was whether the government’s priority tax claim was barred because the 
government’s proof of claim was filed late.  The panel in PATCO held that the claim was not barred 
because, at the time, section 502 contained no provision for disallowing claims solely because the claims 
were filed late.  PATCO had followed the earlier holding of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
In re Vecchio, 20 F.3d 555, 559 (2d Cir. 1994), that late filed priority tax claims were not barred by the 
Bankruptcy Code and thus could not be barred by the Bankruptcy Rules.  The Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit rejected the analysis of the Vecchio and PATCO panels, holding that Bankruptcy Rule 3002, 
which requires creditors to file proofs of claim by the bar date, constitutes a separate substantive rule of law 
sufficient to disallow the government’s late-filed priority claim.  In re Chavis, 47 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 
1995).  The issue became moot for cases filed after Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,  
Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 213, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994), which added to the Bankruptcy Code a provision 
disallowing most late-filed claims. 
164 64 F.3d 1146 (8th Cir. 1995). 
165 Id. at 1149 (“We need not accept the debtors' invitation to reach the difficult question of whether the 
portion of the tax attributable to prepetition income was "incurred by the estate," because like the courts 
below, we conclude that the prepetition portion of the claim was for a tax of a kind specified in section 
507(a)(7).”). 
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prepetition taxes in the year of bankruptcy are covered by the post-petition assessability 
rule, and are therefore excluded from discharge.166 
The difficult problem for the O’Neill Shoe panel was addressing the government’s 
argument that the court’s interpretation of the post-petition assessability rule would apply 
it to all post-petition taxes.  Like the panel in PATCO, the lower courts in O’Neill Shoe 
had dismissed the government’s argument as “absurd.”  The O’Neill Shoe panel, 
however, expressed concern with the lower courts so easily dismissing the analogy as 
“absurd.”167 To solve the interpretative dilemma, the O’Neill Shoe panel noted that the 
other two provisions in section 507(a)(8) – the lookback rule168 and the 240 day 
assessment rule169 – only apply to pre-petition conduct.  Even though, prior to the 2005 
Act,170 the post-petition assessability rule contained no such language, the O’Neill Shoe 
panel suggested that Congress must have intended the post-petition assessability rule to 
likewise apply only to taxes on prepetition income.171 While this may be a sensible 
reading of Congressional intent, it is certainly not a reading mandated by the language of 
the statute.  Unlike subsections (i) and (ii) of section 507(a)(8)(A), which specifically 
referred to, or could only applied to, tax liabilities for years ending prepetition,172 
subsection (iii) made no such reference.  The doctrine of Expresio unius est exclusio 
alterius173 would lead to the opposite of the result suggested by the panel in O’Neill 
Shoe.174 
Moreover, the O’Neill Shoe panel did not wholly incorporate the theory used in 
the lookback and 240 day rules.  Had it done so, prepetition taxes incurred in the year of 
bankruptcy would not be covered by section 507(a)(8) at all, since the lookback rule and 
the 240 day rule only apply to taxes for years ending prepetition.175 While the O’Neill 
Shoe panel’s partial incorporation of the lookback rule’s language into the post-petition 
assessability rule solves the interpretative problem of entirely post-petition taxes falling 
within the post-petition assessability rule, full incorporation would, as discussed below 
 
166 Id. at 1150. 
167 L.J. O’Neill Shoe, 64 F.3d at 1150 (“We nevertheless agree with MDOR [the taxing authority] that the 
‘plain meaning’ reading provided by the lower courts presents some conceptual difficulties and structural 
inconsistencies in this case.”). 
168 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i). 
169 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii). 
170 The 2005 Act contains an amendment causing all three rules in section 507(a)(8) to apply only to taxes 
for years arising post-petition.  11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2005) (flush language). 
171 L.J. O’Neill Shoe, 64 F.3d at 1150 (“We believe that subsection (iii) can be read, like the other 
subsections of 507(a)(7)(A), to address only prepetition taxable activity or events.”) . 
172 See supra notes 147 - 149. 
173 Literally, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of others.  See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 
(6th ed. 1990) ("[w]hen certain . . . things are specified in a law . . . an intention to exclude all others from 
its operation may be inferred.").   The doctrine is normally used with respect to lists, but similar reasoning 
would apply where one part of a statute mentions an exclusion while another part does not. 
174 The argument would be that by expressing that subsection (i) only applies to taxes for years ending 
prepetition and not expressing a similar limitation in subsection (iii), Congress did not intend the limitation 
to apply under subsection (iii).  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 741 n.9  (2004) (quoting 2A 
N. Singer, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:06, at 194 (6th ed. 2000) (“the usual rule [is] 
that 'when the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another, 
the court assumes different meanings were intended.’”). 
175 See supra notes 147 - 149.  
27
with respect to the 2005 Act,176 cause a more serious problem of excluding all taxes in 
the year of bankruptcy from eighth priority treatment.   
Other courts have followed PATCO and O’Neill Shoe in holding that taxes owing 
by corporate debtors in the year of bankruptcy are to be split between the prepetition and 
post-petition period, with the prepetition taxes entitled to eighth priority and the post-
petition taxes entitled to first priority.177 Despite the holding of three circuit courts, the 
Internal Revenue Service has continued to claim that all taxes incurred in the year of 
bankruptcy are post-petition claims entitled to first priority as administrative expenses.178 
In a series of scholarly articles published in the American Bankruptcy Institute 
Law Review in 2001, three experts suggested various approaches for treating year-of-
bankruptcy taxes in the corporate context.  Professor Jacob L. Todres argued that 
corporate taxes in the year of bankruptcy should be apportioned between the prepetition 
period and the post-petition period based on time, ignoring whether the income being 
taxed was in fact earned prepetition or post-petition.179 Professor Todres argued that the 
time-based approach is consistent with the tax rules in other areas,180 and is consistent 
with the language of I.R.C. section 1398, which allows only individuals to make the split-
year election.181 Professor Todres agrees with PATCO that all straddle-year taxes were 
“’incurred by the estate’ since a tax is always deemed incurred on the last day of the 
taxable year.” 182 According to Professor Todres, the PATCO result is consistent with 
both the Bankruptcy Code and the annual year concept of tax law.  Professor Todres did 
not explain how some taxes deemed to arise prepetition (namely, a portion of the taxes 
 
176 See discussion infra beginning at page 41. 
177 See In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 116 F.3d 1391, 1396 (11th Cir.  1997); In re Quid Me 
Broadcasting, Inc., No. 95-03876, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7581, *14-15, 78 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5039 
(W.D.N.Y. 1996).  See also In re Bayly Corp., 163 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s claim against the debtor for under-funding its pension plan was 
not an obligation “incurred by the estate” within the meaning of section 503(b)(1)(B), and therefore panel 
did not address whether the obligation constituted a “tax.”  The panel suggested that it would follow OPM 
Leasing rather than PATCO if the obligation was a tax by treating it as “incurred” when the liability 
accrued rather than when the tax year ended. ) Id. at 1209. 
178 See Memorandum for Associate Area Counsel, 2002 IRS CCA LEXIS 67, *11-13 (2002) (“[o]ur 
position is that no provision of section 507(a)(8) includes the prepetition portion of income tax liability for 
the straddle year”). 
179 Jacob L. Todres, Tax Filing Year in Bankruptcy:  Corporate Bankruptcy: Treatment of Filing Year 
Income Tax – A Suggested Approach, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 523 (2001). 
180 Professor Todres identifies five situations in which taxes must be apportioned:  (1) an “S” corporation 
shareholder’s interest in the corporation is terminated mid-year, (2) an “S” corporation’s status is 
terminated mid-year, (3) a corporation that has gone through a change of control mid-year wishes to carry-
back net operating losses, but is limited by I.R.C. section 382 from carrying-back post-change-of-control 
losses, (4) a corporation that enters or leaves a consolidated group mid-year cannot have post-departure tax 
items attributed to the group’s consolidated return, and (5) a partner’s interest in a partnership is terminated 
mid-year.  Id. at 543-545.  In the first three situations, the default rule is to allocate the year-end tax items 
based on time, but in certain cases the parties can elect to close the tax year at the time of change.  Id. The 
opposite rule applies in the fourth situation:  the default year requires the corporation to lose the tax year at 
the time of change, but an election is available in certain circumstances to allocate.  Id. In the fifth 
situation, the Internal Revenue Code allows either allocation, closing the books, or any other method of 
allocation that is reasonable. 
181 Id. at 549. 
182 Id. at 554.  Professor Todres does not consider the effect of 11 U.S.C. section 502(i) on this conclusion. 
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from the year of bankruptcy) could come within the language of the post-petition 
assessability rule, while all other post-petition taxes would not. 
Attorney Graham Stieglitz argued that the government’s claim for taxes should be 
deemed to arise for bankruptcy purposes when the income giving rise to the claim was 
earned, rather than at the end of the year when the tax claim arises under applicable non-
bankruptcy tax law.183 Stieglitz thus rejects the interpretation made by the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in PATCO and accepted by Professor Todres.  Stieglitz 
bases his argument on the definition of a “claim” under bankruptcy law, focusing on a 
series of famous bankruptcy law tort cases that struggled with the question of whether the 
claimant had a right to payment on the petition date.184 
Professor Jack F. Williams summarized the two other articles, and suggested that 
Congress decide whether income taxes incurred by a corporation in the year of 
bankruptcy should be entirely treated as administrative expenses, should be divided 
between the prepetition and post-petition periods based on mandating the filing of 
separate returns, or should be allocated on the basis of time.185 
Thus, under existing law, there is a split of opinion as to whether the 
government’s claim for taxes on prepetition corporate income should be deemed to have 
been incurred prepetition or post-petition.  Regardless of the answer to this question, 
however, every court to consider the issue has held that the claim for such taxes is not 
entitled to administrative expense priority because the post-petition assessability rule 
applies and relegates the taxes to eighth priority.  The Internal Revenue Service has never 
accepted the case law, and has continued to insist that corporate tax claims in the year of 
bankruptcy be treated as first priority administrative expenses.186 
Similarly, none of the cases has directly ruled on how the taxes incurred in the 
year of bankruptcy are to be apportioned between the prepetition and post-petition 
periods.  Professor Todres has correctly identified two possible apportionment methods – 
the “closing of the year” method in which the tax liability for transactions which occurred 
prepetition would be determined separately from the tax liability for transactions which 
occurred post-petition, and the allocation-based-on-time method in which the final year 
of bankruptcy tax liability is apportioned based on the length in time in the prepetition 
and post-petition periods.187 The former method would be inconsistent with the Internal 
Revenue Code’s theory excluding corporations from making a split year election, because 
the allocation would require the taxpayer to prepare two tax returns to identify the tax 
effect of the income earned prepetition.  Therefore, apportionment based on time is more 
consonant with the statutory rules.  Apportionment based on time also answers the 
government’s argument that any apportionment would treat corporate taxpayers as if they 
 
183 Graham Stieglitz, Mini-Symposium:  Tax Filing Year in Bankruptcy:  Stuck in the Middle Again!  How 
to Treat Straddle-Year Income Taxes in a Corporate Chapter 11 Reorganization, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 467 (Winter 2001). 
184 The bankruptcy court’s definition of a “claim” is discussed infra beginning at note 218.  A stronger 
argument in favor of Mr. Stieglitz’s view can be made by focusing on contract cases, which are more 
directly relevant to tax liabilities than are the tort cases upon which Stieglitz relies.  Id. 
185 Jack F. Williams, Mini-Symposium: Tax Filing Year In Bankruptcy: Bifurcation for Claim Filing 
Purposes of a Corporate Tax Year That Straddles the Petition Date, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463 
(Winter 2001). 
186 See supra note 178. 
187 See discussion supra notes 179 - 182. 
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were eligible to make the split-year election.  Unlike a split-year election, apportionment 
based on time does not attempt to account separately for prepetition and post-petition 
activity.   For example, a non-electing debtor who filed bankruptcy at the end of March, 
and owed $10,000 in taxes for full calendar year would owe one-quarter of the taxes 
($2,500) for the pre-petition period, and three-quarters of the taxes ($7,500) for the post-
petition period.  The government would have a $2,500 claim entitled to eighth priority 
under section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii), and a $7,500 claim entitled to first priority as an 
administrative expense.  This would be true even if all of the activity giving rise to the tax 
occurred prepetition.  Under the closing-of-the-year method, all of the taxes in this event 
would be subject to eighth priority, and none would be eligible for treatment as first 
priority administrative expenses.  An allocation based on time would harmonize the 
statutory provisions while making an appropriate distinction between creditors who make 
a split year election (and thus allocate pre- and post-petition taxable activity), and those 
who do not make the election.   
While allocating year-of-bankruptcy taxes based on time best harmonizes the 
existing statutory rules, Congress should consider changing the law to require all 
taxpayers to split the year of bankruptcy into two taxable years.  There would be 
significant advantages to mandating a split-year return.  Most importantly, a split-year 
return would eliminate confusion as to the amount and treatment of prepetition and post-
petition claims.  The existing system, which allows individual taxpayers in Chapter 7 and 
11 cases to elect whether they wish to split their returns or not, likely results in lower tax 
revenues, because debtors can be expected to make the election only when it will reduce 
their tax liabilities.  Similarly, if prepetition and post-petition claims are prorated on the 
basis of time, the claim amounts will not properly reflect prepetition and post-petition 
economic activity.  The only disadvantage of requiring a split-year election is that debtors 
will be required to do the extra work of preparing two partial-year tax returns.  Under 
existing law, individual taxpayers are already strongly incentivised to make the split-year 
election,188 and all taxpayers must prepare segregated prepetition and post-petition 
financial records in order to comply with the rules of bankruptcy procedure.189 Therefore, 
the additional expense from mandating a short-year tax return would likely not be very 
significant.  On balance, mandating a split-year return makes the most sense because it 
would accurately tax and treat prepetition and post-petition activities, would minimize 
manipulation, and would not impose an undue burden on taxpayers who are already 
required to maintain segregated financial records.  By mandating separate tax returns for 
the prepetition and post-petition period, the priority given to the government’s claims 
would accurately reflect the debtor’s economic activity, would limit opportunities for tax 
manipulation, and would not impose a significant hardship on debtors.. 
 
ii. Individual Taxpayers Who Do Not Make The Split-
Year Election. 
 
188 See discussion infra beginning at note 245.  
189 See, e.g. Bankruptcy Rule 1007(b)(1) (debtor must file schedules of assets, liabilities, current income 
and expenditures; 2015(a) (requiring debtors to file, among other things, monthly operating reports and 
reports of disbursements); 11 U.S.C. § 704(8) (required monthly operating reports). 
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The courts have applied an entirely different set of rules to individual debtors who 
do not make the split-year election.  Instead of holding that the prepetition taxes are 
entitled to eighth priority under the post-petition assessability rule,190 the courts have 
consistently held that the prepetition taxes do not constitute a claim against the estate at 
all, and the debtor is solely liable for them.191 The courts considering this issue have 
relied on a statement in a committee report to the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, which 
suggests that the entire tax liability for the year of bankruptcy is to be treated outside of 
bankruptcy, and should not be a liability of the estate:  “If the debtor does not make the 
[section 1398 split-year] election, no part of the debtor's tax liability from the year in 
which the bankruptcy case commences is collectible from the estate, but is collectible 
from the individual debtor.”192 Many courts have followed this legislative history in 
holding that the bankruptcy estate has no liability for taxes of an individual debtor 
incurred in the year of bankruptcy if the debtor does not make the split-year election.193 
190 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii). 
191See, e.g. In re Haedo, 211 B.R. 149, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (if debtor does not make the split-year election 
“the entire liability for the year of the bankruptcy filing is a claim against the debtor but is not collectible 
from the estate”); In re Prativadi, 281 B.R. 816, 819 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2002);  In re Johnson, 190 B.R. 
724, 726 (Bankr. Mass. 1995) (“The Debtors' failure to make the election under section 1398 leaves the 
IRS with a post-petition tax claim against the Debtors individually, with no claim whatsoever against their 
bankruptcy estate for any part of the 1992 tax liability”); In re Pflug, 146 B.R. 687, 689 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1992); In re Moore, 132 B.R. 533 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991); In re Mirman, 98 B.R. 742, 744-745 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 1989); In re Turboff, 93 B.R. 523, 525 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988);  see also In re Canon, 130 B.R. 
748, 751 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991)  (“The United States contends that the Trustee is not entitled to the 1988 
refund because the estate has no liability for the Debtor's 1988 taxes. However, liability for unpaid taxes is 
not at issue here because withholdings made both prepetition and post-petition satisfied the tax liability for 
the year in which the Debtor filed his Chapter 7 petition. Furthermore . . . a trustee has a right to demand an 
apportioned share of the refund if the debtors are entitled to a refund for the tax year in which the petition is 
filed.”); accord In re Weir, No. 85-40456-7, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 778, *9, 71 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 4724 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1990). 
 However, in In re Wood, 240 B.R. 609 (C.D. Cal. 1999), the district court applied a different rule 
in a Chapter 11 case.  First, the Wood court stated in accordance with the other cases involving non-electing 
individuals that the prepetition taxes for the year of bankruptcy would not constitute a claim against the 
estate.  The debtor argued that since the taxes were due prior to the confirmation of the plan, and the 
government had failed to obtain payment through the plan, the taxes were dischargeable in Chapter 11.  To 
avoid having the taxes be discharged, the court first suggested that the taxes would be entitled to first 
priority treatment as administrative expenses, and thus would be excepted from discharge.   “There is no 
question that the tax liability would be a nondischargeable debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A).”  Id at 613 
n.36.  The two rulings conflict with each other.  If the estate is not liable for the taxes, then the taxes cannot 
constitute administrative expenses.  To be administrative expenses, the taxes must be “incurred by the 
estate.”  See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i).  Moreover, administrative expenses are not excepted from 
discharge under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1)(B) (covering only “taxes entitled to 
priority under 507(a)(8)); § 1141 (discharge of claims arising priority to confirmation, except taxes of an 
individual excepted from discharge under section 523(a)).  The court used conclusionary language to 
obfuscate the statutory rules in order to prevent the debtor from discharging under Chapter 11 taxes that 
would not be dischargeable under Chapter 7.  A consistent application of the rule stated in the legislative 
history – that the taxes are not an obligation of the estate, but instead are a personal obligation of the debtor 
arising at the end of the tax year – should have resulted  in the discharge of the taxes not dealt with under 
the plan. 
192S. Rep. No. 96-1036 at 26, 1980-2 C.B. 620, quoted in In re Prativadi, 281 B.R. 816, 819 (Bankr. W.D. 
N.Y. 2002); In re Johnson, 190 B.R. 724, 727 (Bankr. Mass 1995).  This was the Senate Report issued in 
connection with the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389. 
193 See supra note 191. 
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The court’s treatment of prepetition taxes in the year of bankruptcy is wrong for a 
number of reasons.  First, the courts have treated this legislative history as if it were itself 
law, without explaining how this result can be reached under the existing statutory 
provisions.  Indeed, there is no solid basis under the existing statutory rules for the 
disparate treatment of corporations and individuals who do not make the split-year 
election with respect to prepetition taxes.  Individuals in Chapter 7 and 11 cases who do 
not make the split-year election, and individuals in Chapter 12 and 13 cases and 
corporations who are ineligible to make the split year election, are treated as having their 
taxable year determined without regard to the filing of the bankruptcy case.194 The only 
difference between the treatment of non-electing individuals and corporations is that 
there is cleavage between an individual debtor and the estate in Chapter 7 and 11 cases as 
to post-petition taxes,195 while there is no cleavage between individual debtors in 
Chapters 12 and 13 and corporate debtors on the one hand, and the estate on the other 
hand, as to post-petition taxes.196 This is because there is no separate identity between a 
Chapter 12, Chapter 13 or corporate debtor and the estate, while there is a separate 
identity between an individual debtor in Chapter 7 and 11 and the estate.197 An 
individual receives a fresh start under Chapter 7 and 11, and may thus have income and 
deductions separate from the estate.  A corporation (or an individual in Chapter 12 or 13), 
on the other hand, has no separate existence.  While there is a basis for different treatment 
of post-petition obligations, nothing in the statute198 requires special treatment for non-
electing individual Chapter 7 or 11 taxpayers with respect to prepetition items. 
Second, the language in the cited legislative history could be applied equally to 
corporations who do not make the split-year election (because they are ineligible to do 
so) and individuals who are eligible but choose not to elect.   
Third, disallowing a claim against the estate for prepetition taxes is bad policy.  
The prepetition income that is being taxed (to the extent it has not been dissipated) is 
property of the estate.  Disallowing a claim against the estate puts the government at a 
disadvantage vis à vis other unsecured creditors in recovering a distribution from the 
estate.  In Chapter 7 cases, the government might not care about losing a claim against 
the estate because the debtor remains personally liable for payment of the taxes because 
only prepetition “claims” are discharged,199 and by definition the tax liability is not being 
treated as a prepetition “claim.” However, the government could well suffer a loss if the 
debtor had no post-petition assets or non-exempt earnings from which to pay the taxes. 
Fourth, disallowing a claim against the estate creates confusion under the Chapter 
11 discharge.  The discharge under Chapter 11 applies to claims against the debtor arising 
 
194 See I.R.C. § 1398(d)(1). 
195 See I.R.C. § 1398(e). 
196 I.R.C. § 1399. 
197See In re Knobel, 167 B.R. 436, 443 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994), citing  H.R. Rep. No. 96-833 at 19 n.2 
(1980) (“The individual may obtain new assets or earn wages after transfer of the pre-bankruptcy property 
to the trustee and thus derive income independent of that derived by the trustee from the transferred assets 
of the bankruptcy estate as in chapter 7 and exempt property may be used to make payments to creditors, 
and hence the bankruptcy law does not create the same dichotomy between after-acquired assets of the 
individual debtor and assets of the bankruptcy estate as in chapter 7 or chapter 11 cases.”). 
198 I.R.C. § 1398; 1399. 
199 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (discharge applies to prepetition “debts,” which are defined in section 101(12 ) 
as liability on a “claim.”). 
32
prior to the date that the plan of reorganization was confirmed (and thus includes post-
petition claims arising prior to confirmation).200 If, as the cases hold, the government has 
no prepetition “claim” against a non-electing individual debtor’s bankruptcy estate,201 
and, furthermore, the government is not entitled to an administrative expense priority 
because the taxes were not “incurred by the estate,”202 then the debtor should be able to 
discharge the post-petition non-priority taxes under a plan of reorganization.203 Surely, 
such a result was not intended. 
Presumably, the courts would support their decision disallowing any tax claim 
against the estate of a non-electing individual debtor for the year of bankruptcy by 
arguing that the statute says that the debtor has a single tax year, and that under 
applicable non-bankruptcy tax law the claim for taxes is deemed to have been “incurred” 
at the end of the year – post-petition.204 Because the “claim” is deemed to arise post-
petition, no claim is allowed under section 502.  Although there is nothing in the Tax 
Code itself that says that taxes are deemed to have been “incurred” at the end of the tax 
year, it is of course true that a year’s tax liability cannot be determined until the year is 
completed.205 The corporate cases have not been consistent in determining when taxes 
are incurred.  In support of its conclusion that taxes for the year of bankruptcy were 
 
200 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A). 
201 See supra note 191. 
202 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1)(B). 
203 For example, assume a debtor files bankruptcy in June, 2005, and owes $60,000 in taxes for the 2005 
year, half of which was attributable to prepetition income.   If the debtor is able to confirm a plan in 
December 2006 that provides for 20% distribution to unsecured creditors, can the debtor discharge the 
$30,000 prepetition tax liability by paying only $6,000?  It would appear under the courts’ rulings that the 
government has no prepetition claim against the estate on account of taxes on income earned prepetition.  
Similarly, none of the taxes on prepetition income was incurred “by the estate,” since the estate did not 
exist prepetition, and thus the government would not be entitled to recover administrative expenses on 
account of the prepetition taxes.  Since the government is not entitled to a priority claim, it would appear 
that the liability could be discharged under Chapter 11 – something Congress certainly did not intend. 
There are several coherent ways around the problem, however.  Under the so-called “best interests 
of creditors” test, the plan can be confirmed only if non-accepting creditors receive at least as much in 
value as they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation occurring on the effective date of the plan.  11 
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).  If a new Chapter 7 case were to be filed on the effective date of the plan, the 
prepetition taxes would be entitled to priority under 507(a)(8) (since the claim would have arisen 
prepetition), and thus the creditor would be entitled to full payment of the claim (albeit over six years).  
Thus, by making no distribution on account of the claim, the plan fails the best interests of creditors test.  
Alternatively, the court could find that the plan fails the good faith tests.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(2), (a)(3).  
The courts that have considered this issue have simply ruled that the plan could not be confirmed without 
paying the claims in full.  See In re Johnson, 190 B.R. 724, 728 (Bankr. Mass. 1995); In re Wood, 240 B.R. 
609, 613 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (stating, without any analysis, that “There is no question that the tax liability 
would be a nondischargeable debt” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)).  
204 Interestingly, some of the courts applying the legislative history in the individual context have rejected 
the notion that the prepetition taxes in the year of bankruptcy were incurred at the end of the year.  See In re 
Johnson, 190 B.R. at 726  (“Although the term "incurred" is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, the clear 
weight of authority holds that federal income taxes are incurred at the time they accrue as opposed to the 
time payment is due for section 503(b)(1)(B) purposes.”). 
205 See Todres, supra note 179, at 533 (“From a tax standpoint, it normally makes no sense to attempt to 
determine how much tax was incurred in a portion of the tax year, since the tax consequences are 
dependent upon what happens during the remainder of the taxable year”);  PATCO, 64 F.3d at 1299 (noting 
that “the statutory language is unclear [as to when a tax claim arises, so] we look to legislative history to 
glean Congress' intent”).   
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“incurred” on the last day of the tax year, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
PATCO relied on statements about the proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1978 made by the 
House and Senate managers after the conference amendments were completed.206 These 
statements reflected language contained in the Senate Finance Committee’s report on an 
earlier draft of the bill, which included a provision specifying that income taxes were to 
be deemed “incurred” for bankruptcy purposes at the end of the tax year.207 The Senate 
Finance Committee’s language to which the statements referred was deleted at the 
conference level and did not become part of the Bankruptcy Code.208 The PATCO panel 
relied on the statements as if the deletion was an oversight.  With equal force, one could 
argue that the deletion of this language suggests an intent by Congress that the taxes not 
be treated as “incurred” at the end of the tax year.  There is simply no clear authority for 
treating prepetition taxes in the year of bankruptcy as being “incurred” at the end of the 
year.209 Indeed, the majority of the courts to consider the issue have rejected the PATCO 
panel’s analysis by holding that taxes are “incurred” as they accrue.210 
Interestingly, the court in In re Johnson,211 one of the cases following the 
legislative history by disallowing any claim against the bankruptcy estate for taxes owing 
by a non-electing individual,212 held that taxes are incurred as they accrue (rather than at 
the end of the year).  The debtor in Johnson filed a petition under the reorganization 
provisions of Chapter 11, and did not make the split-year election.  The debtor sought to 
treat the prepetition taxes owing for the year of bankruptcy as eighth priority taxes under 
the post-petition assessability rule, rather than as first priority administrative expenses, 
because debtor could confirm a plan to pay eighth priority taxes over six years,213 while 
the debtor would have had to pay first priority administrative expenses in cash on the 
 
206 PATCO, 64 F.3d at 1300. 
207 S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 346(a) (1978) (as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee and the 
Senate Finance Committee), reprinted in Collier on Bankruptcy, Appendix Volume 3 at VII (15th ed. 1995) 
(“[A] tax on or measured by income or gross receipts for a taxable period shall  be considered incurred on 
the last day of the taxable period.”). 
208 PATCO, 64 F.3d at 1300. 
209 In a so-far unsuccessful attempt to obtain first priority administrative expense treatment for corporate 
taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy, the government has consistently argued that taxes are incurred at 
the end of the tax year.  See supra note 178.  As is discussed below, if the government’s argument is 
successful but the taxes are not accorded administrative expense priority under applicable bankruptcy, the 
government will be relegated to having a dischargeable general unsecured claim. 
210 See, e.g. In re Redmond, 36 B.R. at 934  (“For purposes of determining when the taxes were incurred, it 
is the date the taxes accrued rather than the date of assessment which controls.”);  In re Hillsborough 
Holdings Corp., 156 B.R. at 320, aff’d on other grounds, 116 F.3d 1391 (11th Cir. 1997);  In re O.P.M. 
Leasing Services, Inc., 68 B.R. 983-84 ;  see also In re Interco, Inc., 143 B.R., 714  (“Congress . . . directed 
that certain claims which were technically incurred post-petition should nevertheless be excluded (at least 
in part) from first level priority status to reflect their prepetition connections.”). 
211 In re Johnson, 190 B.R. at  726. 
212 Because the claim was not dischargeable, the court held that the debtor was required to pay the claim in 
full under the plan (even though the government had no claim against the debtor’s estate).  Johnson, 190 
B.R. at 728 (“[T]his Court finds that the Debtors' 1992 tax liability to the IRS can only be collected from 
the Debtors or from their post-petition income for services performed after the filing of the Chapter 11. 
Moreover, the Debtors' Chapter 11 plan must provide for payment of these taxes, as their payment is 
integral to the feasibility and good faith requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129.”) (citations omitted). 
213 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (repealed 2005).  Under the 2005 Act, eighth priority taxes must be paid in 
regular installments over five years following the date the petition was filed, unless the debtor treats other 
nonpriority unsecured creditors in a more favorable way.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)(C) (2005). 
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effective date of the plan.214 The Johnson court agreed with the debtor that the taxes 
were “incurred” as they accrued, but rejected the argument that the taxes therefore were 
covered by the post-petition assessability rule.  The Johnson court held instead that the 
split year election rules somehow mandate that the taxes incurred in the year of 
bankruptcy not constitute a claim against the estate.215 The Johnson court did not explain 
why treating the prepetition taxes as eight priority claim would thwart the split-year 
election rules.  Presumably, the court believed that granting an eighth priority would treat 
electing and non-electing debtors the same way – a belief that is not well grounded.216 
Ultimately, the Johnson court held that the taxes were personal obligations of the debtor 
that could not be restructured under the plan.  The Johnson court did not consider that its 
ruling would appear to make the taxes dischargeable, since confirmation of a Chapter 11 
plan discharges all claims against the debtor arising prior to the confirmation date and not 
dealt with by the plan.217 
More importantly, the Johnson court’s analysis wrongly focuses entirely on the 
label attached to the claim by the tax law, and ignores the Bankruptcy Code’s definition 
of a “claim.”  A “claim” is broadly defined in the Bankruptcy Code to include any right 
to payment, even if unliquidated, contingent and unmatured.218 The legislative history 
says that Congress intended this language to be interpreted in the broadest possible 
way.219 While applicable non-bankruptcy law determines whether a claimant has a 
substantive right to payment, the timing of the claim for bankruptcy purposes is a 
question of federal bankruptcy law, and is not governed by the label attached to the claim 
by non-bankrutpcy law.220 In tort cases, some courts have focused exclusively on 
 
214 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A). 
215Johnson, 190 B.R. at 727 (“the cases cited by the Debtors [for the proposition that the prepetition taxes 
in the year of bankruptcy fall within the post-petition assessability rule] are corporate cases, not individual 
cases, or do not involve income taxes, and section 1398 is inapplicable to corporations. The allocation 
scheme advocated by the Debtors circumvents their failure to make the election afforded them by section 
1398(d)(2). Therefore, in the context of Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases involving individual debtors, such 
an allocation scheme contravenes the provisions of the Tax Reform Act.”). 
216 See discussion supra after note 187. 
217 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (Confirmation of a plan “discharges the debtor from any debt that arose 
before the date of such confirmation.”). 
218 11 U.S.C. § 101(a)(5)(A). 
219See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 at 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266; S. Rep. No. 95-
989 at 21-2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5807-08 (“By the broadest possible definition 
and by the use of the term throughout [the Bankruptcy Code] . . . the bill contemplates that all legal 
obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the 
bankruptcy case.  It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court.”) 
220 See Ralph R. Mabey &  Annette W. Jarvis, In re Frenville: A Critique by the National Bankruptcy 
Conference's Committee on Claims and Distributions, 42 BUS. LAW. 697, 704 (1987) (“state law labels 
established for an entirely different purpose should not be determinative of when a claim arose for purposes 
of its treatment in bankruptcy,” citing Thomas A. Jackson, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
48-49 (1986)).  Only the Third Circuit has suggested that state law labels of when a claim “accrues” should 
be controlling in Bankruptcy.  In the now infamous case of In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332, 335-36 
(3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985), the panel held that an accounting firm could not assert 
an equitable indemnity claim against the debtor for providing the accounting firm with false information 
until a claim giving rise to indemnity is brought against the accounting firm.  The panel also held that 
because the indemnity “claim” did not arise under state law prepetition, the accounting firm was not 
prevented by the automatic stay (11 U.S.C. § 362(a)) from suing the debtor.  The Third Circuit has 
continued to apply Frenville despite severe criticism from academics and other circuits.  See Jones v. 
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whether the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred prepetition.221 Most courts have 
required a showing that the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred prepetition, and that 
a sufficient relationship existed between the claimant and the debtor/tortfeasor so that it 
would be fair to expect the debtor to discover the injury and file a proof of claim in the 
bankruptcy case.222 Attorney Graham Stieglitz has concluded that the government has a 
“claim” for taxes owing prepetition in the year of bankruptcy under either the conduct 
test or the relationship test.223 
While the tort cases are instructive, possibly of more relevance are the contract 
cases.  A bankruptcy “claim” is deemed to arise in contract cases when the contract is 
entered into, even though no breach has occurred and even though the damages from a 
future breach would be difficult to determine.   In a famous case under the 
reorganizations provisions of Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,224 the debtor 
had guaranteed that its affiliated corporations would perform their obligations under 
long-term real property leases.  The issue in the case was whether landlords had “claims” 
against the debtor under the guarantees when the tenants were not in default at the time of 
bankruptcy, and might never default.  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
recognized that in a regular liquidation proceeding under the 1989 Act, the creditors 
would not have had prepetition dischargeable claims, because in liquidation proceedings 
under the 1898 Act claims had to be “provable,” and unliquidated claims were not 
 
Chemetron Corp., 212 F.3d 199, 206 (3rd Cir. 2000) (“[T]his court held [in Frenville] that in most 
circumstances a "claim" arises for bankruptcy purposes at the same time the underlying state law cause of 
action accrues. We are cognizant of the criticism the Frenville decision has engendered, but it remains the 
law of this circuit.”)   
Courts in all of the other circuits have either specifically rejected Frenville or have adopted 
theories inconsistent with Frenville. See, e.g., In re Parker, 313 F.3d 1267, 1269 (10th Cir. 2002) (rejecting 
Frenville); In re Jastrem, 253 F.3d 438, 442 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting Frenville); In re Andrews, 239 F.3d 
708, 710 n.7 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The Third Circuit has taken a narrower view of "claim," but this approach 
has been universally rejected.”) (citation to Frenville omitted); In re Manville Forest Prods., 209 F.3d 125, 
129 (2d Cir. 2000) (claim will be deemed to have arisen pre-petition if "the relationship between the debtor 
and the creditor contained all of the elements necessary to give rise to a legal obligation – 'a right to 
payment' – under the relevant non-bankruptcy law"); Butler v. NationsBank, N.A., 58 F.3d 1022, 1029 (4th 
Cir. 1995) (“we have explicitly declined to follow the reasoning of Frenville, stating, ‘We have found no 
court outside the Third Circuit which has followed the reasoning and holding of Frenville,’”citing Grady v. 
A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 201 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1260 (1988)); In re Piper Aircraft 
Corp., 58 F.3d 1573, 1576 n.2  (11th Cir. 1995) (rejecting Frenville); In re Hemingway Transp., 954 F.2d 
1, 8 (1st Cir. 1992) (“more recent decisions consistently have declined to accept the Frenville reasoning 
and its failure to accord full breadth to the term "claim"); Signature Combs, Inc. v. United States, 253 F. 
Supp. 2d 1028, 1033-34, 1038 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (rejecting Frenville); Am Int'l v. Datacard Corp., 146 
B.R. 391, 405-06 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (rejecting Frenville); In re Transp. Sys. Int'l, 110 B.R. 888, 894  (D. 
Minn. 1990) (rejecting Frenville). 
221 See Grady, 839 F.2d 198  at 201 n.4  (plaintiff who used defective Dalkon Shield manufactured by 
debtor pre-petition had a “claim” in bankruptcy even though plaintiff did not know she was sick at time of 
bankruptcy). 
222 See, e.g., Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. Ill. 2000);  Piper Aircraft Corp., 58 F.3d at 1577 (“an 
individual has a § 101(5) claim against a debtor manufacturer if (i) events occurring before confirmation 
create a relationship, such as contact, exposure, impact, or privity, between the claimant and the debtor's 
product; and (ii) the basis for liability is the debtor's prepetition conduct”); In re Parks, 281 B.R. 899, 902-
03  (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2002). 
223 See Stieglitz, supra at note 183, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV at 484-490. 
224 In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum, 106 F.2d 22 (2nd Cir. 1939). 
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“provable.”225 However, claims that existed as of the petition date were dischargeable 
under the reorganization provisions of Section 77B of the 1898 Act, even though they 
were not provable.226 The Second Circuit panel held that the claim arose when the 
contract was entered into, even though the claim was not ripe under applicable non-
bankruptcy law.227 The Bankruptcy Code incorporated a definition of a “claim” similar to 
the definition used in Section 77B of the 1898 Act.228 It is generally accepted now that 
contract claims are deemed to arise for bankruptcy purposes when the contract was 
executed.229 
Tax liability is more like contract liability than tort liability.  The debtor knows 
when it earns income that it will have to pay taxes on that income.  A known obligation 
to pay taxes on the income exists when the income is earned, even though the amount of 
tax may depend on future events, and the due date for payment is in the future.  These 
factors simply mean that the tax claim is unliquidated and unmatured.  But the obligation 
to pay has been incurred when the income is earned:  the fact triggering tax liability (the 
incurrence of income) had incurred, and the taxpayer is aware of the obligation to pay 
taxes on earned income.  Although the obligation to pay is set by law rather than contract, 
the contract cases are more apt because the obligation to pay becomes fixed when the 
income is earned, and does not depend on future events or discovery to ripen into an 
obligation.  The difficult problems in tort cases – the existence of harm caused by the tort 
and the fairness of requiring the victim to identify both the injury and the identity of the 
tortfeasor at the time of bankruptcy – do not exist with respect to income taxes.  The 
taxpayer knows upon earning income of the obligation to pay taxes, and knows to whom 
the taxes will be owed.  Because the government has an unliquidated and unmatured right 
to payment when the income is earned, a claim exists for bankruptcy purposes and should 
be respected.  Treating a tax claim on income earned prepetition as if it arose post-
 
225 Id. at 26 (“The claims based on the debtor's guaranties were wholly contingent and indeterminate in 
amount, there having been no default under the leases and no predictable prospect of a default. In ordinary 
bankruptcy such claims would not be provable or dischargeable to any extent. In re F. & W. Grand 5-10-25 
Cent Stores, 2 Cir., 70 F.2d 691.”). 
226 Id. (“In a proceeding under section 77B, however, they are claims subject to reorganization. . . . 
"'[C]reditors' shall include for all purposes of this section and of the reorganization plan, its acceptance and 
confirmation, all holders of claims of whatever character against the debtor or its property . . . whether or 
not such claims would otherwise constitute provable claims under this title.") 
227 Radio-Keith-Orpheum, 106 F.2nd at 26. 
228 11 U.S.C. § 101(a)(5)(A) (“The term ‘claim’ means . . . right to payment, whether or not such right is 
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, 
legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.”) . 
229 See In re Manville Forest Prod. Corp., 209 F.3d at 129  (“Under contract law, a right to payment based 
on a written indemnification contract arises at the time the indemnification agreement is executed”); In re 
Houbigant, Inc., 188 B.R. 347, 358-59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[A] contractual indemnification claim 
exists as a contingent claim against the indemnitor as of the date the indemnification agreement is 
executed.");  see also In re Hemingway Trans., Inc., 954 F.2d 1, 9 n.9 (1st Cir. 1992); see also  In re M. 
Frenville Co., 744 F.2d  at 336 (3d Cir. 1984) (In distinguishing equitable indemnity claims from 
contractual indemnity claims, the panel stated:  “Such a surety relationship is the classic case of a 
contingent right to payment under the Code -- the right to payment exists as of the signing of the 
agreement, but it is dependent on the occurrence of a future event. When parties agree in advance that one 
party will indemnify the other party in the event of a certain occurrence, there exists a right to payment, 
albeit contingent, upon the signing of the agreement");  In re Hemingway Transport, Inc., 954 F.2d 1, 9 n.9 
(1st Cir. 1992). 
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petition at the end of the tax year does violence to the principles underlying the 
bankruptcy claims process.   
Finally, most courts have failed to consider the purpose of section 502(i).230 
Section 502(i) says that tax claims that are deemed to “arise” post-petition, and are 
entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8), are to be treated for allowance or 
disallowance as if they had arisen prepetition.231 Section 502(i) was intended to cover tax 
claims for prepetition activities that are not deemed to “arise” until post-petition.232 The 
prepetition portion of the government’s income tax claim for the year of bankruptcy is 
entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii), because the taxes are assessable post-
petition.233 Prior to the 2005 Act,234 Section 502(i) should have treated the government’s 
claim for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes as an allowed prepetition 
claim, even though the taxes technically may have arisen under applicable non-
bankruptcy law post-petition – at the end of the tax year.   
However, the only court to consider the effect of section 502(i) in this context, In 
re Mirman,235held that section 502(i) should be ignored because it is contrary to the 
statement in the committee report that the government should have no claim against the 
estate of a taxpayer who does not make the split year election for year-of-bankruptcy 
taxes.236 In essence, the court held that a statement from a committee report trumps the 
plain wording (and the legislative history) of the statute.   
While the proper role of legislative history in judicial decision making has been 
the subject of substantial debate,237 the Supreme Court has made it clear that statements 
 
230 The only court to consider 502(i) in connection with a non-electing individual debtor is In re Mirman.,
98 B.R. 742 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989), discussed infra note 235. 
231 11 U.S.C. § 502(i). 
232 See In re St. Louis Freight Lines, Inc., 45 B.R. at 549  (following Collier on Bankruptcy’s suggestion 
that section 502(i) was intended to cover only prepetition taxes that are assessed post-petition);  In re 
Razorback Ready-Mix Concrete Co., 45 B.R. at 925;  see also In re Miller, 363 F.3d at 1009, discussed 
supra beginning at note 119 (suggesting that the Victor court’s analysis ignores the plain meaning of 
section 502(i), which is to treat a prepetition tax claim which is deemed to arise post-petition under 
applicable non-bankruptcy law as an allowed prepetition claims).   
233 See discussion supra beginning at note 132. 
234 Under the 2005 Act, eighth priority will only be given to tax claims for years that end prepetition.  See 
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (flush language) (2005).   Therefore, the only tax claims in the year of bankruptcy 
that can possibly be eligible for eighth priority treatment will be the prepetition portion of taxes owing by 
an individual debtor who makes a split-year election, and taxes owing by debtors who file bankruptcy on 
the last day of the tax year.  In both cases, the taxes will arise prepetition not post-petition, and therefore 
502(i) will not be needed. It therefore appears that section 502(i) has been turned into dead wood with 
respect to income taxes.   
235 98 B.R. 742 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989). 
236 Id. at 745  (holding that section 502(i) only applies if the debtor makes the split-year election.  Note, 
however, that section 502(i) would not apply to the prepetition claim against a debtor who makes the split-
year election, because the tax claim for the prepetition portion of the year would arise pre-petition, not post-
petition).   
237 For some time, the justices of the Supreme Court have debated the proper role of legislative history in 
judicial decision making.  For example, in Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511 (1993), the Supreme Court 
cited legislative history to support its conclusion that the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 
tolled the time period for a military officer to redeem property from foreclosure while the officer was in 
military service, regardless of whether the military service hindered the officer’s ability to redeem the 
property.  In overruling the state courts, the Supreme Court found that the statute on its face was 
“unambiguous, unequivocal, and unlimited” in tolling the redemption period.  Id. at 518 (Scalia, J. 
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in legislative history that are not incorporated into a statute are not to be treated as law.  
For example, in United States v. Gonzales,238 a federal statute provided that a defendant’s 
federal sentence for using a firearm during the commission of a drug crime not run 
concurrently with any other sentence given in connection with the drug crime.  A 
legislative committee report said that it was the intent that the federal firearm sentence be 
served first before any other sentence.239 Nothing in the actual statute addressed the 
order in which sentences were to be served.240 Lower courts used the legislative history 
to suggest that Congress meant to set the order in which defendants would serve multiple 
federal sentences (after all, the federal government had no control over the order of state 
sentences), and therefore it was appropriate to order that the defendant’s federal sentence 
for using a firearm in connection with the drug crime be served concurrently with the 
defendant’s state sentence for the drug crime.241 The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the statute was clear on its face in prohibiting concurrent sentences of any kind, and 
that it was inappropriate for the lower courts to consult legislative history to create an 
ambiguity that did not exist in the statute itself.242 
The same analysis applies to the treatment of tax claims against non-electing 
debtors.  The courts are improperly relying on a statement in a committee report as to 
how tax claims against debtors who do not make the split-year election are to be treated.  
The statute enacted by Congress does not speak to the treatment of tax claims against 
non-electing debtors.  Moreover, the treatment suggested in the committee report is 
inconsistent with the general treatment of “claims” in bankruptcy.  As in the Gonzales 
case, the statement in the committee report should not be relied on as law when Congress 
never enacted the statement into law.  There is simply no proper basis for the suggestion 
that the statement in a committee report reflects Congressional intent when the issue was 
not addressed in the statute.  Legislative history may properly be used to resolve statutory 
 
concurring).  The Supreme Court then proceeded to review snippets of legislative history suggesting that 
Congress intended to provide blanket protection for military officers while on active duty. Id. at 514-515.  
Justice Scalia wrote a lengthy concurring opinion criticizing the Court for discussing legislative history at 
all, since the statute on its face was clear and unconditional.  Id. at 518 (Scalia, J. concurring).    In Justice 
Scalia’s view “[t]he language of the statute is entirely clear, and if that is not what Congress meant then 
Congress has made a mistake and Congress will have to correct it.”  Id. at 528.  Justice Scalia noted that an 
examination of the legislative history might lead to the conclusion that Congress did not intend for the 
statute to be enforced as written , and suggested that any attempt to determine what Congress and the 
President intended would be disingenuous – the Court would only be citing the authority supporting its 
conclusion and ignoring contrary authority.  See id. at 526-27, 519 (Scalia, J., concurring).  The justices 
engaged in similar debates over the role of legislative history in other cases.  See, e.g., Bank One Chicago., 
N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264 (1996).   
238 520 U.S. 1 (1997). 
239 Id. at 5 (“The excerpt from the Senate Report accompanying the 1984 amendment to § 924(c), relied 
upon by the Court of Appeals, reads:  ‘The Committee intends that the mandatory sentence under the 
revised subsection 924(c) be served prior to the start of the sentence for the underlying or any other 
offense.’  S. Rep., at 313-314.”). 
240 Id. (“This snippet of legislative history injects into § 924(c) an entirely new idea – that a defendant must 
serve the five-year prison term for his firearms conviction before any other sentences.”). 
241 Id. at 7 (“Seeking to avoid this conflict between § 924(c) (as reinterpreted in light of its legislative 
history) and § 3584(a), the Court of Appeals held that § 924(c) only prohibited running federal terms of 
imprisonment concurrently.”). 
242Id. at 7 (“The statutes clash only if we engraft onto § 924(c) a requirement found only in a single 
sentence buried in the legislative history: that the firearms sentence must run first. We therefore follow the 
text, rather than the legislative history, of § 924(c).”). 
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ambiguities,243 but it should not be used to create new law never enacted by Congress.  
The cases holding, on the basis of a statement in a committee report that was not reflected 
in the statute, that the government has no claim against the estate on account of 
prepetition taxes owing in the year of bankruptcy are not correctly reasoned.  As a matter 
of policy, the estate benefits from any income earned during the pre-bankruptcy period, 
because that income becomes property of the estate (to the extent it still exists on the date 
of bankruptcy),244 and so the government, like every other creditor, should have a claim 
against the estate on account of that pre-petition income.  As the corporate cases have 
held, the statute’s provision of a single tax year does not prevent the bifurcation of the 
claim for priority purposes.   
The only reason that the inconsistent treatment between corporate and individual 
cases has not caused havoc within the bankruptcy system is that the rulings have created 
a strong incentive245 for individual debtors to elect to split the year of bankruptcy, 
creating an eighth priority claim for the pre-petition portion of the of taxes for the year of 
bankruptcy under the post-petition assessability rule.246 Since most debtors presumably 
elect to split the year of bankruptcy, the system works for individual debtors the same 
way as for corporate debtors.  However, as discussed below,247 it is unclear how these 
precedents will be applied to cases filed after the effective date of the 2005 Act. 
 
C. The Implication of the Post-petition Assessability Rule on 
Prepetition Taxes in the Year of Bankruptcy. 
 
The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980248 solved the problem of how to treat taxes 
incurred in the year of bankruptcy by individual taxpayers who make a split-year 
 
243 Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) (“First, this Court has repeated with some frequency: 
‘Where . . . resolution of a question of federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look 
first to the statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear." , 
quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984)). 
244 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (estate entitled to all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as 
of the petition date). 
245 Debtors who make the split-year election obtain the benefit of having the estate liable to pay their pre-
petition tax liabilities.  By making the estate liable, and providing the government with an eighth priority 
claim, there is a significant chance that the estate will use funds which would otherwise go to pay the 
debtor’s other prepetition creditors to pay the debtor’s non-dischargeable tax liabilities.  Debtors thus have 
a strong incentive to make the split-year election in order to have the estate use money that would 
otherwise to other creditors to satisfy the debtor’s own non-dischargeable obligation.   
246 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).  Note that taxes on the debtor’s post-petition earnings will be an 
administrative claim against the estate if the estate benefits from the income (see I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1)), as it 
will under the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act in most reorganization cases (see infra note 414).  
The government would not have a claim against the estate for taxes on the debtor’s income in the usual 
Chapter 7 case, because the debtor’s post-petition income is not property of the estate.  See, e.g.,  11 U.S.C. 
§ 541(a)(6) (earnings on estate property attributable to debtor’s post-petition services are not property of 
the estate); Tabb, supra note 19 at 299 (“anything the debtor earns before bankruptcy is fair game for 
payment to the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy creditors, and comes into the estate, but the debtor’s earnings after 
bankruptcy belong to the debtor alone, free from the clutches of the debtor’s creditors”).  Thus, the debtor 
would be solely liable for tax on the debtor’s post-petition income in most Chapter 7 cases because the 
income is not property of the estate. 
247 See discussion infra beginning at page 41. 
248 See supra note 192. 
40
election.249 However, it caused great confusion over the proper treatment of claims for 
year-of-bankruptcy for all other taxpayers.250 The courts added to the confusion by 
treating non-electing individuals differently from corporations, even though there is 
nothing in the statute to justify the disparate treatment.251 The courts were wrong to rely 
on an unenacted statement in a committee report to hold that the government has no 
claim for year of bankruptcy taxes against the bankruptcy estate of a non-electing 
individual.252 The statement in the committee report is not law, because it was never 
reflected in a statutory enactment.253 The Bankruptcy Code makes it clear that claims for 
taxes on prepetition income are prepetition “claims,” even though the claims are deemed 
to arise under applicable non-bankruptcy law post-petition, at the end of the tax year (or 
possibly even when the return is due).254 
Therefore, the government should have a claim against the bankruptcy estates of 
both corporate and non-electing individual debtors for the pro-rata portion of the year-of-
bankruptcy taxes properly allocated on the basis of time to the prepetition period.255 The 
prepetition claim should be treated as an “allowed claim” under section 502(i),256 and 
should be given eighth priority under the post-petition assessability rule.257 The claim 
should not be entitled to first priority as an administrative expense for two reasons:  (1) 
the claim is entitled to eighth priority and therefore is excluded from the definition of an 
administrative expense,258 and (2) the claim was not “incurred by the estate” since the 
estate did not exist when the income was earned and the tax claim accrued for bankruptcy 
purposes.259 Because the claim is entitled to eighth priority, the claim should be excepted 
from discharge in an individual Chapter 7 case.260 
The prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy tax claims against taxpayers who 
make the split-year election should work the same way, but the amount of the claim 
should be calculated differently.  Instead of allocating the year’s taxes to the prepetition 
period on the basis of time, the claims against electing individual taxpayers will be 
computed on the basis of a separate return.261 For example, if a debtor filed bankruptcy 
on July 1, exactly half of the year will have occurred prepetition and half post-petition.  If 
a non-electing debtor owed $100,000 of taxes for the year, the government would have a 
$50,000 eighth priority claim for the prepetition portion of the year.  However, if the 
 
249 See discussion supra at notes 142 - 143. 
250 See discussion regarding treatment of corporate taxpayers beginning on page 23 and individual 
taxpayers who do not make the split-year election beginning on page 29. 
251 Id. 
252 See discussion supra beginning at note 238. 
253 Id. 
254 See discussion supra beginning at note 218. 
255 See discussion supra beginning after note 186. 
256 See discussion supra beginning at note 230. 
257 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) (eighth priority for taxes assessable post-petition); I.R.C. § 6501(a) 
(three year statute of limitations on assessment begins to run upon filing of return). 
258 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B).   
259 Id. 
260 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A).   The claim is not discharged in a corporate Chapter 7 case because a 
corporation does not receive a discharge.  11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (only individuals receive Chapter 7 
discharge).  Whether the claims are dischargeable under the reorganization chapters is discussed below 
beginning on page 49.   
261 I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(A). 
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taxpayer made the split-year election, the taxpayer’s liability would be computed on the 
basis of a separate return.  If the taxpayer owed $70,000 in taxes for the first half of the 
year and $30,000 of taxes for the second half of the year, the government’s eighth 
priority prepetition claim would be $70,000 rather than $50,000.  With the split-year 
election, the debtor’s claims will accurately reflect the actual income earned by the debtor 
pre-petition, rather than reflecting an average portion of the debtor’s annual income 
allocated to the prepetition time period.  There is, thus, a distinction between the 
treatment of electing and non-electing taxpayers, but it is not nearly as significant as 
treating the entire year-of-bankruptcy tax liability as a post-petition obligation of the 
debtor and not an obligation of the estate. 
 
4. The Post-Petition Assessability Rule after the 2005 Act. 
 
The most fundamental change made by the 2005 Act concerning income tax 
claims was a seemingly innocuous shift of language from section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) to the 
flush language of section 507(a)(8)(A).  The language in question previously made it 
clear that the lookback rule only applied to tax years that ended prepetition.  Thus, taxes 
in the year of bankruptcy could only fall within the lookback rule if the debtor made a 
split-year election or if the debtor filed bankruptcy on the last day of the debtor’s tax 
year.262 In all other cases, the tax year will not have ended on or before the date of 
bankruptcy.   
The movement of the language in the 2005 Act will have no effect on the 
lookback rule, because the language was previously set forth in the lookback rule.  
However, the movement of the language sets forth new rules that apply to the two other 
provisions of section 507(a)(8) - the 240 day rule, and the post-petition assessability rule.  
While a new requirement has been added to the 240-day rule, it will not change the rule, 
because the 240-day rule only applied to taxes assessed prepetition.263 Since the tax year 
must end in order for taxes to be assessed, the change made by the 2005 Act will not 
effect the 240-day rule 264 
However, the change made by the 2005 Act will have a substantial impact on the 
post-petition assessability rule.  Like the lookback rule, after the 2005 Act the post-
petition assessability rule will only apply to year-of-bankruptcy taxes if the debtor makes 
a split-year election or files bankruptcy on the last day of the tax year.  In all other cases, 
the tax year will not have ended “on or before the petition date,” and the post-petition 
assessability rule will not apply.  In all other circumstances, year-of-bankruptcy taxes will 
not be entitled to eighth priority.  The statutory change thus overrules the theory upon 
which the corporate cases, discussed beginning on page 23, are based.265 
It is not clear why Congress changed the statute.  One possibility is that the court 
wanted to clarify that the post-petition assessability rule would not apply to taxes for 
years commencing post-petition.  However, the courts have consistently held that the 
 
262 See discussion supra beginning at note 58. 
263 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii) (applies to “taxes assessed within 240 days . . . before the date of the 
filing of the petition).   
264 See discussion supra beginning at note 75. 
265 See supra notes 161, 166, 177. 
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post-petition assessability rule would not apply to purely post-petition tax years.266 Did 
Congress simply intended to codify this rule?  If so, Congress erred also by eliminating 
priority for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes.  The codification of the 
post-petition-year rule could have been made by simply saying that taxes for years 
beginning post-petition would not be covered by the post-petition assessability rule.  
Requiring the tax year to end pre-petition goes further by eliminating year-of-bankruptcy 
taxes from the application of the rule.267 
A second possibility is that the change was made at the behest of the government, 
which has consistently argued that year-of-bankruptcy taxes should be treated as post-
petition obligations – indeed, should be treated as first priority post-petition 
administrative expenses.268 However, the statute does not specify that all claims for taxes 
owing for the year of bankruptcy will be entitled to first priority as administrative 
expenses, but merely that the taxes will not be subject to eighth priority.  Will the 
elimination of eighth priority accomplish the government’s objective of turning the 
prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes into first priority administrative 
expenses? 
The corporate cases applied the post-petition assessability rule to grant eighth 
priority, rather than first administrative expense priority, to the prepetition portion of 
year-of-bankruptcy taxes.  However, they were not consistent in rationalizing their 
rulings.  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in PATCO accepted the 
government’s argument that an entire year’s tax claim arose at the end of the tax year, but 
held nevertheless that the claim for the prepetition portion of the year’s taxes constituted 
a eighth priority claim under the post-petition assessability rule.269 The PATCO panel did 
not attempt to distinguish the long line of authority holding that the post-petition 
assessability rule applies only to prepetition taxes.270 One would expect the government 
to argue that Congress intended the 2005 Act, by preventing the use of the post-petition 
assessability rule for year-of-bankruptcy taxes, to overturn PATCO and treat all of the 
taxes in the year of bankruptcy as if they had been “incurred by the estate,” and thus as 
first priority administrative expenses.  Using the PATCO panel’s theory, the government 
may well succeed in arguing for administrative expense priority since the post-petition 
assessability rule no longer applies to prevent administrative priority.271 
However, the PATCO panels’ conclusion that the prepetition portion of year-of-
bankruptcy taxes was incurred by the estate has not been universally accepted.  Both the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in O’Neill Shoe272 and the Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit in Hillsborough Holdings273 explicitly refused to decide whether the 
prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes were incurred by the estate, holding 
simply that the taxes were covered by the post-petition assessability rule and thereby 
 
266 See supra note 136. 
267 Unless, of course, the debtor makes a split-year election under I.R.C. section 1398, or files bankruptcy 
on the last day of the tax year. 
268 See supra note 178. 
269 64 F.3d 1292, 1301-02  (9th Cir. 1995) discussed supra beginning at note 154. 
270 See supra note 136. 
271 See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i). 
272 64 F.3d 1146 (8th Cir. 1995). 
273 116 F.3d 1391 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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excluded from first priority administrative expense treatment.274 The cases involving 
individual debtors, in rejecting administrative priority for the prepetition portion of year-
of-bankruptcy taxes, have held that the prepetition taxes were not “incurred by the 
estate.”275 
While the government may have thought that eliminating eighth priority would 
make the entire year’s tax claim an administrative expense, a proper reading of the 
statutory rules and longstanding bankruptcy policy suggests a different result.  There is a 
great weight of bankruptcy authority suggesting that the government’s “claim” 276 – here, 
the right to the payment of taxes on income earned prepetition – accrues when the income 
is earned, even though the amount is unliquidated and the claim is unmatured.277 Using 
the proper analysis of a bankruptcy “claim,” the government’s right to payment arose 
when the debtor earned the income.  Since the bankruptcy estate was not in existence 
when the debtor earned the prepetition portion of the year-of-bankruptcy taxes, that 
liability could not have been “incurred by the estate.”  Thus, the government should have 
a prepetition claim for taxes owing on prepetition income.  Using the proper definition of 
a bankruptcy claim, Congress, by eliminating the possibility of using the post-petition 
assessability rule, has turned the government’s eighth priority claim,278 which was 
automatically excepted from discharge,279 into a dischargeable general unsecured claim. 
 
5. Administrative Priority Claims. 
 
As a general matter, two different taxpayers are created when a petition is filed280 
by an individual debtor in a Chapter 7 case: the debtor and the bankruptcy estate.  The 
debtor’s post-petition earnings do not constitute property of the bankruptcy estate,281 and 
those earnings are not available to pay prepetition creditors.   The debtor is responsible 
for filing a tax return and paying any taxes on the debtor’s post-petition income if that 
income does not belong to the estate.282 
274Hillsborough Holdings, 116 F.3d at 1394 (“We need not decide which of these positions is correct; we 
can assume for purposes of this appeal that the entire year's taxes were incurred by the estate.")  supra note 
165. 
275 See supra note 191;  Johnson, 190 B.R. at 726  (prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes not 
“incurred by the estate”). 
276 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(a)(5)(A) (a “right to payment, whether . . . liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured); see also 
discussion supra beginning at note 218. 
277 See discussion supra starting at note 211. 
278 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) (repealed 2005). 
279 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) (excepting from discharge claims entitled to eighth priority under section 
507(a)(8)). 
280 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (“commencement of case . . . creates an estate”). 
281 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (earnings on estate property attributable to debtor’s post-petition 
services are not property of the estate);  Tabb, supra note 19, at  § 5.8, p. 299  (“anything the debtor earns 
before bankruptcy is fair game for payment to the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy creditors, and comes into the 
estate, but the debtor’s earnings after bankruptcy belong to the debtor alone, free from the clutches of the 
debtor’s creditors”). 
282 The debtor is not required to pay tax on the debtor’s post-petition income if the estate is entitled to the 
income.  See I.R.C. § 1398(e)(2).  Thus, the distinction is made between post-petition income belonging to 
the estate (which is taxable to the estate), and post-petition income belonging to the debtor personally 
(which is taxable to the debtor personally). 
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The bankruptcy estate of an individual debtor is comprised of most of the debtor’s 
property existing on the petition date.283 Certain rights of an individual debtor acquired 
after the petition are also included in the estate, to limit the individual debtor’s ability to 
time the receipt of assets to avoid having those assets used to pay creditor claims.284 An 
individual debtor is allowed to remove certain exempt property from the estate.285 In a 
Chapter 7 case, the trustee is required to liquidate the remaining property of the estate 
into cash,286 and to distribute the proceeds to creditors in accordance with the rules of 
distribution.287 
Non-individual debtors are treated differently, because they have no separate 
existence from the bankruptcy estate.  A corporate debtor therefore is not entitled to 
remove exempt property from the estate,288 and does not receive a discharge under 
Chapter 7,289 because it will cease to exist after all of its assets are liquidated, and the 
proceeds are paid to creditors.  The entire corporate existence is reflected in the 
bankruptcy estate, and all of the corporation’s property as of the petition date is included 
in the bankruptcy estate.   
The cleavage between the separate existence of the individual debtor and the 
bankruptcy estate, and the lack of cleavage between the corporate debtor and the 
bankruptcy estate, is reflected to some extent in the tax law.  For individual debtors, the 
taxable income of the estate is to be computed separately and paid by the trustee.290 The 
income of the estate consists of the income to which the estate is entitled if it was 
“received or accrued” after the bankruptcy case.291 The income of the debtor consists of 
the income to which the bankruptcy estate is not entitled.292 An individual debtor in a 
Chapter 7 or 11 case can make a split-year election to treat the year of bankruptcy as two 
years (a prepetition and a post-petition year).293 If the election is not made, the debtor’s 
taxable year is determined without regard to the bankruptcy case.294 For non-individual 
debtors (corporations and partnerships), and for individual debtors under Chapter 12 or 
13, no separate taxable entity results for entity taxpayers.295 The statute thus reflects the 
separate existence of the individual debtor in Chapter 7 and 11 cases. 
For all taxpayers, income earned by the estate on property of the estate is taxable 
to the estate.296 All of the income earned post-petition by entity taxpayers and individual 
 
283 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1) (property of the estate).  Certain property nominally held by the debtor is 
excluded from the estate because it really belongs to someone else.  See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b).   
284 Property of the estate includes, for example, property recovered by the trustee post-bankruptcy by 
avoiding a pre-petition transfer (11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3)), and property inherited by the debtor within 180 
days of bankruptcy (11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)). 
285 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). 
286 See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1). 
287 See 11 U.S.C. § 726. 
288 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (applying exemption statute to an “individual debtor”). 
289 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (only an individual receives a discharge). 
290 I.R.C. § 1398 (c)(1).   
291 I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1).   
292 I.R.C. § 1398(e)(2).   
293 I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2).   
294 I.R.C. § 1398(d)(1).   
295 I.R.C. § 1399 (“Except in any case to which section 1398 applies, no separate taxable entity shall result 
from the commencement of a case under title 11 of the United States Code.”).   
296 See I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1). 
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taxpayers in Chapter 12 and 13 cases become property of the estate and thus are taxed to 
the single entity – the debtor.  In individual Chapter 7 and 11 cases, taxes on the debtor’s 
post-petition income is taxed to the debtor if the debtor does not have to turn that income 
over to the estate for use to pay creditors.  Any income earned by the estate, and any 
income which the debtor has to turn over to the estate, will be taxed to the estate and not 
to the debtor.297 
Under a change made the 2005 Act, an individual debtor will be able to confirm a 
Chapter 11 plan over the objection of a creditor only if the debtor either pays the claim in 
full with interest, or the value of property distributed under the plan exceeds the debtor’s 
projected gross income during the 5-year period after the first plan payment is made 
under the plan.298 If the property of the estate does not vest in the debtor under the plan, 
and the debtor proposes to use post-petition income to pay creditors during the term of 
the plan, that income should be taxable to the bankruptcy estate and not the debtor.  It 
remains to be seen how this provision will be interpreted and apply. 
Claims for taxes owing by the estate on post-petition income should be entitled to 
first priority as administrative expenses.  The statute provides that any tax “incurred by 
the estate” which is not entitled to eighth priority is an administrative expense.299 Prior to 
the 2005 Act, the courts consistently excluded taxes on post-petition income from eighth 
priority treatment, giving them first priority administrative expense status, although no 
court has provided sound reasoning for the exclusion.300 As explained earlier in this 
paper,301 the government’s claim for taxes on post-petition income should not constitute 
an “allowed claim” in bankruptcy,302 and should therefore be excluded from eighth 
priority under the post-petition assessability rule.303 In the 2005 Act, Congress clarified 
(in this respect) the eighth priority rules by making them applicable only to tax years 
ending before the petition date.304 Therefore, it is now crystal clear that taxes on the 
estate’s post-petition income will be entitled to administrative priority.  Note, however, 
that taxes on an individual debtor’s Chapter 7 or 11 post-petition income will not 
constitute a claim against the estate at all if income belongs to the debtor and not to the 
estate.305 
It is less a question of whether administrative priority is to be granted to some 
prepetition taxes.  The government has long contended that prepetition taxes in the year 
of bankruptcy should be treated as first priority administrative expenses.306 The 
government has argued that all taxes in the year of bankruptcy first arise at the end of the 
 
297 I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1) (estate taxed on income to which the estate is entitled); § 1398(e)(2) (debtor not 
taxed on income to which the estate is entitled). 
298 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15). 
299 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(1). 
300 See discussion supra beginning at note 132. 
301 See discussion supra beginning at note 138. 
302 Section 101(a)(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment.  Section 502 treats claims as “allowed 
claims” if there is a right to payment as of the petition date.  See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b).  Since the government 
has no right to payment for taxes on income that has not yet been earned, there is no allowed claim on the 
date of the petition for taxes on income earned post-petition. 
303 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (provides eighth priority only for “allowed unsecured claims of governmental 
units”). 
304 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8). 
305 I.R.C. § 1398(e)(2). 
306 See supra note 178. 
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tax year, and therefore are “incurred by the estate.”307 The courts have consistently 
rejected the government’s interpretation, finding in corporate cases that the prepetition 
portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes are covered by the post-petition assessability rule,308 
and finding in the individual cases (where the debtor does not make a split-year election) 
on the basis of a statement in a committee report to the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 that 
all taxes in the year of bankruptcy are an individual obligation of the debtor and not an 
obligation of the estate.309 The situation is even more confused after the 2005 Act, 
because the basis for the corporate cases – the application of the eighth priority post-
petition assessability rule – no longer applies to year of bankruptcy taxes.310 While the 
cases are poorly reasoned, they reach the correct result.  Taxes on prepetition income 
should not be given first priority as administrative expenses because the tax claim arises 
prepetition,311 and therefore the taxes were not “incurred by the estate.”   
 Prior to the 2005 Act, the statute granting administrative priority failed to specify 
whether secured claims were covered by the statute.312 The 2005 Act makes it clear that 
secured claims for post-petition taxes are entitled to first priority as administrative 
expenses.313 
III. DISCHARGEABILITY OF YEAR-OF-BANKRUPTCY TAX CLAIMS.
There are three separate questions that must be answered in the affirmative before 
one can determine that a claim has been discharged in bankruptcy.  First, the debtor must 
receive a discharge.  Under Chapter 7, only individual debtors are eligible to receive a 
discharge.314 Corporate and partnership debtors are not eligible to receive a Chapter 7 
discharge.  Moreover, even eligible individual debtors can be denied a discharge entirely 
for committing certain wrongful acts either a short time before or after bankruptcy.315 In 
addition, discharges can be denied if the debtor previously received a discharge within a 
certain period of time.316 
Second, the discharge must by its terms apply to the claim.  A Chapter 7 
discharge only applies to claims “that arose before the date of the order for relief” or 
claims that are treated under section 502 as if they had arisen before the order for 
relief.317 The Chapter 7 discharge by its terms does not apply to claims which come into 
existence post-petition, unless section 502 specifically treats the claim as arising 
prepetition.  Of particular relevance for income tax claims in the year of bankruptcy is 
section 502(i) of the Bankruptcy Code, which should require the prepetition portion of 
year-of-bankruptcy taxes to be treated as a prepetition allowed claim, even if applicable 
 
307 Id.; see also PATCO, 64 F.3d at 1298;  O’Neill Shoe Co. , 64 F.3d at 1150.  
308 See discussion supra beginning on page 23. 
309 See discussion supra beginning on page 29. 
310 See discussion supra beginning on page 41. 
311 See discussion supra beginning after note 217. 
312 See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i) (repealed 2005). 
313 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i) (2005). 
314 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (denying discharge to debtors who are not individuals). 
315 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)–(7) (concealing or destroying estate property or financial records, making a 
false oath, failing to explain losses, refusing to obey orders of the court). 
316 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8)-(9). 
317 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). 
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non-bankruptcy law the claim would treat the claim as arising post-petition.318 If the 
claim arose prepetition (or is treated by the section 502 as having arisen prepetition), the 
claim is subject to the discharge order even if no proof of claim was filed by the creditor 
and even if the claim was not allowed as part of the bankruptcy distribution process.319 
Thus, as a general matter, prepetition claims will be subject to the discharge order while 
most post-petition claims will not be subject to the discharge order.   
 Finally, even if the debtor receives a discharge and the claim is covered by the 
discharge order, the particular claim may still be excepted from discharge.  Section 523 
of the Bankruptcy Code lists nineteen types of claim that are excepted from discharge.320 
There are three basic types of claims excepted from discharge.  The first type is claims 
arising out of the debtor’s bad conduct, such as claims against the debtor for fraud, 
embezzlement, willful and malicious injury, and drunk driving.321 Most of these claims 
are excepted from discharge only if the creditor timely seeks and obtains an order from 
the Bankruptcy Court excepting the claims from discharge.322 Second, claims that the 
debtor knew about and failed to list in the bankruptcy schedules are not discharged.323 
These claims are automatically excepted from discharge.  Finally, certain claims are 
automatically excepted from discharge because of the nature of the claim or the claimant.   
This includes certain claims for things like spousal support, student loans, criminal 
restitution, and, most importantly for this article, certain tax obligations.324 
Claims for taxes are excepted from discharge if the debtor failed to file a required 
tax return,325 filed a required tax return late and within two years of bankruptcy,326 or 
committed tax fraud.327 
In addition, two types of taxes are excepted from discharge due to the timing of 
the taxes, rather then the debtor’s tax liability resulting from bad acts.  First, taxes entitled 
to priority under sections 507(a)(2)328 are automatically excepted from discharge.329 
Section 507(a)(2)330 grants a priority to so-called involuntary gap period taxes – taxes 
arising after the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition and before the order for 
 
318 See discussion supra beginning at note 230.  Even without section 502(i), the definition of a “claim” 
should include the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes.  See discussion supra beginning at note 
218. 
319 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). 
320 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). 
321 See § 523(a)(2),  (4), (6). 
322 11  § 523(c)(1). 
323 11  § 523(a)(3). 
324 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1), (5), (7),  (8), (13). 
325 §  523(a)(1)(B)(i) 
326 §  523(a)(1)(B)(ii) (return filed late and within two years of bankruptcy.  Note that as a result of an 
apparent drafting error, claims for taxes covered by a late return filed more than two but fewer than three 
years before bankruptcy will fall within the post-petition assessability rule and will be excepted from 
discharge under section 523(a)(1)(A);  see discussion supra after note 85. 
327 §  523(a)(1)(B)(iii) (debtor filed a fraudulent return or willfully attempted to evade or defeat taxes).   
328 Under the 2005 Act, what was section 507(a)(2) has been renumbered as section 507(a)(3).  11 U.S.C. § 
507(a)(3).  The renumbering has occurred because a new category of claims has been given first priority – 
spousal support claims.  § 507(a)(1). 
329 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1). 
330See supra note 328.   
48
relief.331 These gap period tax claims are treated as allowed prepetition claims,332 given 
second priority,333 and are also excepted from discharge.334 
Second, all taxes entitled to eighth priority are excepted from discharge.335 Taxes 
are entitled to eighth priority if covered by the lookback rule, the 240 day rule, or the 
post-petition assessability rule, discussed earlier.336 Prior to the 2005 Act, the courts 
correctly held that the government’s claims for taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy 
were not discharged.  However, the rulings were not correctly analyzed.     
The issue of dischargeability with respect to corporate taxes in Chapter 7 does not 
arise, because corporations do not receive aChapter 7 discharge.337 The issue does arise, 
however, with respect to individuals.  Prior to the 2005 Act, the courts correctly held that 
the government’s tax claims against individuals who made the split-year election would 
not be discharged because those claims were entitled to eighth priority under both the 
post-petition assessability rule and the lookback rule, and thus were excepted from 
discharge under section 523(a)(1)(A).338 The 2005 Act should not change this result, 
because the prepetition short year will still fall within the language of both the lookback 
and post-petition assessability rules, because, by definition, the short tax year will have 
ended on the petition date.339 
This leaves the claims against non-electing individuals.  Prior to the 2005 Act, the 
courts should have applied the post-petition assessability rule to the government’s claims 
for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes.340 Instead, however, the courts 
wrongly treated the government’s claim as a post-petition personal obligation of the 
debtor and not as an obligation of the estate. 341 The courts reached the correct result that 
the taxes were excepted from discharge, but for the wrong reason. 
For cases subject to the 2005 Act, the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy 
taxes incurred by non-electing individuals should be dischargeable, unless the debtor files 
bankruptcy on the last day of the tax year.  The 2005 Act has eliminated eighth priority 
for these taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy, unless the tax year ends on the petition 
date (as it does only if the debtor makes the split year election or files on the last day of 
the tax year).342 Since the prepetition portion of taxes in the year of bankruptcy would 
only be excepted from discharge if entitled to eighth priority (or incurred during the gap 
period), the non-priority taxes for the prepetition portion of the year of bankruptcy should 
be dischargeable.  Eliminating the possibility of eighth priority has turned eighth priority 
 
331 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(2),  502(f). 
332 Id. 
333 § 507(a)(2) (repealed 2005), 507(a)(3).  
334 § 523(a)(1)(A). 
335 Id. 
336 See discussion infra beginning at page 5. 
337 See supra note 314. 
338See, e.g.,  In re McCready, 255 B.R. 834, 835 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1999).   With a split-year election, the 
partial pre-bankruptcy year ends on the petition date, and the taxes would be subject to eighth priority 
under either the lookback rule of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) or the post-petition assessability rule of 11 
U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).  See discussion supra at notes 65, 142, and 143. 
339 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(A)(i), (iii).  
340 See discussion supra beginning after note 193. 
341 See discussion supra beginning at page 29. 
342 See discussion supra beginning on page 41. 
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non-dischargeable taxes into dischargeable general unsecured claims.  Taxes for the post-
petition portion of the year of bankruptcy should not be covered by the discharge.343 
However, the courts may continue to follow the erroneous decisions holding that 
the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes incurred by non-electing individual 
debtors arises post-petition, and is only a personal obligation of the debtor and not of the 
estate.344 If the courts continue to follow these cases, which rely on a statement in a 
committee report that is not reflected in the statute,345 the government’s tax claim will 
remain outside of bankruptcy and will not be affected by the changes made in the 2005 
Act. 
 A third possibility is that the courts will adopt for non-electing individuals the 
theory applied by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in PATCO346 to corporate taxpayers 
– that the prepetition taxes incurred by a debtor in the year of bankruptcy are deemed to 
arise post-petition, and are thus incurred by the debtor.347 If the court adopts the PATCO 
panel’s reasoning, the prepetition portion of taxes in the year of bankruptcy will be 
entitled to first priority as an administrative expense, because the 2005 Act eliminated the 
possibility of applying the post-petition assessability rule to the taxes.  The 2005 Act has 
thus thrown into limbo whether taxes owing by non-electing individuals for the 
prepetition portion of the year of bankruptcy will be dischargeable.   
 
IV. TREATMENT OF YEAR-OF-BANKRUPTCY TAX CLAIMS IN CHAPTER 
PROCEEDINGS.
1. Treatment of Claims Against the Estate. 
 
A. Chapter  11 Cases Prior to the 2005 Act. 
 
Unlike Chapter 7 where claims are paid in peri passu from the proceeds generated 
by the liquidation of the estate’s property, claims against the Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
estate are paid in accordance with the terms of the debtor’s confirmed plan of 
reorganization.348 The debtor’s plan must meet a number of requirements in order to be 
confirmable.  For example, first priority administrative expenses must be paid in cash on 
the effective date of the plan, unless the holder of the claim accepts different treatment.349 
Similarly, unless the government agreed otherwise, eighth priority tax claims350 must be 
paid in deferred cash payments over a period not exceeding six years from assessment of 
the tax.351 
343 See supra note 317.  
344 See discussion supra beginning at note 191. 
345 Supra note 192. 
346 See discussion supra beginning at note 154. 
347 See supra note 155. 
348 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (plan binds debtor and creditors). 
349 11 U.S.C. § 1109(a)(9)(A). 
350 The eighth priority tax claim will consist of the prepetition separate return prepared by an eligible 
individual taxpayer who makes the split-year election, or a pro-rata share of the year’s taxes for the 
prepetition portion of the year. 
351 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (repealed 2005). 
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The use of the term “assessment” created some confusion.  Year-of-bankruptcy 
taxes could not have been “assessed” prepetition,352 and the automatic stay prevents the 
commencement of most collection actions post-petition.353 However, special statutory 
rules allowed the government to assess unpaid prepetition taxes at any time after a 
bankruptcy petition is filed, without complying with the normal deficiency procedures.354 
Therefore, the sooner the government made the assessment, the shorter the period over 
which the debtor could pay the claim following confirmation of a plan. 
The government’s claims for the pre-petition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes 
for both electing individual debtors and corporate debtors were treated as eighth 
priority,355 while the post-petition portions were treated as first priority administrative 
expenses.356 However, the cases holding that the government has no claim against the 
bankruptcy estate of non-electing individual taxpayers for year-of-bankruptcy taxes357 
posed quite a theoretical problem in Chapter 11 cases because of the broader discharge.  
At least theoretically, the government would have no claim against the estate, and the 
debtor would still be able to discharge the taxes since they arose prior to confirmation of 
the plan.358 
The Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court in In re Johnson359 followed the Chapter 7 
cases holding that the government had no claim against the estate of a non-electing 
individual debtor for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes.360 However, to 
prevent the debtor from being able to discharge those taxes as part of the debtor’s 
Chapter 11 plan, the court held that the debtor’s plan could be confirmed only if the 
debtor provided in the plan for payment of the taxes.361 The court did a poor job of 
explaining why the plan had to provide for payment of the debtor’s personal post-petition 
tax obligations if the estate had no liability for them.362 
352 See discussion supra beginning at note 75. 
353 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 
354 See I.R.C. § 6871(b) (“Any deficiency . . . determined by the secretary . . . on . . . the debtor’s estate in a 
case under title 11 of the United States Code . . . may despite the restrictions imposed by section 6213(a) on 
assessments, be immediately assessed if such deficiency has not theretofore been assessed in accordance 
with law.”).  There is a corresponding exception to the automatic stay for this assessment.  11 U.S.C. § 
362(b)(9)(D). 
355 See supra note 142 (electing individual taxpayers); see also discussion supra beginning at page 23 
(corporate taxpayers). 
356 See discussion supra beginning at page 43. 
357 See discussion supra beginning at page 29. 
358 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A). 
359 190 B.R. 724 (Bankr. Mass 1995). 
360 Id. at 127.  See also discussion of the Johnson case supra beginning at note 211. 
361 Johnson, 190 B.R. at 628 (“[T]he Debtors' Chapter 11 plan must provide for payment of these taxes, as 
their payment is integral to the feasibility and good faith requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129.”). 
362 The Johnson court recognized that “the cases that have dealt with section 1398 in the context of Chapter 
11 cases are vague as to the required treatment of post-petition liability to the IRS in plans of 
reorganization.”Id . The Johnson court noted that the bankruptcy court in In re Santiago Vela, 87 B.R., 229, 
231-32  (Bankr. D.P.R. 1988), stated that nonpayment of the personal tax obligation was grounds for 
converting or dismissing the bankruptcy case.  However, the Santiago Vela case involved withholding 
taxes for which the estate was liable.  The nonpayment of the taxes thus constituted a continuing loss to the 
estate, which is one of the grounds for conversion or dismissal.  Santiago Vela, 87 B.R. at 231 (“the United 
States has asserted that the debtors' failure to pay their post-petition federal tax obligations constitutes a 
continuing loss to the estate and evidences the absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation under 
Section 1112(b)(1). The Court agrees….”).  Unlike Santiago Vela, the Court in Johnson held that the taxes 
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The Johnson court reached the right result for the wrong reason.  The government 
should have had an eighth priority nondischargeable claim for the prepetition portion of 
year-of-bankruptcy taxes.363 Because individual Chapter 11 cases are quite rare,364 there 
are only a couple of other published opinions discussing the problem with the Chapter 11 
discharge created by the courts treating the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy 
taxes incurred by non-electing individual debtors as a personal obligation of the debtors 
rather than as a claim against the bankruptcy estate.365 The problem was caused by the 
courts erroneously relying on an unenacted statement in a committee report to deny the 
government a claim against the bankruptcy estate.366 Prior to the 2005 Act, the courts 
would not have had to twist the statutory language367 to prevent the debtor from 
discharging the taxes in Chapter 11 if they had recognized that the government is entitled 
to a claim against the debtor’s estate for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy 
taxes.  Using the proper analysis, the government’s claim (prior to the 2005 Act) would 
have been entitled to eighth priority,368 and as such would have been excepted from 
Chapter 7 discharge.369 Claims excepted from discharge under Chapter 7 are likewise 
excepted from an individual debtor’s discharge in Chapter 11.370 
B. Chapter 11 Cases Under the 2005 Act. 
 
The 2005 Act has made a number of changes in the treatment of the government’s 
eighth priority tax claims under Chapter 11.  The debtor must pay eighth priority tax 
claims in “regular installment payments,”371 over five years from the date of the order for 
 
were not owed by the estate.  How could the nonpayment of taxes that were not owed by the estate 
constitute a continuing loss to the estate? 
363 See discussion supra beginning at page 39. 
364 According to statistics provided by the Office of the United States Courts, there were only 10,132 
Chapter 11 cases filed in the 2004 calendar year.  See Table F-2, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, Business and 
Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Cases Commenced, By Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code During the Twelve Month 
Period Ended Dec. 31, 200, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/bankrupt_f2table_dec2004.pdf. Of these, only 946 cases were non-
business filings.  Id. While the court does not indicate what portion of the business filings were made by 
individuals, the total number of Chapter 11 cases is small in relation to the 1,597,462 bankruptcy cases 
filed in 2004 (less than one percent).   
365 In In re Smith, 210 B.R. 689, 692  (Bankr. D. Md. 1997), the Court followed  Johnson in holding that a 
trustee could recover year-of-bankruptcy tax payments made by the debtor while the debtor was a debtor-
in-possession, because the estate was not liable for those payments and therefore the payments were 
improper.  In In re Wood, 240 B.R. 609, 610 (C.D. Cal. 1999), the debtor sought to structure payment of 
the government’s tax claim for the year of bankruptcy.  The Wood court held that the plan could not 
restrain the government’s efforts to collect the taxes from the debtor.   Id. At 617.   Interestingly, the Wood 
court suggested that the government’s claim would be nondischargeable under Chapter 11 because it was 
excepted from discharge under section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Id. (the debtor’s taxes “were in any 
event nondischargeable under §§ 1141(d)(2) and 523 and thus could have been collected outside the plan”).   
Contrary to the Wood court’s suggestion, nothing in section 523 excepts from discharge personal 
obligations of the debtor which are not claims against the estate.   
366 See discussion supra at note 192. 
367 See discussion supra beginning at note 359. 
368 See discussion supra beginning at note 219. 
369 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A). 
370 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A). 
371 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C). 
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relief rather than six years from assessment,372 and must in all cases pay post-
confirmation interest.373 A new statutory provision enacted by the 2005 Act requires the 
debtor to pay the rate of interest specified by applicable non-bankruptcy law.374 In 
addition, the 2005 Act requires that the treatment of the claim be “not less favorable than 
the most favored nonpriority unsecured claim provided for by the plan.”375 Thus, for 
cases filed after the effective date of the 2005 Act, the government’s claim is well 
protected in Chapter 11.  The only potential loss to the government is interest during the 
so-called “gap period” accruing between the filing of the petition and confirmation of the 
plan.   
However, the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes will no longer be 
entitled to eighth priority under the 2005 Act.376 Instead, the taxes will either be treated 
as first priority administrative expenses,377 as general unsecured claims,378 or as post-
petition claims against the debtor and not as claims against the estate at all.379 In the first 
situation, the government will be protected since administrative expenses must be paid in 
cash on the effective date.380 If the obligation is not treated as a claim against the estate, 
as suggested by the non-electing individual cases, then the issue of dischargeability will 
once again loom large.  Dischargeability is discussed below.381 If the prepetition portion 
of year-of-bankruptcy taxes is treated as a general unsecured claim, as it should be treated 
under the statutory rules after the 2005 Act changes,382 then the government will be in the 
same position as any other general unsecured creditor.  
General unsecured creditors are principally383 protected in Chapter 11 by the best-
interests-of-creditors test, which requires the debtor to show that objecting creditors will 
receive at least as much in value under the plan as they would receive in a liquidation.384 
In addition, unless the class in which the government’s claim is placed votes to accept the 
plan,385 the debtor either must pay the claim in full or retain no interest in the estate’s 
property after confirmation.386 
372 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C)(ii). 
373 See § 1129(a)(9)(C)(i) (requiring that the total value of the claim “as of the effective date of the plan” 
be paid) .  The phrase “as of the effective date” requires maintaining the present discounted value of the 
claim by paying interest on the claim.  See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 467 (2004) (holding that 
interest must be paid to maintain “value as of the effective date”). 
374 11 U.S.C. § 511. 
375 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C)(iii). 
376 See discussion supra beginning at page 41. 
377 Id. 
378 Id.; see also supra note 275. 
379 Id.; see also discussion beginning at page 29. 
380 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A). 
381 See discussion infra beginning at page 58. 
382 See discussion supra beginning at page 39. 
383 There are other protections for creditors in Chapter 11, such as requirements of good faith, legality and 
disclosure.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1)-(5). 
384 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). 
385 Voting is by class under Chapter 11, and a class accepts the plan if more than half in number of creditors 
holding at least two-thirds in amount of claims votes to accept the plan.  11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).   
386 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).  Under the 2005 Act, an individual debtor may keep property 
acquired by the debtor post-petition, which is included in the estate under new section 1115, without 
running afoul of the cramdown rule.  Id. 
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The 2005 Act contains substantial new restrictions on an individual debtor’s 
ability to confirm a Chapter 11 plan387 These restrictions were enacted to prevent debtors 
who have the ability to pay their debts out of future income from discharging them in 
bankruptcy.  The problem with Congress’s theory is that the debtor’s projected 
disposable income is based on the debtor’s past earnings, rather than future earning 
capacity, and on standardized expenses, both of which may not be reflective of the 
debtor’s actual ability to pay.  Under the new provision, if any general unsecured creditor 
objects to the plan, the individual debtor must show that the value of property being 
distributed under the plan exceeds the debtor’s projected disposable income during the 5 
year period following the first plan payment.388 If the value of the debtor’s projected 
disposable income during the five year period would exceed the value of the distributions 
to be made under the plan, and the plan does not provide for full payment of the claim 
with interest, the plan cannot be confirmed.  Note that unlike Chapter 13 (but like 
Chapter 12), the rule does not require the debtor to actually use post-petition income to 
fund the plan.  Rather, the rule merely provides that the distribution under the plan 
exceed what would be distributed out of the debtor’s projected disposable income.  If the 
value of the property of the estate exceeds the debtor’s projected disposable income over 
the five-year period, it would appear that a plan could be confirmed using only estate 
property and estate earnings, without using any of the debtor’s future income, to pay 
creditors.   
Whether the new rule will have any impact on tax claims depends on whether the 
courts treat the government’s claim for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy 
taxes by non-electing individual debtors as a dischargeable general unsecured claim, as 
they should, or, as they did in the past, whether they treat the government’s claim as a 
personal nondischargeable obligation of the debtor that had to be provided for under the 
plan even though the government had no claim against the bankruptcy estate.  In the 
former case, the debtor’s projected disposable income test would have to be met to 
confirm a plan to pay the government less than full payment of its claim.  In the latter 
case, the government would be entitled to full payment regardless of the test to be 
applied.   
While confirming a Chapter 11 plan will not be easy, the government will bear a 
substantial risk that some portion of its claim for the prepetition portion of year-of-
bankruptcy taxes will go unpaid if it has only a general unsecured claim against the estate 
for those taxes.  By eliminating the possibility of eighth priority under the post-petition 
assessability rule, the 2005 Act exposes the government’s claim against an individual 
debtor for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes to discharge if the debtor’s 
tax liability is properly treated as a “claim.”   
 
C. The Estate’s Liability for Post-Confirmation Interest and 
Penalties on Year-of-Bankruptcy Tax Claims. 
 
387 Under the 2005 Act, an individual debtor will either have to pay all unsecured creditors, including the 
government’s claim for prepetition taxes, in full with interest over the term of the plan, or use all of the 
debtor’s projected disposable income for at least the five year period beginning on the date that the first 
payment is due under the plan to make payments to creditors.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15). 
388 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15). 
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Prior to the 2005 Act, the statute governing eighth priority claims did not contain 
the magic language that would require the payment of post-confirmation interest on the 
tax claim.389 This did not necessarily mean, however, that the debtor could confirm a 
plan to pay eighth priority tax claims over six years without interest.  To confirm a plan 
of reorganization, the debtor also must show that the plan meets the so-called “best-
interests-of-creditors” test.  The “best interests” test requires the plan proponent to show 
that the property to be distributed to an objecting creditor under the plan has at least as 
much “value as of the effective date of the plan” as the creditor would have received in a 
Chapter 7 liquidation occurring on the effective date of the plan.390 If the priority claim 
would have been paid in full from a Chapter 7 liquidation occurring on the effective date 
of the plan, then the debtor should be required to pay post-confirmation interest on the 
claim at a fair market rate in order for the proposed plan payments to have a “value as of 
the effective date of the plan” – or in financial terms a present discounted value – equal to 
the cash payment that would have been made in the hypothetical Chapter 7 case.  If the 
priority claim would not have been paid in full in the hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation, 
then the debtor must only pay the amount of interest necessary for the present value of 
the payment stream to equal or exceed the distribution that would be made in a Chapter 7 
case.  Therefore, the debtor may or may not be required to pay interest depending on the 
value of the Chapter 11 payment stream in comparison with the distribution that would be 
made in the hypothetical Chapter 7 case.   
Prior to the 2005 Act, if the debtor was required to pay market-rate post-confirmation 
interest in order to meet the best interests of creditors test, the rate of interest would 
presumably be determined under the Supreme Court’s “prime plus” formula, under which 
the prime rate is used as the base rate, and the creditor can seek to prove its entitlement to 
a premium to compensate for the additional risk of the loan to the debtor.391 Ultimately, 
the Bankruptcy Court would determine the appropriate interest rate on a case-by-case 
basis, without regard to the applicable non-bankruptcy rate.392 Where the debtor is not 
required to pay market rate interest (because the priority claim would not be paid in full 
in the hypothetical Chapter 7 case), the debtor could propose the lowest rate that would, 
using mathematical discounting formulas,  result in the payment stream having a greater 
present value than the hypothetical Chapter 7 distribution.   
 
D. Chapter 12 and 13 Cases. 
 
Like creditors in Chapter 11, creditors in Chapter 12 and 13 cases are paid in 
accordance with the terms of the debtor’s confirmed plan of reorganization, rather than 
from the proceeds generated by selling off the estate’s property.  Creditors holding 
priority claims receive special protection in Chapter 12 and 13 cases.  In order to be 
confirmed, a Chapter 12 or 13 plan must provide for full payment of priority tax claims 
 
389 The statute did not require the payment stream to have a “value as of the effective date of the plan equal 
to the allowed amount of the claim.”  See § 1129(a)(9)(C) (repealed 2005); Till v. SCS Credit Corporation,  
541 U.S. at 467. 
390 11 U.S.C. § 1129(7)(A)(ii). 
391 See Till v. SCS Credit Corporation, 541 U.S. at 467. 
392 Id. 
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over the life of the plan.393 This rule applies to both first priority administrative expenses 
and eighth priority taxes.  The plan term is generally three to five years.394 A debtor who 
fails to demonstrate the ability to pay all priority tax claims in full over the plan term will 
be unable to confirm a Chapter 12 or 13 plan,395and the bankruptcy case will likely be 
converted to Chapter 7 or dismissed.396 
The first question that must be considered is whether the government’s claims for 
taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy will be entitled to priority.  As with corporate 
debtors, individual Chapter 12 and 13 debtors are not eligible to make a split-year 
election.  Will the courts follow the corporate cases in treating the prepetition portion of 
year-of-bankruptcy taxes as an eighth priority claim,397 or will they will follow the non-
electing individual debtor cases in treating the claim as a personal obligation of the debtor 
and not an obligation of the estate?398 Only a few published opinions have addressed the 
issue.   
The Bankruptcy Court in In re Michaelson399 felt bound by the Court of Appeals’ 
corporate precedent in O’Neill Shoe Company,400 holding that the prepetition portion of 
year-of-bankruptcy taxes would be entitled to eighth priority under the post-petition 
assessability rule.  In the opinion, however, the Michaelson court suggested that it 
disagreed with the Court of Appeals’s decision in O’Neill Shoe, and went on to throw up 
its hands as to how the year’s tax claim should be divided between the prepetition and 
post-petition period.  The Michaelson court denied the debtor’s motion to treat estimated 
tax payments as the amount of the eighth priority claim, but did explain how the 
prepetition portion of the claim should be determined, leaving the debtor in limbo.401 
In an unpublished opinion, the bankruptcy court in In re Wilkoff,402 agreed with 
the Michaelson court that estimated taxes were irrelevant, but disagreed with the 
Michaelson court’s holding that the government’s claim for the pre-petition portion of 
year-of-bankruptcy taxes would be entitled to eighth priority.  Instead, the Wilkoff court 
held that the government’s claim for taxes in the year of bankruptcy arises post-petition, 
noting that other courts were in disagreement about whether the claim arises at the end of 
the tax year or when the tax return is due.  Since in either case the claim in Wilkoff would 
 
393 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(a)(2) (“[P]lan shall . . . provide for full payment, in deferred cash payments, of 
all claims entitled to priority under section 507, unless . . . (B) the holder of a particular claim agrees to 
different treatment of such claim”), 1322(a)(2) (same). 
394 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(c), 1322(d) (plans under Chapter 12 and 13 cannot exceed 3 years without court 
approval, or 5 years with court approval). 
395 The debtor must show that a plan is feasible in order to confirm the plan.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(11), 
1225(a)(6), 1325(a)(6). 
396 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112 (b)(1)(2) (repealed 2005), 1112(b)(4)(m) , 1208(c)(3) – (5), 1307(c)(3), (5). 
397 See discussion supra beginning on page 23. 
398 See discussion supra beginning on page 29. 
399 200 B.R. 862, 866  (Bankr. Minn. 1996). 
400 64 F.3d 1146, 1151 (8th Cir. 1995), discussed supra beginning at note 164. 
401 Michaelson,, 200 B.R. at 868 (“[T]he Debtors must first identify their 1995 prepetition income. Then, it 
seems, the Debtors must show how pre and post-petition deductions, exemptions, credits, etc., affected that 
income to produce a calculated portion of their 1995 income tax liability. The question, more precisely, is: 
how can the Debtors relate their 1995 tax liability to their prepetition income without bifurcating the tax 
period? Perhaps, the answer is that they cannot.”).  The Michaelson court did not consider allocating the 
year’s taxes pro-rata based on time.  See discussion supra beginning at note 178 . 
402 No. 98-34354, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 124, *18, 24-27, 87 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2266, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas.  
(CCH)  ¶50,289 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001). 
56
have arisen post-petition, the court simply held that the claim arose post-petition.403 The 
Wilkoff court therefore applied section 1305(a), which allows but does not require the 
government to file a claim against the bankruptcy estate for taxes that “become payable” 
post-petition.404 The Wilkoff court held that since the government did not file a claim 
under section 1305(a), the debtor could not treat the claim under its plan.405 The Wilkoff 
court also held that the Chapter 13 discharge did not apply to the government’s year-of-
bankruptcy tax claim against the debtor personally, since by not electing to file a claim 
under section 1305(a), the government did not have an “allowed claim,” and only 
“allowed claims” are covered by the Chapter 13 discharge.406 The Wilkoff court thus 
treated the question of whether the taxes “become payable” as determinative of when the 
“claim” arises for bankruptcy classification and priority purposes.  Apparently under the 
Wilkoff court’s analysis, the government would have the option either to file a proof of 
claim for taxes arising prepetition, which claim would be treated as an eighth priority 
non-dischargeable claim, or to not file a claim and have the taxes be deemed non-
dischargeable post-petition obligations that cannot be treated under the plan.407 
While the Wilkoff court’s holding may be consistent with the holdings made in the 
non-electing individual debtor cases,408 it is not consistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s 
definition of a “claim.”409 A better reconciliation of the statutory language would be to 
apply section 1305(a) only to post-petition claims which become payable prior to 
confirmation.  Prepetition claims which become payable post-petition should be treated 
as allowed prepetition claims under the general rules of section 502, and priority would 
be determined under the normal rules of section 507.  Certainly, nothing in the language 
of section 1305(a) suggests that claims which would already be subject to section 502 
somehow lose their status as “claims” simply because the government elects not to file a 
proof of claim. 
If the Wilkoff case is followed after the 2005 Act becomes effective, there is little 
chance that the government will ever elect under section 1305(a) to file a claim for 
income taxes due in the year of bankruptcy.  By eliminating eighth priority for the 
prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes, the 2005 Act turns what should have 
previously been an eighth priority claim that had to be paid in full over time into a 
dischargeable general unsecured claim.  If Wilkoff is followed, the debtor, by not making 
the split-year election, would cause the government’s claim to be treated as if the 
bankruptcy case were never filed.  The government would lose any claim against the 
 
403 Wilkoff, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 124 at *10-12. 
404 Id. at *10;  see also 11 U.S.C. § 1305. 
405 Wilcoff, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 124  at *23-24 ( “Since the IRS is an entity holding a claim for ‘taxes that 
become payable to a governmental unit while the case is pending,’ it had the option of filing a proof of 
claim for Debtors' 1998 income tax liability. It did not do so. Consequently, the claim was not allowed or 
disallowed under § 502. Thus, the claim could not be provided for in the Plan.”).  Id. 
406 Id. at *24  “Furthermore, only debts that ‘have been provided for by’ a Chapter 13 plan or ‘disallowed 
under section 502’ are discharged under § 1328(a). Consequently, when a holder chooses not to file a claim 
under § 1305(a), the claim is not discharged. Since the IRS chose not to file a claim under § 1305(a), its 
claim will not be discharged under § 1328(a)”).  Id. (citations omitted). 
407 Accord  In re Olson,  No. 02-83078, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1537, 4-7 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2003) (holding that 
government has election to file claim or to treat taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy as 
nondischargeable post-petition claims). 
408 See discussion supra beginning at page 29. 
409 See discussion supra beginning at note 218. 
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debtor’s bankruptcy estate on account of the year-of-bankruptcy tax liability, but the 
claim itself would be enforceable against the debtor immediately, and would not be 
affected by the debtor’s bankruptcy discharge.  Surely the government would prefer to be 
treated as a super-creditor, unimpaired by the bankruptcy and able to collect its claim in 
full immediately after confirmation, rather than as an ordinary general unsecured creditor 
holding a dischargeable claim. 
If this is what Congress intended by section 1305, it should have done a better job 
of excepting the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes from the general 
definition of a “claim.”  The holding in Wilkoff would make it much more difficult for 
debtors with significant year-of-bankruptcy tax liabilities to perform under a confirmed 
plan, because it does not appear that the post-petition obligation to pay the taxes will be 
factored into the debtor’s expenses in computing the debtor’s “projected disposable 
income,” all of which must be used to pay creditors under the plan.410 The loss of eighth 
priority is irrelevant under Wilkoff, because the court held that the government’s tax claim 
would be protected from discharge even without eighth priority. 
If the courts follow the holding of Michaelson, on the other hand, the loss of 
eighth priority411 will have a substantial impact on the government’s rights.  As a general 
unsecured creditor for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes, the 
government will be entitled to share with other unsecured creditors in the funds available 
under the plan for distribution to general unsecured creditors.412 In all cases, the debtor 
must meet the best-interests-of-creditors test by showing that rejecting creditors receive 
as much in value as they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation on the effective date.413 
In addition, the debtor must either pay the claim in full or use all of the debtor’s 
“projected disposable income” for the three to five year term of the plan to pay creditors 
(or under Chapter 12 provide creditors with as much in value).414 Debtors who do not 
have enough “projected disposable income” to pay all general unsecured claims over the 
plan period should be able to confirm a Chapter 12 or 13 plan that pays only part of their 
year-of-bankruptcy taxes.  The balance of the claim should be dischargeable.   
The pre-2005 Act case law puts the government in a precarious position with 
respect to cases arising after the 2005 Act becomes effective.  Under the theory used by 
the court in Wilkoff, the government should not file a claim because doing so will turn a 
non-dischargeable claim into a dischargeable one.  Under the theory used by the court in  
Michaelson, the government’s failure to file a proof of claim should enable the debtor to 
discharge the taxes.415 
410 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(b)(1)(B) (requiring that “all of the debtor’s projected disposable income” during 
the plan period  be “applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan”), 1325(b)(2) (defining 
“disposable income” as “current monthly income . . . less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended” 
for maintenance and support),  1325(b)(3) (providing that “reasonably necessary to be expended” refers to 
section 707(b)(2)(A) and (B)), and 707(b)(2)(A)-(B) (allowing a deduction for standard living expenses 
allowed under Internal Revenue Service guidelines for tax deficiencies.  These guidelines make no 
allowance for the debtor’s new bankruptcy obligation to pay taxes on pre-bankruptcy earnings). 
411 See discussion supra beginning after note 264. 
412 See 11 U.S.C.§§ 1123(a)(4) (same treatment of all claims in class), 1222(a)(3) (same), 1322(a)(3) 
(same). 
413 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), 1225(a)(4), 1235(a)(4). 
414 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B), (C), 1325(b)(1)(B). 
415 See discussion infra at note 534. 
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A secondary question is whether the debtor must pay post-confirmation interest 
on priority taxes treated under the plan.  This issue only applies to administrative priority 
post-confirmation taxes, and, prior to the 2005 Act, to prepetition taxes entitled to eighth 
priority.416 While the Chapter 12 and 13 statutes do not explicitly require the payment of 
post-confirmation interest on priority claims,417 a best-interests-of-creditors test similar to 
the one in Chapter 11418 does require the payment of post-petition interest if the creditor 
would have received full payment in a Chapter 7 liquidation occurring on the effective 
date of the plan.419 However, the debtor may be able to confirm a plan without paying 
priority creditors interest if the value of the plan’s payment stream equals or exceeds the 
distribution that the government would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation occurring on 
the effective date.  Moreover, there is no requirement for paying post-petition pre-
confirmation interest (except on secured claims).420 
2. Dischargeability of Year-of-Bankruptcy Tax Clams in Chapter 
Proceedings. 
 
A. Chapter 11 Prior to the 2005 Act. 
 
The Chapter 11 discharge provisions are more complex than the Chapter 7 
discharge provisions, in large part because the courts have set entirely different rules for 
corporate debtors and non-electing individual debtors. 
 
i. Corporate Debtors. 
 
Corporate debtors generally421 receive a discharge in Chapter 11, even though 
they are excluded from receiving a discharge under Chapter 11.422 Prior to the 2005 Act, 
corporate debtors could even discharge debts that would be excepted from an individual 
 
416 After the 2005 Act, the only way that year-of-bankruptcy taxes will be entitled to eighth priority is if the 
debtor files bankruptcy on the last day of the tax year.  Chapter 12 and 13 debtors are not allowed to make 
the split-year election.  I.R.C. § 1398(a).  Therefore, all taxes in the year of bankruptcy were not incurred in 
a tax year ending on or before the petition date, unless the debtor files bankruptcy on the last day of the tax 
year.  See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A).  Eighth priority will therefore rarely apply to year-of-bankruptcy taxes 
in Chapter 12 and 13 cases. 
417 11 U.S.C. ¶ 507 (a)(8)(A) (no requirement to pay “value as of effective date equal to the allowed amount 
of the claim”). 
418 See discussion supra at note 390.  
419 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(4), 1325(a)(4).  While the statutory language does not say that the court may 
confirm a plan only if it complies with the best-interests test, courts have refused to confirm plans that do 
not provide for the payment of interest on claims that would be paid in full in a Chapter 7 liquidation.  See 
In re Sublett, 895 F.2d 1381, 1385-86  (11th Cir. 1990);  In re Hardy, 755 F.2d 75, 76 (6th Cir. 1985) 
(refusing under best-interests test to confirm plan that provided for full payment of claims without interest); 
In re Martin, 17 B.R. 924, 925-26 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (same). 
420 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). 
421 Corporate debtors do not receive a discharge if the plan provides for the liquidation of all or 
substantially all of the debtor’s property, the debtor does not engage in post-confirmation business.  See 11 
U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (2005).  If a corporate debtor has post-confirmation operations or does not liquidate, it 
is entitled to a Chapter 11 discharge upon confirmation of the plan.  § 1141(d)(1). 
422 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(d)(1)–(2).   
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debtor’s discharge.423 Therefore, even though, as the courts have properly held, the 
prepetition portion of the government’s year-of-bankruptcy corporate tax claim was 
entitled to priority under the post-petition assessability rule,424 it technically remained a 
dischargeable obligation under the Bankruptcy Code.  The discharge, however, was of 
little moment if the government properly filed a claim and demanded the treatment to 
which it was entitled, because the government’s eighth priority tax claim for the 
prepetition portion of the year’s taxes had to be paid in full under the plan.425 However, 
because the obligation was discharged to the extent not provided for in the plan, 
questions regarding entitlement to and the rate of interest to be paid on the delinquencies 
were important.426 
ii. Individual Debtors Who Make the Split Year 
Election. 
 
Dischargeability questions are also quite straight forward for individual debtors 
who make the split-year election.427 Taxes excepted from discharge under section 523 of 
the Bankruptcy Code are also excepted from an individual debtor’s Chapter 11 
discharge.428 If the debtor makes the election, the government’s claim (both prior to and 
after the 2005 Act) for taxes owing for the prepetition partial-year will be entitled to 
eighth priority,429 and thus will be excepted from discharge under section 523.430 The 
government’s claim will also, therefore, be excepted from the Chapter 11 discharge.431 
iii. Individual Debtors Who Do Not Make the Split-
Year Election. 
 
The issues are more complex for non-electing individuals.  Even before the 2005 
Act, claims that would be excepted from the Chapter 7 discharge were also excepted 
from an individual debtor’s Chapter 11 discharge.432 Thus, under a correct reading of the 
Bankruptcy Code,433 the prepetition portion of the government’s tax claims against 
individual debtors should be excepted from discharge.434 
423 § 541(d)(2) (exception for debts excepted from discharge under section 523 only applies to individual 
debtors). 
424 See discussion supra beginning at page 23. 
425 See discussion supra at notes 351 (before 2005 Act), 371 (after 2005 Act). 
426 See discussion supra at notes 389 (no stated requirement for interest prior to 2005 Act), 373 (interest 
requirement under 2005 Act), 374 (rate of interest specified under 2005 Act). 
427 Individual debtors under both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 are allowed to make the split-year election.  See 
I.R.C. § 1398(a), (d)(2)(A)(2005). 
428 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2)(2005) (“The confirmation of a plan does not discharge an individual debtor from 
any debt excepted from discharge under section 523 of this title.”). 
429 See discussion supra note 141 (before 2005 Act), beginning after note 264 (after 2005 Act). 
430 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A). 
431 See supra note 428. 
432 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2)(2005).  The 2005 Act cleaned up the language by making it clear that it is the 
discharge, rather than the confirmation of the plan, that does not discharge an individual debtor from debts 
excepted from discharge under section 523.  It is difficult to understand how the change in the language 
would change the effect of the provision.   
433 As discussed supra beginning on page 29, the courts have incorrectly held that the prepetition portion of 
year-of-bankruptcy taxes for individual debtors did not fall within the post-petition assessability rule.  
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Unfortunately, the courts have not granted eighth priority to the government’s 
claim for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes owed by non-electing 
individual debtors.435 Instead, most courts held that the entire tax claim for the year of 
bankruptcy (both the portion that related to prepetition income and the portion that 
related to post-petition income) was to be treated as a post-petition personal obligation of 
the debtor, and not an obligation of the estate, where an individual debtor failed to make a 
split-year election.436 The dischargeability problem was avoided in Chapter 7 because 
the courts held that the entire year’s claim “arose” post-petition,437 and the Chapter 7 
discharge only applied to prepetition claims.438 However, the Chapter 11 discharge is 
broader than the Chapter 7 discharge, applying to “any debt that arose before the date of 
. . . confirmation.”439 Where the tax year ends post-petition, but prior to confirmation, it 
would thus appear, under the theory adopted by the courts in cases involving non-electing 
individuals, that the taxes for the year of bankruptcy would arise before confirmation and  
be dischargeable.  Thus, the government could not collect the taxes from the debtor 
because they would be discharged by confirmation of the plan, and the government could 
not collect the taxes from the estate because the courts held that the estate is not liable for 
the taxes.   
The only courts to consider the issue, however, did not rule that the taxes were 
uncollectible.  In In re Wood,440 an individual Chapter 11 debtor sought to prevent the 
government from collecting prepetition year-of-bankruptcy taxes.  The debtor had 
attempted to treat the claim under its plan of reorganization, even though the government 
had not filed a proof of claim.  The district court began by stating that there was no 
 
Rather, the courts have held that the taxes arise post-petition and do not constitute a claim against the 
estate.  Under this theory, the claims are also not discharged because the claims arise after the petition date.  
Interestingly, this theory would expose the claims to discharge under Chapter 11, because the claims were 
not excepted from discharge under section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Since the Chapter 11 discharge 
applies to claims arising after the petition date but prior to confirmation, these erroneous rulings create the 
potential for discharging tax claims that should not be dischargeable.  The district court in In re Wood, 240 
B.R. 609, 613 (C.D. Cal. 1999), first held that the prepetition portion of taxes incurred in the year of 
bankruptcy did not constitute a claim against the estate.  Then to avoid the problems with the Chapter 11 
discharge, the Wood court held that the same claim was entitled to first priority as an administrative 
expense.  Id. Since administrative expenses have to be paid in cash in full on the effective date of the plan 
(11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)((9)(A)), there was no way for the debtor to discharge the tax liability.  However, it 
makes no sense for the same tax claim not to be a claim against the estate for priority purposes, while at the 
same time being a claim against the estate for treatment as an administrative expense.   The Wood court’s 
conclusionary treatment of the problem was erroneous.   
434 Prior to the 2005 Act, the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy tax claims should have been entitled 
to eighth priority under the post-petition assessability rule.  See discussion supra beginning on page 39.  In 
turn, claims entitled to eighth priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) are excepted from discharge 
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A).  All claims against individual debtors that would be excepted from the 
Chapter 7 discharge have always been excepted from the Chapter 11 discharge as well.  11 U.S.C. § 
1141(d)(2). 
435 See discussion supra beginning at page 29. 
436 Id.; see also cases cited supra in note 191. 
437 Id. 
438 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b). 
439 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A). 
440 240 B.R. 609 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
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question but that the taxes were excepted from discharge under section 523.441 The court 
did not explain how the taxes would be excepted from discharge under section 523, but in 
a footnote cited to section 523(a)(1)(A).442 The district court then held that the entire 
year’s taxes arose post-petition because the debtor did not make a split-year election.443 
According to the district court: 
 
Wood's failure to make the election "leaves the IRS with a post-petition tax claim 
against [Wood] individually, [but] with no claim whatsoever against the 
bankruptcy estate for any part of the [1995] tax liability."444 
The Wood court did not explain how the taxes could be excepted from discharge under 
section 523(a)(1)(A), which only applies to prepetition eighth priority claims, after it had 
just ruled that the government had no claim whatsoever against the estate, and only a 
post-petition claim against the debtor.445 
The district court’s opinion in Wood is internally inconsistent and illogical.  If the 
government’s entire year-of-bankruptcy tax claim is deemed to arise post-petition, and is 
deemed to constitute only a personal obligation of the debtor and not an obligation of the 
estate, it cannot be excepted from discharge under section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
because section 523 only applies to prepetition claims.  Moreover, if the claim is not 
excepted from discharge under section 523, it would appear to be subject to the Chapter 
11 discharge if the claim “arose”446 prior to the confirmation date.  The district court in 
Wood avoided the discharge question only through sloppy analysis and conclusionary and 
incorrect references to the Bankruptcy Code.  While Congress likely did not intend to 
allow Chapter 11 debtors to avoid paying taxes incurred in year of bankruptcy, the theory 
adopted in the non-electing individual cases – that all year-of-bankruptcy taxes arise at 
the end of the tax year – is difficult to reconcile with the statutory language to achieve the 
result of excepting the taxes from discharge. 447 The problem is that the underlying 
theory is wrong – prepetition taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy should be treated as 
prepetition “claims.”  The theory adopted by the courts cannot be reconciled with the 
 
441 Id. at 612 (“There is no question that Wood's federal income tax liabilities are nondischargeable under 
11 U.S.C. § 523.”). 
442 Id. at 613 n.36. 
443 Id. at 613 (“Because Wood failed to bifurcate the tax year, his entire 1995 tax liability is a post-petition 
debt.”). 
444 Id. (citations omitted). 
445 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) excepts from discharge taxes “of a kind and for the periods specified in section 
507(a)(2) and 507(a)(8) of this title.” 
446 At the latest, the claim would arise when the return for the tax year was due, although most courts have 
suggested that the claim arises at the end of the tax year. 
447 One possibility is to argue that the post-petition, individual liability of the debtor for year-of-bankruptcy 
taxes does not constitute a “debt” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, because the Chapter 11 
discharge only applies to a “debt that arose before the date of such confirmation.”  A “debt” is defined in 
the Bankruptcy Code as “liability on a claim.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(12).  This brings us back to the Bankruptcy 
Code’s broad definition of a “claim.”  § 101(5); see also discussion supra beginning at note 228.  If the 
courts wish to follow the theory in the non-electing individual debtor cases (that the claims are personal 
post-petition obligations of the debtor and not claims against the estate), they should reconcile their rulings 
with the case law defining a bankruptcy claim.  This will be difficult to do, since the Bankruptcy Code 
defines a “claim” so broadly.  
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case law defining when a “claim” exists for bankruptcy purposes,448 and applying the 
statutory rules would appear to make the government’s claim for taxes incurred 
prepetition in the year of filing dischargeable and uncollectible in a Chapter 11 case.   
 
3. Chapter 11 after the 2005 Act. 
 
The 2005 Act has made a number of changes to the Chapter 11 discharge 
provisions that create greater uncertainty about the dischargeability of year-of-bankruptcy 
taxes.  The most important change is that Congress has eliminated the possibility of 
treating as eighth priority the government’s claim for the prepetition portion of year-of-
bankruptcy taxes.449 The impact of this change on corporate and individual debtors is 
discussed below.  Congress has also changed the timing of the Chapter 11 discharge for 
individual debtors, and has enacted new provisions to except certain tax claims from 
broad corporate discharge.   
 
A.  Corporate Taxpayers. 
 
Because corporate debtors could previously discharge in Chapter 11 debts that 
would be excepted from discharge if the debtor had been an individual,450 the exception 
from discharge for eighth priority claims under section 523(a)(1)(A) did not apply to 
corporate Chapter 11 debtors.451 In corporate Chapter 11 cases, the main protection for 
the government’s claim for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes was its 
eighth priority.  The debtor could not confirm a plan without providing for the full 
payment of the eighth priority claim.452 
Since the Chapter 11 discharge applies only to obligations that are not set forth in 
the plan,453 the debtor’s obligation under the plan to pay the claim in full would not be 
discharged.  Thus, if the government properly filed a proof of claim and demanded the 
treatment accorded by Chapter 11 to the claim, the government’s rights would in general 
be protected.   
By eliminating eighth priority treatment for the prepetition portion of the 
government’s claim for taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy, Congress has likewise 
eliminated the protection previously granted to the claims as a result of the priority.454 
448 See discussion supra beginning at note 228. 
449 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(2005), discussed supra beginning at page 41. 
450 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2) (excepting from the Chapter 11 discharge debts covered by section 523 only 
if the debtor is an individual).   
451 Id. 
452 See supra note 351. 
453 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in . . . the plan . . . the confirmation of the plan 
discharges the debtor from any debt.”) 
454 It remains to be seen whether the courts will treat the government’s claim for the prepetition portion of 
year-of-bankruptcy taxes as a general unsecured claim.   The elimination of eighth priority removes the leg 
upon which the court’s previous theory in corporate cases rested.  See discussion supra beginning on page 
23.  It remains to be seen whether the courts will now treat the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy 
corporate taxes as prepetition general unsecured claims or as first priority administrative expenses.  See 
discussion supra beginning at page 41.  For the remainder of the discussion, I assume that the courts will 
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Without priority, the government’s claim for the prepetition portion of year-of-
bankrutpcy taxes should be treated as a general unsecured claim.455 General unsecured 
claims do not have to be paid in full under the plan; indeed with the right facts a debtor 
should be able to confirm a plan providing for no distribution to general unsecured 
creditors.456 The portion of the claim which is not to be paid under the plan will be 
discharged.457 The principal effect of the 2005 Act on the dischargeability of year-of-
bankruptcy tax claims does not, therefore, occur as a direct result of a change to the 
dischargeability rules.  Rather, it is the change in the priority rules which causes taxes 
that were previously required to be paid in full under the plan to become dischargeable. 
The 2005 Act also contains a new provision directly changing the dischargeability 
rules.  New section 1141(d)(6)(B) excepts from the corporate discharge traditional tax 
fraud claims.458 The provision applies to fraudulent returns and willful attempts to 
“evade or defeat such tax.”459 These provisions will likely apply to earlier years’ taxes 
rather than to taxes in the year-of-bankruptcy, because such actions taking place post-
petition would likely result in dismissal or conversion of the bankruptcy case.460 
B.  Individual Taxpayers. 
 
The changes made by the 2005 Act should not have a significant impact on those 
who make a split-year election.  If the split-year election is made, the taxes for the 
prepetition “year” of filing will be entitled to eighth priority under both the lookback rule 
and the pre-petition assessability rule, and will be excepted from discharge under section 
523(a)(1)(A).  The changes made by the 2005 Act clarify the requirement to pay post-
confirmation interest on the claim,461 and require that the applicable non-bankruptcy rate 
of interest be utilized.462 
The 2005 Act may have a more significant impact on individual debtors who do 
not make the split-year election. Under the 2005 Act, the government’s claims against 
individual debtors who do not make the split-year election for the prepetition portion of 
year-of-bankruptcy taxes would no longer be entitled to eighth priority.463 If the courts 
had properly applied the post-petition assessability rule to these claims prior to the 2005 
Act, the change would result in the government’s claim for prepetition year-of-
bankruptcy taxes losing all priority and becoming dischargeable.  As a general unsecured 
creditor, the government would receive on account of its claim for the prepetition portion 
 
apply existing bankruptcy law concerning when a “claim” exists for bankruptcy purposes, rather than 
creating a separate doctrine for tax cases.   
455 See discussion supra beginning at note 383. 
456 See id. If the government would receive no distribution in a Chapter 7 liquidation because there is not 
enough liquidation value in the estate to pay higher priority creditors in full, and the debtor’s shareholders 
retain no interest in the debtor, the plan could be confirmed over the government’s objection without 
making any distribution on account of the government’s general unsecured claim. 
457 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A). 
458 § 1141(d)(6)(B).   
459 Id. 
460 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(2) (conversion or dismissal for “cause”), (4)(i) (“cause” includes failing to file 
tax returns due post-petition or to pay post-petition taxes). 
461 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C). 
462 11 U.S.C. § 511(a) (requiring interest on tax claims to be paid at the applicable nonbankruptcy rate). 
463 See discussion supra beginning on page 41. 
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of year-of-bankruptcy taxes only the payments called for by the plan, which could be 
substantially less than full payment.   
However, prior to the 2005 Act, the courts did not accord eighth priority to the 
government’s claim for the pre-petition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes.  Instead, the 
courts held in non-electing individual Chapter 7 cases that the government had no claim 
against the estate,464 and held in the few Chapter 11 cases that discussed the issue, using 
faulty reasoning, that the claims had to be paid under the plan and were excepted from 
discharge under section 523(a)(1)(A).465 The elimination of eighth priority may have no 
effect on these rulings, because the courts had not accorded the claims eighth priority in 
the past.  If, as argued above, these cases are wrong, the impact of the 2005 Act’s 
elimination of eighth priority will be substantial. 
The 2005 Act contains two new Chapter 11 dischargeability exceptions.  First, 
individual debtors do not receive a discharge up front on the effective date of the plan.466 
Instead, the discharge is held in abeyance until all payments under the plan are 
completed.467 A new provision allows the bankruptcy court to grant a “hardship 
discharge” even if the debtor does not complete all payments required by the plan, if 
creditors received more in value under the plan than they would have received in a 
Chapter 7 liquidation occurring on the effective date of the plan, and modification of the 
plan would not be practical.468 If the government’s claim for the prepetition portion of 
year-of-bankruptcy taxes were to be properly treated as a general unsecured claim against 
the estate, this new provision would provide some protection in the event the debtor fails 
to make the payments called for by the plan, but would still permit the discharge of 
amounts not provided for in the plan (or in the case of a hardship discharge, even 
amounts provided for in the plan and not paid if the hardship standards are met).  
However, if the courts treat the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes as a 
personal obligation of the debtor, as they did in non-electing individual cases prior to the 
2005 Act,469 the new provisions would appear not to impact year-of-bankruptcy tax 
claims because they would already be excepted from the Chapter 11 discharge. 
Second, the 2005 Act excepts certain corporate fraud claims from the previously-
unlimited Chapter 11 discharge.  Corporate debtors cannot discharge tax claims with 
respect to which the corporation made a false return or willfully attempted to evade or 
defeat taxes.470 As long as the debtor did not commit tax fraud, the prepetition portion of 
year-of-bankruptcy taxes remains dischargeable in corporate Chapter 11 cases. 
 
C. Using a Chapter 11 Plan to Delay Payment of Non-
Dischargeable Taxes. 
 
464 See discussion supra beginning on page 29. 
465 See discussion supra beginning on page 59. 
466 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (repealed 2005) (“[C]onfirmation of the plan . . . discharges the debtor ”) 
467 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5).  This provision applies unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise.  
468 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5).  In addition, no hardship discharge can be granted in certain circumstances 
where the debtor committed fraud or may be found guilty of  security fraud or certain other felonies.  Id.;
see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(q). 
469 See discussion supra beginning at page 59. 
470 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(6)(B) . 
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Even if the government’s tax claim is excepted from discharge, the debtor may 
still be able to use the bankruptcy case to delay payment or limit the amount of the 
government’s claim.  What happens, for example, if the government’s claim is allowed in 
a certain amount under the plan, and the government later seeks to hold the debtor 
personally liable for additional amounts?  In Snyder v. United States,471a Michigan 
District Court held that the government was bound, under principles of res judicata, to the 
amount of the claim set forth in the plan, and thus could not recover the additional 
amounts from the debtor.  Similarly, in In re Martin,472 a California Bankruptcy Court 
held that the government could not seek to enforce a non-dischargeable tax claim outside 
of the provisions of the plan where the government had participated in plan negotiations 
and had agreed to the plan terms.473 Other courts have held that the government can seek 
more than is specified in the plan if the government’s claim is not dischargeable, even 
where the amount specified in the plan was based on proofs of claim filed by the 
government.474 The government was involved in actual negotiations with the debtor in 
those cases restricting the government’s ability to collect non-dischargeable taxes.   
The courts have also been unclear about the debtor’s ability to use a plan to 
provide additional time for paying nondischrgeable taxes.  One California bankruptcy 
court ruled that a debtor, under a provision in a confirmed plan of reorganization, could 
enjoin the government from collecting non-dischargeable taxes during the plan term.475 
A California district court disagreed with the first court’s reasoning, suggesting that the 
plan could not impair the rights of a creditor holding a non-dischargeable claim, or at a 
minimum the court would have to make specific findings that the collection activity 
would jeopardize the plan's success or frustrate the debtor's rehabilitation before the 
government’s rights could be impaired.476 More recently, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel focused on the need for the debtor “to prove that [the injunction] is 
necessary to allow the debtor to successfully reorganize and to perform the terms of the 
Chapter 11 plan.”477 While one commentator has read the cases to suggest that a plan 
could modify the government’s collection rights “regardless of whether the taxing agency 
actually consented,”478 the cases certainly suggest that requests by the debtor to modify 
the government ability to collect non-dischargeable taxes will not be easily granted.   
 
471213 B.R. 321, 323 (E.D. Mich. 1997) 
472 150 B.R. 43, 46 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1993). 
473 See also In re Matunas, 261 B.R. 129, 133 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2001) (the government could not seek to 
collect 1993 taxes which had not been preserved under the terms of a post-confirmation stipulation that was 
based on the terms of the debtor’s plan of reorganization). 
474 See, e.g., DePaolo v. United States, 45 F.3d 373, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1995) (the government filed proofs 
of claim for non-dischargeable taxes in the wrong amount, and the court allowed the government to recover 
additional amounts from the debtor because the claim was not discharged.); In re Sage, No. 01-3288, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2896, at *7,  89 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 783 (D.N.J. 2002) (same); In re McConahey, 192 B.R. 
187, 190-91 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1996) (same with respect to non-dischargeable employment tax claim filed in 
wrong amount).   
475 In re Mercado, 124 B.R. 799, 800 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991). 
476 In re Wood, 240 B.R. 609, 616-17 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
477 In re Brotby, 303 B.R. 177, 190 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003);  see also In re Bartleson, 253 B.R. 75, 80-84  
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000) (because plan failed to specifically provide that government would be enjoined from 
collecting non-dischargeable taxes outside of plan, no res judicata issue could apply).   
478 C. Richard McQueen & Jack F. Williams, TAX ASPECTS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 10.11, 
p. 10-22 (2nd Ed., 1999) 
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D. Claims for Interest and Penalties on Non-Dischargeable 
Taxes in Chapter 11.  
 
Dischargeability is also important with respect to post-petition interest and 
penalties not provided for under the plan.  The basic bankruptcy principle is that claims 
are determined as of the petition date,479 and unmatured interest is not allowed.480 The 
Bankruptcy Code allows only oversecured creditors to include in the amount of the claim 
post-petition interest.481 In a Chapter 7 case, all prepetition creditors are entitled to 
recover post-petition interest at the legal rate after all other claims are paid in full.482 In 
this way, all general unsecured creditors are treated equally, whether their contracts 
provided for interest or not.  Therefore, it has long been the general rule that the 
government cannot include in its claim against the estate post-petition pre-confirmation 
interest.483 
In Chapter 11, there is no provision for the payment of post-petition pre-
confirmation interest to unsecured creditors, although the best interests of creditors test 
might require the payment of interest if prepetition interest would have been paid in a 
Chapter 7 liquidation occurring on the effective date of the plan.484 Whether the estate 
must pay post-confirmation interest under a plan is considered above.485 However, the 
Bankruptcy Code only addresses the government’s ability to recover interest as part of its 
claim against the bankruptcy estate.  The Bankruptcy Code does not address whether the 
debtor remains personally liable for interest if the government’s claim is not 
dischargeable. 
Prior to the enactment of the current Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court held in 
Bruning v. United States486 that post-petition interest on a nondischargeable tax debt 
could be collected from the debtor and was itself excepted from discharge, because the 
interest was part of the tax under applicable non-bankruptcy law.487 Bruning has been 
followed after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code by courts in every circuit.488 
479 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2005) (“[T]he court . . . shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful 
currency of the United States as of the date of the filing of the petition.”). 
480 11 U.S.C. § 502(a)(2). 
481See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (interest is allowed to the extent the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of 
the secured creditor’s claim); see also United States v. Ron Pair Enters. Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 235  (1989) 
(allowing secured tax claimant to recover interest under 11 U.S.C. §  506(b)). 
482 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5). 
483 See New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328, 332  (1949). 
484 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii); Kitrosser v. CIT Group/Factoring, Inc.,  177 B.R. 458, 467-72  
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
485 See discussion supra beginning at note 389. 
486192 F. Supp. 826 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 317 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1963), aff'd, 376 U.S. 358 (1964). 
487 Id. at 829 (“The Bankruptcy Act expressly excepts taxes from discharge and the clear language of the 
revenue statute adds interest to the tax. The result is that interest added to the tax is excepted from 
discharge.”)(Footnote omitted). 
488 See, e.g,. In re Tuttle, 291 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002) (following Bruning, and stating “Although a 
few bankruptcy courts have held Bruning inapplicable to Bankruptcy Code cases, those decisions 
subsequently were reversed.”); In re Cousins, 209 F.3d 38, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2000) (Bruning survived 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code); Pardee v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp., 218 B.R. 916, 921 (9th Cir. 
1998); In re Johnson, 146 F.3d 252, 255  (5th Cir. 1998); Leeper v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 
49 F.3d  98, 101-02  (3d Cir. 1995) (recognizing in dicta that Bruning remains good law); In re Shumate, 
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Therefore, although the government will generally not be entitled to recover post-petition 
interest and penalties as part of its claim against the bankruptcy estate, if the 
government’s claim is excepted from discharge it may pursue the debtor after bankruptcy 
to recover post-petition interest and penalties. 
E. Chapters 12 and 13. 
 
Any debt excepted from discharge under section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code is 
also excepted from the Chapter 12 discharge.489 Because the prepetition portion of year-
of-bankruptcy tax claims should properly have been entitled to eighth priority,490 and 
because all eighth priority claims are excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(1),491 
a Chapter 12 debtor should not have been able to discharge the prepetition portion of 
year-of-bankruptcy tax claims.492 Because a Chapter 12 debtor is, like a corporate debtor, 
unable to make the split-year election, the corporate cases applying eighth priority to the 
pre-petition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes would likely apply under Chapter 12.493 
Prior to the 2005 Act, Chapter 13 differed from Chapter 12 in providing a “super-
discharge” under which some taxes excepted from discharge in Chapter 7 under section 
523 could be discharged under a Chapter 13 plan.494 Notably, taxes excepted from 
discharge under section 523(a)(1) were not excepted from the Chapter 13 discharge.495 
At first blush, it would appear that priority tax claims could be discharged in Chapter 13.  
However, a careful analysis shows that the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy 
taxes could not really be discharged in Chapter 13, assuming that the government’s tax 
claim was properly granted eighth priority under the post-petition assessability rule.  This 
is because all priority tax claims must be paid in full under a Chapter 13 plan,496 and a 
debtor could receive the super-discharge only if the debtor completed all payments under 
 
No. 90-2026, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 407 at *14  (4th Cir.  1992) (dicta); Klingman v. Levinson, 877 F.2d 
1357, 1362-63  (7th  Cir. 1989); In re Hanna, 872 F.2d 829, 830-31 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Burns, 887 F.2d 
1541, 1543 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. River Coal Co., 748 F.2d 1103, 1106-07  (6th Cir. 1984); In 
re Boccio, 281 B.R. 171, 175  (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
489 See 11 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(2)(2005). 
490 See discussion supra beginning at page 29. 
491 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A). 
492 Note however that the courts have ruled, incorrectly in this author’s opinion, that the government’s 
claim for year-of-bankruptcy taxes incurred by taxpayers who do not make the split-year election is not 
entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).  See discussion supra beginning at page 29.  These 
courts have reasoned that the taxes arise post-petition, do not constitute claims against the bankruptcy 
estate, and are not covered by the Chapter 7 discharge.   Presumably, under the theory adopted by these 
courts, since the government’s tax claim would not be “provided for by the plan,” nor allowed under 
section 503 or disallowed under section 502, the Chapter 12 discharge would not discharge these claims.  
See 11 U.S.C. § 1228(a).  
493 See discussion of In re Michaelson supra note 397. 
494 See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (Repealed 2005). 
495 Id. 
496 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2). 
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the plan.497 Therefore, the discharge would apply only after the priority tax claim is paid 
in full – rending the discharge mostly498 irrelevant.   
Chapter 13 also contained a separate hardship discharge provision applicable 
when all payments under the plan were not completed, but the hardship discharge did not 
discharge any debts excepted from discharge under section 523(a).499 Therefore, under a 
proper reading of the statutory rules,500 the debtor had no real ability to discharge 
prepetition taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy, assuming that the government timely 
acted to protect its interests.501 
The 2005 Act creates uncertainty concerning the proper treatment of the 
prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes under Chapter 13.  Because year-of-
bankruptcy taxes will no longer be eligible for eighth priority treatment (unless the debtor 
files bankruptcy on the last day of his or her tax year), the prepetition portion of year-of-
bankruptcy taxes should constitute general unsecured claims against the bankruptcy 
estate,502 and should be dischargeable in a Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 case – if the debtor 
can comply with the other requirements for confirming a plan.503 As a general unsecured 
creditor, the government has significantly less protection than it had as a priority creditor.   
However, Chapters 12 and 13 contain some protections for general unsecured 
creditors.  Similar to the requirement in Chapter 11,504 in order to confirm a Chapter 12 or 
 
497 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (“As soon as practical after completion by the debtor of all payments under the plan 
. . . the court shall grant the debtor a discharge.”). 
498 As discussed supra after note 415, it is possible that post-petition interest on the tax claim could be 
discharged because the requirement to pay priority claims in full does not specifically require full payment 
of the claim together with interest.  However, the best interests of creditors test in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4), 
or the cramdown requirements in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1), could require the payment of interest in certain 
circumstances. 
499 11 U.S.C. § 1328(c)(2). 
500 It is unclear whether the court’s holding that the government’s prepetition claim against a debtor who 
fails to make the split-year election for taxes owing in the year of bankruptcy does not constitute a claim 
against the estate (see supra note 191) would apply under Chapter 13, because Chapter 13 debtors, like 
corporate debtors, are not eligible to make the split-year election.   See I.R.C. § 1398(a).  The bankruptcy 
court in In re Michaelson, 200 B.R. 862, 865-66  (Bankr. Minn. 1996), felt bound by the Court’s of 
Appeal’s precedent in In re L.J. O’Neill Shoe Company, 64 F.3d 1146, 1151 (8th Cir. 1995) (discussed 
supra beginning at note 164), which applied to corporate debtors, in holding that the government’s claim 
for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes owing by an individual Chapter 13 debtor was 
entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).  The Michaelson court suggested, however, that it 
disagreed with O’Neill Shoe, and went on to throw up its hands as to how the year’s tax claim should be 
divided between the prepetition and post-petition period.  The Michaelson court correctly held that the 
debtor’s attempt to use the amount of estimated tax due for the period was incorrect.  Rather, the Court held 
that the year’s actual taxes would have to be allocated somehow, but how?  The Michaelson court did not 
decide:  “the Debtors must first identify their 1995 prepetition income. Then, it seems, the Debtors must 
show how pre and post-petition deductions, exemptions, credits, etc., affected that income to produce a 
calculated portion of their 1995 income tax liability. The question, more precisely, is: how can the Debtors 
relate their 1995 tax liability to their prepetition income without bifurcating the tax period? Perhaps, the 
answer is that they cannot.”   Michaelson, 200 B.R. at 868. The court did not consider allocating the year’s 
taxes pro-rata based on time.  See discussion supra beginning at note 179 . 
501 See discussion infra note 534. 
502 Assuming, of course, that no tax fraud was committed in connection with the taxes which would create 
an independent ground for non-dischargeability.  See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C). 
503 Both the Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 discharge apply broadly to “claims” addressed in the plan.  See 11 
U.S.C. §§ 1228, 1328. 
504 See supra note 387. 
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Chapter 13 plan, a debtor must meet a best interests of creditors test by showing that 
objecting creditors will receive at least as much in present discounted value under the 
plan as the creditor would receive in a liquidation occurring on the effective date.505 In 
addition, the debtor must show either (a) that the creditor will receive full payment of the 
claim with interest506 (at the applicable non-bankruptcy rate),507 or (b) that all of the 
debtor’s projected disposable income during the three (or with the court’s permission 
five)508 year plan period will be used to make payments to unsecured creditors.509 In a 
Chapter 12 case, the debtor can meet the requirement by distributing property of a value 
equal to the debtor’s projected disposable income for the three to five year period is 
distributed to creditors.510 Chapter 13 appears to require the debtor to use the projected 
disposable income to fund the plan.511 “Projected disposable income” is defined 
somewhat differently in Chapter 12 and Chapter 13, but the basic requirements are quite 
similar.512 Therefore, debtors who do not have enough projected disposable income to 
pay all general unsecured claims over the plan period should be able to pay only part of 
their year-of-bankruptcy taxes, and discharge the balance, in a Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 
plan.513 
One difficult problem that has arisen in Chapter 13 cases concerns the timing of 
the plan.  A Chapter 12 plan must be filed within 90 days after the order for relief.514 A
Chapter 13 plan must be filed within 15 days after the Chapter 13 petition is filed (or 
within 15 days after the case is converted to Chapter 13).515 If a debtor files bankruptcy 
early in the tax year, the amount of tax for the year, and hence the allocable portion for 
the prepetition and post-petition period, may not be established at the time the plan is 
filed because the year has not ended and the return is not yet due.  Most of the litigation 
over timing has focused on a special rule contained in Chapter 13, which allows the 
government to file a claim for taxes which “become payable” while the case is 
pending.516 The claim for taxes which “become payable” post-petition while the case is 
 
505 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(4), 1325(a)(4).  This best interests of creditors test requires the payment stream 
under the plan to be discounted to present value and compared with the distribution that would be made in a 
Chapter 7 liquidation occurring on the effective date. 
506 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A), 1325(b)(1)(A). 
507 11 U.S.C. § 511(A).  
508 11 U.S.C. § 1222(c). 
509 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B), 1325(b)(1)(B). 
510 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(C). 
511 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B). 
512 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2). 
513 However, if the courts follow the theory adopted by the Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court in its 
unpublished opinion in In re Wilkoff, No. 98-34354, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 124, 87 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2266, 
2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)  ¶ 50289 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001), and the government does not file a proof of 
claim, the debtor would remain personally liable for the taxes because they are treated as unimpaired by the 
bankruptcy proceeding.  See discussion, supra, beginning at note 402.   
51411 U.S.C. § 1221.  Note that the period can be extended by the court for cause due to circumstances 
beyond the debtor’s control.  Id. 
515 See bankr. rule 3015(b).  Note that the period can be extended for cause. 
516 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1). 
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pending is treated as if it had arisen prepetition for purposes of allowance.517 The 
meaning of the words “becomes payable” has vexed the courts.518 
Moreover, because the language of the section applies at the option of the taxing 
authority, debtors attempting to file claims on behalf of the taxing authority in order to 
provide for payment over the plan term rather than upon demand or levy have not been 
successful.519 The section only allows the government the option of filing a claim for 
post-petition taxes which become payable during the pendency of the case to obtain 
treatment under the plan.  It does not require prepetition claims which become payable 
post-petition to be treated as post-petition claims, as some courts have held.520 The debtor 
should be permitted to file a proof of claim on behalf of the government for the pre-
petition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes if the government fails to do so under 
general bankruptcy principles.521 The special rule allowing the government to file a 
claim for a tax that become payable post-petition does not in any way impair the normal 
rules applicable to prepetition claims.   
All of this begs the question of how the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy 
taxes can be treated under the plan when the amount will not be known until after the end 
of the year, when the return is filed.  This same issue occurs with respect to any claim 
that is contingent or unliquidated at the time the plan is proposed.  The general rule in 
bankruptcy is that contingent and unliquidated claims must be estimated by the court 
when the fixing of the claim would unduly delay the administration of the case.522 The 
debtor should seek to have the amount of the claim determined for purposes of allowance 
and treatment in bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy court should then estimate the claim by 
apportioning the debtor’s projected tax liability.  Admittedly, this is not an ideal solution.  
It would be far better to have the debtor file a split-year return so that the actual partial-
year tax liability can be easily determined and properly treated. Congress, however, has 
chosen to preclude Chapter 13 debtors from making the split year election, so there is no 
other method for making the allocation. 
What happens if the court’s estimate of the claim turns out to be wrong?  
Presumably, if the court’s estimate is too high, the debtor would be eligible for a refund 
 
517 11 U.S.C. § 1305(b) (claim “shall be allowed or disallowed under section 502 . . . but shall be 
determined as of the date such claim arises, and shall be allowed under section 502(a) . . . the same as if 
such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition”). 
518 See, e.g., In re Wilkoff, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 124, *13-14 (becomes payable either at the end of the year 
or when the return is due);  In re Dixon, 218 B.R. 150, 152  (B.A.P. 10th Cir. BAP 1998) (taxes become 
payable when tax year ends);  In re Hudson, 158 B.R. 670, 673-74 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993) (same); In re 
Matravers, 149 B.R. 204, 206 (Bankr. D. Utah 1993) (same); In re Ripley, 926 F.2d 440, 443-44 (5th Cir. 
1991) (taxes become payable when return due). 
519 See In re Wilkoff, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 124  (rejecting debtor’s attempt to file claim for Internal Revenue 
Service on the basis of estimated taxes); In re Bryant, No. 94-13471, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 1889, *11 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Apr. 24, 1998) (“Whether to file a claim under § 1305(a) is a voluntary decision on behalf 
of the governmental unit, and it is well established that the debtor, trustee, or any other party in interest 
other than the governmental unit cannot file a proof of claim on behalf of the taxing authority”); In re 
Michaelson, 200 B.R. at 865, n.3  (same); In re Ripley, 926 F.2d at 443 n.12 (5th Cir. 1991). 
520See, e.g., In re Hudson, 158 B.R. 670, 673-74 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993). 
521 See 11 U.S.C. § 501(c) (if a creditor does not timely file a proof of such creditor’s claim, the debtor or 
the trustee may file a proof of such claim).   
522 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1). 
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under applicable non-bankruptcy law.523 If the court underestimates the tax liability, the 
government can recover the additional amounts only if the government’s claim is not 
discharged by the plan.  Because (prior to the 2005 Act) the prepetition portion of year-
of-bankruptcy taxes should have been entitled to eighth priority under the post-petition 
assessability rule,524and because all eighth priority claims are excepted from 
discharge,525the claim would not have been discharged by confirmation of the Chapter 12 
plan, 526 and the government should have been able to recover from the debtor any 
additional amounts owing.    In a Chapter 13 case, however, the government would be 
bound by the court’s estimation of the claim, because even tax claims excepted from 
discharge under Chapter 7 under section 523(a)(1) could be discharged in Chapter 13.527 
The 2005 Act has compounded the problem by eliminating eighth priority for 
year-of-bankruptcy taxes, thus transforming what should have been an eighth priority 
non-dischargeable claim into a non-priority dischargeable general unsecured claim.528 
After the 2005 Act, the court’s estimate of the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy 
taxes should now be binding on the government, and any balance not paid under the plan 
should be discharged upon the completion of plan payments529 – unless the claim is 
otherwise excepted from the Chapter 13 discharge, which it will rarely be.530 
Dischargeability is important in situations other than the court’s underestimation 
of the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes.  Unless a claim is excepted from 
the Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 discharge, the plan’s proposed treatment of a claim is 
binding on the creditor.531 Thus, without an exception to discharge, if the plan proposes 
to pay less than the full amount of the claim, the creditor will be bound by the plan’s 
proposed treatment unless the creditor successfully objects to confirmation.532 Similarly, 
if the plan mentions a claim but does not provide for payment, the debtor does not have to 
pay the claim.533 Most importantly, if a Chapter 13 plan proposes to pay allowed claims, 
but the government fails to timely file a proof of claim, the claim need not be paid and is 
 
523 See I.R.C. § 6511(a) (statute of limitations on claims for refund is later of three years after date taxes 
were due or two years after date the taxes were paid.). 
524 See discussion supra beginning at page 39. 
525 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A). 
526 See 11 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(2). 
527 See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). 
528 See discussion supra beginning at page 41.   
529 See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).   
530 The 2005 Act has substantially restricted the super-discharge in Chapter 13, by excepting from the 
Chapter 13 discharge many claims excepted from discharge under section 523(a).  These include tax claims 
for which a return was not filed or was filed late and within two years of bankruptcy, and tax fraud claims.  
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1)(B), (C); 1328(a)(2).  Interestingly, claims excepted from discharge under 
section 523(a)(1)(A) because they are entitled to eighth priority remain dischargeable under Chapter 13.  
See 11 U.S.C. § 13218(a)(2).   
531 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1228(a); 1328(a) (discharge applies to all claims “provided for by the plan or 
disallowed under section 502”).   
532 See In re Tomlan, 102 B.R. 790, 793-94 (E.D. Wash. 1989), aff’d,  907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(allowing discharge of priority tax claim in Chapter 13 case because plan referred to debt, and government 
failed to file a timely claim). 
533See, e.g.,In  re Hairopoulos, 118 F.3d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Gregory, 705 F.2d 1118, 1122 
(9th Cir. 1983) (“[P]rovided for in section 1328(a) simply requires that for a claim to become dischargeable 
the plan must 'make a provision for' it, i.e., deal with it or refer to it."); .see also supra, note 531. 
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discharged when the debtor pays allowed claims in accordance with the plan.534 The 
government has up to 180 days after the order for relief to file a claim for taxes.535 
Because priority tax claims are discharged under Chapter 13,536 the government’s failure 
to file a timely claim results in a permanent loss of tax revenue if the debtor completes 
plan payments and obtains a regular discharge.   
This special loophole for unfiled claims should not have applied in Chapter 12 
cases prior to the 2005 Act, because the government’s claim for the pre-petition portion 
of year-of-bankruptcy taxes should have been entitled to eighth priority under the post-
petition assessability rule, and therefore excepted from discharge under section 
523(a)(1)(A).  Since all claims excepted from discharge under section 523(a) are also 
excepted from the Chapter 12 discharge,537 the government should have been able to 
collect the taxes from the debtor even if it failed to file a proof of claim.  After the 2005 
Act, however, the government’s claim for pre-petition year-of-bankruptcy taxes will no 
longer be entitled to eighth priority and will thus no longer be excepted from discharge 
under section 523 (unless the debtor files bankruptcy on the last day of the tax year).  The 
government’s failure to file a claim in cases subject to the 2005 Act should result in 
dischargeability.  Courts may well result to the flawed reasoning of the Bankruptcy Court 
in Wilkoff to avoid this result.538 
The 2005 Act contains a new rule giving the government additional time to file a 
proof of claim for tax returns that the debtor is required to file post-petition.  The new 
rule treats the government’s claim as timely if filed within 60 days after the debtor files a 
return under new section 1308.539 Section 1308 requires the debtor to file tax returns “for 
all taxable periods ending during the 4-year period ending on the date of the filing of the 
petition” by the time of the first meeting of creditors.540 Presumably, the prepetition 
portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes is a “period” that ended on the petition date, even 
 
534See, e.g., 
In re Elstien, 238 B.R. 747, 756 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (“If the plan provides for a debt, but the creditor 
fails to file a claim, the underlying debt will not be paid but will be discharged.”); In re Osborne, 159 B.R. 
570, 580 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993), aff’d, 167 B.R. 698 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994), aff’d, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir. 
1996); In re Richards, 50 B.R. 339, 341 (E.D. Tenn. 1985); In re Rothman, 76 B.R. 38, 41 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 1987) (tax claim discharged even where taxing authority did not know how much claim was at 
bar date – should have filed a motion for extension of time to file a claim); In re Hunt, 59 B.R. 718, 720 
(Bankr. D. Me. 1986); In re Goodwin, 58 B.R. 75, 77 (Bankr. D. Me. 1986).  Note that Congress amended 
section 502(b)(9) in 1994 to make it clear that late-filed claims are subject to discharge, overruling earlier 
cases like In re Hausladen, 146 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992).  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994). 
535 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) (claim filed by government within 180 days after order for relief, or such longer 
period as may be provided by the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, is “timely”);  see also In re Gardenhire, 
209 F.3d 1145, 1148  (9th Cir. 2000) (equitable tolling of the 180 day period is not available).   
536See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (not excepting from regular Chapter 13 discharge claims excepted from 
discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)). 
53711 U.S.C. §§ 1228(c)(2), 1328(c)(2); In re Anderson, 228 B.R. 844, 846-47  (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1998) 
(priority tax claims not discharged by Chapter 13 hardship discharge, even where government failed to file 
a proof of claim). 
538 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 124, discussed supra beginning at note 400.   
539 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9). 
540 See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (first meeting of creditors).  Note that the meeting of creditors can be held open by 
the trustee, or tolled by the court, in certain circumstances.  11 U.S.C. § 1308(b). 
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though the tax year had not ended on the petition date.  However, the statute only applies 
“if the debtor was required to file a tax return under applicable non-bankruptcy law.”541 
Since it would be rare that the debtor would have been required to file a return for year-
of-bankruptcy taxes by the time of the first meeting of creditors (even if it is extended), 
the statute appears to be inapplicable to year of bankruptcy taxes.  Therefore, the general 
rule requiring the government to file a claim within 180 days after the order for relief542 
appears to be the applicable rule for the prepetition portion of year of bankruptcy taxes.   
This 180 day deadline puts the government in a difficult spot.  If the government 
fails to file a claim, the Chapter 13 plan should effectively discharge the liability for 
prepetition year-of-bankruptcy taxes.  Yet, the government may not know how much the 
claim is at the time of the filing deadline because the debtor may not have yet filed a 
return.  In addition, the government may wish to continue to argue, as it has previously 
argued, that year-of-bankruptcy taxes constitute post-petition debts that are not 
discharged.  The government may be able to avoid the Catch-22 by filing a protective 
claim.  The protective claim could say something like this:  
 
The government files this proof of claim to protect its rights in the 
event the court determines that the government has a prepetition 
claim for taxes owing on the debtor’s prepetition income earned 
during the calendar (or fiscal) year in which the debtor filed 
bankruptcy.  It is the government’s contention that it has a post-
petition claim against the debtor for all taxes incurred in the year of 
bankruptcy, and that this claim will not be discharged by any 
provision of the Bankruptcy Code.  However, if the court 
determines that the government has a prepetition claim for some 
portion of the taxes incurred by the debtor in the year of 
bankruptcy, the government hereby asserts a claim in an 
unliquidated amount for such taxes.  The claim is unliquidated 
because the debtor has not filed a tax return for the year in which 
the debtor filed the petition initiating this case. 
 
A timely-filed protective claim should protect the government’s rights.  However, those 
rights have been severely curtailed by the 2005 Act, since the government’s claim for the 
prepetition portion of year of bankruptcy taxes can no longer be entitled to eighth 
priority.  Therefore, the debtor should be able to treat the tax claim in the same manner as 
any other dischargeable general unsecured claim.   
 
V. CONCLUSION.
It is fair to assume that most debtors who file bankruptcy will owe income taxes 
for the year of bankruptcy.  With more than one million bankruptcy cases filed each 
year,543 the laws providing for the treatment of year-of-bankruptcy tax claims affect many 
people.  Laws that affect so many people should be clear and easy to apply.  
 
541 11 U.S.C. § 1308(a). 
542 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9). 
543 See supra note 364. 
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Unfortunately, this article illustrates just how complicated and confusing it is to 
determine how the government’s claims for income taxes incurred by the year of 
bankruptcy will be treated.   
The treatment of taxes owing by the debtor in the year of bankruptcy is 
straightforward only if an individual debtor in a case under either Chapter 7 or 11 makes 
the election to split the year of bankruptcy into two tax years, because the separate returns 
establish the amount of taxes for the prepetition and post-petition periods.544 Equally 
importantly, when an eligible debtor timely makes the split-year election, the priority 
rules will properly treat the government’s claim for taxes shown on the prepetition return 
as an eighth priority claim, and properly treat the taxes shown on the post-petition return 
either as an administrative priority claim (if the income is usable by the bankruptcy 
estate), or as a personal obligation of the debtor (if the income belongs to the debtor free 
of creditors’ claims under the debtor’s fresh start).545 All is right in the world if the 
election is made. 
 However, not every debtor makes or is eligible to make the split-year election.  
The treatment of tax claims in the year of bankruptcy becomes highly confusing and 
uncertain whenever an individual debtor in a Chapter 7 or 11 case does not make the 
split-year election, and whenever a debtor is unable to make the election – either because 
the debtor is not an individual, or because the individual debtor has filed a petition under 
Chapters 12 or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.546 
Prior to the 2005 Act, the courts struggled to develop a coherent theory for the 
treatment of the government’s claim for taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy, but 
failed miserably.  For individual Chapter 7 debtors who do not make the split-year 
election, the courts concluded that the government’s claim for the entire year’s taxes 
constitutes a personal obligation of the debtor and not an obligation of the debtor’s 
bankrutpcy estate.547 The courts also recite this rule in Chapter 11 cases, but then to 
avoid the Chapter 11 discharge provisions somehow transmute the non-estate obligation 
into a claim that must be paid by the estate under a plan of reorganization.548 In reaching 
these results, the courts simply ignore the broad definition of a “claim” contained in the 
Bankruptcy Code, and the long line of cases outside of the tax area interpreting when a 
bankruptcy “claim” arises.549 A proper analysis would require the courts to recognize 
that the government’s claim for taxes on prepetition income arises when that income is 
earned, even though the claim is unliquidated because the precise amount of taxes cannot 
be determined, and even though the claim is unmatured and contingent because future 
events occuring on or before the end of the year may offset the tax liability.550 Under the 
non-tax cases, the courts would be required to allocate the year’s taxes between the 
prepetition and post-petition periods on the basis of time.551 To reach their conclusion 
that the government’s claim is cognizable only outside of bankruptcy, the courts simply 
 
544 See discussion supra beginning at page 19. 
545 Id.
546 See discussion supra beginning at pages 23 and 29. 
547 See discussion supra beginning at page 29. 
548 See discussion supra beginning at page 59. 
549 See discussion supra beginning after note 217 
550 Id.
551 See discussion supra beginning after note 186. 
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ignored the rules that have been consistently applied in bankruptcy outside of the tax 
sphere.552 
For corporate debtors, the courts have held that the taxes must be divided between 
the prepetition and post-petition periods, with the prepetition taxes entitled to eighth 
priority.553 The courts have been unable explain precisely how the annual tax liability is 
to be divided between the prepetition and post-petition periods, and have differed on the 
theory for granting eighth priority rather than first priority to the taxes.554 Some courts 
have held that even though all of the year’s taxes are deemed to arise post-petition, the 
post-petition assessability rule applies to subordinate the government’s claim to eighth 
priority555 (even though the courts have unanimously held in other contexts that the post-
petition assessability rule does not apply to post-petition taxes556).  Other courts have 
suggested that the prepetition portion of the year’s taxes arises prepetition, not post-
petition, and therefore falls within the eighth priority post-petition assessability rule.557 
No court has adequately explained how under the statutory language such different 
results can arise in corporate and individual cases. 
 The 2005 Act has eliminated eighth priority for taxes incurred in the year of 
bankruptcy unless the debtor makes a split-year election or files bankruptcy on the last 
day of the debtor’s tax year.558 It is unclear whether the 2005 Act will have any effect on 
non-electing individual debtors.  If the courts continue to follow the “non-claim” theory 
of the individual Chapter 7 cases,559 the changes made by the 2005 Act will likely have 
no effect because the government’s claim was not previously entitled to priority.  If the 
courts re-examine the “non-claim” theory, as they should,560 the 2005 Act could result 
either in the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes being treated as first priority 
administrative expenses, or as dischargeable general unsecured claims.561 
The changes made by the 2005 Act will wreck havoc under either of the theories 
used in corporate cases.  By moving language in the statute, Congress has made it clear 
that eighth priority can only be granted to claims for tax years ending on or before the 
petition date.562 The tax year in which bankruptcy is filed will end on or before the 
 
552 Id.
553 See discussion supra beginning at page 23. 
554 Id.
555 See discussion supra beginning at note 154. 
556 See discussion supra at note 136. 
557 See discussion supra beginning at note 164. 
558 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A) (2005), discussed supra beginning at page 41. 
559 See discussion supra beginning at page 29. 
560 See discussion supra beginning after note 217 
561 The government’s tax claim for the pre-petition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes can be treated as a 
first priority administrative expense only if the claim is “incurred by the [bankruptcy] estate.”  See 11 
U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i) (2005).  Because the taxes were incurred on prepetition income, if the courts re-
examine the law and determine the government’s claim to exist prepetition, the claim should not be entitled 
to first priority as an administrative expense because the estate did not even exist when the taxes were 
incurred.  See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (bankruptcy estate created upon commencement of bankruptcy case).  
Because the 2005 Act has eliminated eighth priority for taxes incurred in tax years ending post-petition (see 
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)), there would be no other basis for granting priority to the government’s claim for 
taxes incurred on prepetition income priority.  Therefore, the government’s claim should be a general 
unsecured non-priority claim, which would be subject to discharge.  See discussion supra beginning at page 
46. 
562 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A) (2005), discussed supra beginning at 41. 
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petition date only if the debtor happens to file bankruptcy on the last day of the tax year 
(or for individual debtors when the split-year election is made, in which case the 
prepetition partial tax year will end on the petition date).  The change made by the 2005 
Act make it impossible for the courts to apply the post-petition assessability rule to 
corporate year-of-bankruptcy taxes whenever the debtor files bankruptcy in the middle of 
a tax year.563 With the 2005 Act’s elimination of eighth priority, it would appear that 
those courts treating the prepetition portion of the year’s taxes as arising prepetition 
(which is the proper analysis under the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of a “claim”) 564 
will be required to treat the government’s claim for pre-petition year-of-bankruptcy taxes 
as a dischargeable general unsecured claim, while those courts treating the government’s 
claim as arising post-petition565 will have to struggle to determine whether the 
government’s claim for taxes on income earned before the estate was in existence will be 
treated as first priority administrative expenses “incurred by the estate,”566 or as a non-
priority post-petition claim (which would have no special protections in Chapter 11, and 
would presumably be subject to discharge). 
The situation for Chapter 13 debtors and the government is even more confusing.  
If the courts follow the theory of the corporate cases, as the court in In re Michaelson 
did,567 then after the 2005 Act the government will likely have a dischargeable general 
unsecured claim for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy cases.  Under the 
theory in Michaelson,568 if the government fails to file a proof of claim, it will likely 
receive no distribution.  On the other hand, if the courts follow the theory of the non-
electing individual debtor cases, as the court in In re Wilkoff did,569 then after the 2005 
Act the government will not have a claim against the estate at all, unless the government 
elects to file a proof of claim under section 1305(a).  If the government elects to file a 
proof of claim under section 1305(a), and the theory of Wilkoff is adopted, then the 
government’s claim will be non-priority and dischargeable.570 Thus, under Michaelson 
theory the government must file a claim to protect its rights, while under the Wilkoff 
theory the government will forefeit substantial rights by filing a claim.  Until the situation 
is resolved, maybe the government’s only course of action is to rely on alternative 
pleading.  The government could file a protective statement saying that it does not elect 
to file a proof of claim under section 1305(a) if the court follows the theory of Wilkoff,
but herewith files a proof of claim if court follows the theory of Michaelson.571 
Regardless of how the courts interpret the 2005 Act, this article points out the 
need for Congress to re-examine the statutory rules.  The existing statutory rules are 
overly complex and vague, forcing debtors to decide whether to make the split-year 
election without being able to understand the consequences of doing so.  The uncertainty 
 
563 This is because only individuals can make the split-year election.  See I.R.C. § 1398(a).  Therefore, 
unless a corporate taxpayer files bankruptcy on the last day of its tax year, the taxpayer’s tax year will end 
post-petition. 
564 See discussion supra beginning at note 164. 
565 See discussion supra beginning at note 154. 
566 See discussion supra note 561. 
567 See discussion supra beginning at note 399. 
568 Id.
569 See discussion supra beginning at note 402. 
570 Id. 
571 See discussion supra following note 542. 
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has created in the past, and will create after the changes made by the 2005 Act, 
unnecessary litigation over the meaning of the law.  Equally important, the ambiguities in 
the statute have caused the courts to interpret the existing tax rules in ways inconsistent 
with the rules applicable to all other bankruptcy claims.   
In enacting a new statute, Congress should focus on when the government’s 
claims should be given priority over other creditors, and when those claims should be 
non-dischargeable.  If Congress feels that the government’s claims for recently-incurred 
taxes should be given priority over other general unsecured claims, it should make the 
law clear and easy to apply by specifying an easily-determinable time period for priority.  
Similarly, if Congress feels that the government’s claims for recently-incurred taxes 
should also be made non-dischargeable, along with claims due to the debtor’s fraudulent 
conduct, it should enact provisions to accomplish these objectives.  The law would be 
greatly clarified and simplified if the priority and non-dischargeability rules were written 
to stand by themselves without referencing each other and without referencing the 
complex non-bankruptcy rules of limitations on assessment.  The cross-references serve 
only to complicate the law and create anomalous results.  In addition, Congress should 
require all debtors to file separate returns for the pre-bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy 
periods.  It would then be a simple matter to treat the pre-bankruptcy tax liability as a 
priority or general unsecured claim in the same matter as all other pre-bankruptcy 
liabilities, and to treat the post-bankruptcy tax liability as an administrative claim if the 
income was available to the estate, and as a non-bankruptcy personal obligation of the 
debtor if the income belonged to the debtor as part of the debtor’s fresh start.  Until the 
statutory rules are fixed, the parties and the courts will have to do the best they can with a 
badly flawed statutory framework.   
 
